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Abstract
ADefence of Predicativism as a Philosophy of Mathematics
T. J. Storer
A specication of a mathematical object is impredicative if it essentially involves
quantication over a domain which includes the object being specied (or sets which
contain that object, or similar). ¿e basic worry is that we have no non-circular way
of understanding such a specication. Predicativism is the view that mathematics
should be limited to the study of objects which can be specied predicatively.
¿ere are two parts to predicativism. One is the criticism of the impredicative
aspects of classical mathematics. ¿e other is the positive project, begun by Weyl in
Das Kontinuum, to reconstruct as much as possible of classical mathematics on the
basis of a predicatively acceptable set theory, which accepts only countably innite
objects. ¿is is a revisionary project, and certain parts of mathematics will not be
saved.
Chapter 2 contains an account of the historical background to the predicativist
project. ¿e rigorization of analysis led to Dedekind’s and Cantor’s theories of the
real numbers, which relied on the new notion of abitrary innite sets; this became
a central part of modern classical set theory. Criticism began with Kronecker;
continued in the debate about the acceptability of Zermelo’s Axiom of Choice; and
was somewhat claried by Poincaré and Russell. In the light of this, chapter 3
examines the formulation of, and motivations behind the predicativist position.
Chapter 4 begins the critical task by detailing the epistemological problems with
the classical account of the continuum. Explanations of classicism which appeal to
second-order logic, set theory, and primitive intuition are examined and are found
wanting.
Chapter 5 aims to dispell the worry that predicativismmight collapses into math-
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6ematical intuitionism. I assess some of the arguments for intuitionism, especially
the Dummettian argument from indenite extensibility. I argue that the natural
numbers are not indenitely extensible, and that, although the continuum is, we can
nonetheless make some sense of classical quantication over it. We need not reject
the Law of Excluded Middle.
Chapter 6 begins the positive work by outlining a predicatively acceptable ac-
count of mathematical objects which justies the Vicious Circle Principle. Chapter
7 explores the appropriate shape of formalized predicative mathematics, and the
question of just how much mathematics is predicatively acceptable.
My conclusion is that all of the mathematics which we need can be predicativist-
ically justied, and that such mathematics is particularly transparent to reason. ¿is
calls into question one currently prevalent view of the nature of mathematics, on
which mathematics is justied by quasi-empirical means.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
¿is thesis presents a case for predicativism as a philosophy of mathematics. By
predicativism, I will mean what is sometimes called predicativism given the natural
numbers. ¿e position can be briey characterized as the acceptance of the natural
numbers as a foundation for mathematics, and the rejection of impredicative meth-
ods in building up from that foundation. ¿e view was rst clearly put forward by
HermannWeyl in his short book of 1918, Das Kontinuum.
As its title suggests, the main object of Weyl’s book was to develop a satisfactory
account of the arithmetical continuum, i.e., the real-number system. ¿ere were
two familiar accounts of the real numbers available to Weyl, which are essentially
equivalent: the reals can be explained in terms either of Cauchy sequences (certain
sequences of rational numbers) or in terms of Dedekind cuts (certain sets of rational
numbers). Given that sequences can be implemented as sets, the question of what
real numbers there are boils down either way to a question about what innite sets
there are. So what theory of innite sets should we adopt? ¿e dominant account
when Weyl was writing — and to this day — was a full-blooded Cantorian set
theory. Weyl found such such an account unsatisfactory because of its use of a
particular concept of set which was, he maintained, ill-dened. In its place, Weyl
proposed a foundation based on the natural numbers, and a non-Cantorian ‘logical’
(i.e. predicative) concept of sets of natural numbers.
More specically, Weyl’s objection to Cantorian set theory, and to the classical
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analysis which takes it as a foundation, was that they are viciously circular. ¿e
alleged circularity consists in the commitment to the existence of sets, including
particularly sets of natural numbers, (or to the existence of real numbers) which
are specied by means of a quantication over all sets (or over all real numbers): in
short, impredicativity.
Impredicativity in this sense, then, is a matter of oending against the so-called
Vicious Circle Principle (VCP), which states that no set can contain objects which
are denable only in terms of that set. We say, then, that an instance of the general
principle of set-abstraction or comprehension,
(CP->) §x∀y(y > x ϕ(y))
is impredicative if ϕ contains a bound variable ranging over a domain of sets which
includes the very set introduced by that instance of comprehension; and it is pre-
dicative otherwise. In full generality, CP-> is of course inconsistent; so if it is to be
accepted at all, it must be restricted in some way. Standard ZF-style set theory, in
which classical mathematics can be regimented, avoids paradox by requiring ϕ to
be of the form y > z& ψ(y); this yields the axiom scheme of Separation. Separa-
tion is still impredicative in that it places no restrictions on the quantiers which
may appear in ψ. To put the matter another way, although Separation only allows
us to form subsets of sets which we already know to exist, it allows us to pick out
the members of such a subset by a condition which may quantify over the entire
set-theoretic universe.
But does oending against VCP really entangle us in vicious circles? Well, a set
specication is supposed to pin down a set x by settling, for each y, whether or not y
belongs to x; it does this by means of the condition ϕ(y). In the impredicative case,
ϕ(y) features a quantied claim, one instance of which will concern the set x that
we are trying to specify. ¿e instance may, for example, return us to the question of
whether or not y belongs to x. ¿is is the reason for thinking that impredicative set
specications may be viciously circular. But we will need to return to the question
whether this is right.
A positive motivation for a predicativity constraint on class comprehension is
that, as Quine puts it,
it realizes a constructional metaphor: it limits classes to what could be
generated over an innite period from unspecied beginnings by using,
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for each class, a membership condition mentioning only preexistent
classes.1
As such, the sets of predicative set theory can be explicitly dened. ¿is makes
predicative set theory much less questionable than impredicative set theory; indeed,
we will later see that the consistency (and indeed correctness) of predicative set
theory is immediate.
¿e possibility of a predicative set theory then suggests a programme and a philo-
sophy. Predicativism as a mathematical programme is the development of (as much
as is possible of) classical mathematics in a predicative manner. ¿is might be done,
for example, within a predicative set theory or a predicative theory of second-order
arithmetic. One striking dierence between classical and predicative mathematics is
that predicative mathematics does not countenance the Cantorian ‘higher innite’:
the only innite objects that are recognized by predicativemathematics are countably
innite.
Predicativism as a philosophy of mathematics is the position that this is in
some sense the right way to do mathematics, and that there is something wrong
with classical mathematics. As with other revisionary philosophies of mathematics,
most notably intuitionism and nitism, it argues that there is a privileged core of
acceptable mathematics. Such a revisionist project gives urgency to themathematical
programme, and in particular the technical question of its scope: Exactly how much
of the body of existing classical mathematics falls within the acceptable core?
We can distinguish two central philosophical claims in such revisionary positions:
a positive claim, that good sense can be made of the privileged core; and a negative
claim, that there is some problem with (justifying or making sense of) what goes
beyond it.
Such revisionary programmes also come in two avours: evangelical, and toler-
ant. Tolerant predicativism is the mild claim that there is some real added value in
proofs that only use predicatively acceptable means, and some value in being explicit
about when we are, and when we are not involved in impredicativity. Compare
the attitude of most working mathematicians towards the Axiom of Choice: they
suppose that you can assume it if you need it, but it’s poor etiquette to assume it
without mentioning the fact; and a certain value is accorded to proofs which avoid
the assumption. Similarly, everyone prefers to have a direct, rather than a reductio
1 Quine, Set ¿eory and its Logic p. 243.
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proof of a disjunctive or an existential claim, because it tells us, at least in principle,
more about the subject: namely which disjunct holds, or which item witnesses the
existential. (Of course, proofs which are more constructive in these ways may well
be longer and more complex, and so there may well also be a place for an elegant
non-constructive proof, especially for textbook purposes.) ¿e tolerant predicativist
similarly argues that we should privilege predicative proofs when they can be had.
Evangelical predicativism pushes the stronger claim that only predicative math-
ematics is genuinely mathematics. Certainly, that part of mathematics which is
predicative enjoys a signicantly less problematic epistemology than the rest. But
the evangelical claim is twofold: rst, that impredicative maths is not really mathem-
atics — that it is either an empty formal game, or an entirely mysterious ‘physics of
abstract objects’;2 and second, that predicative mathematics preserves the traditional
epistemology of mathematics as (more or less) transparent to pure reason.
In this thesis, I argue for a weak form of evangelical predicativism. I also ex-
plore the scope of predicative mathematics, and suggest that adopting evangelical
predicativism does not mean sacricing as much mathematics as is o en thought.
In fact, the predicatively acceptable core of mathematics seems to include all of the
mathematics which is used in the natural sciences.
1.2 Plan of the rest of the thesis
Chapter 2 sketches the historical origins of impredicative mathematics; it also high-
lights some of the objections and resistance to those developments, which form the
pre-history of predicativism. ¿e historical approach serves to introduce and explain
some of the connections between many of the themes which will be explored in the
rest of the thesis.
Chapter 3 explains more carefully what predicativism, and the predicativist pro-
gramme, actually are. It nishes the introductory part of the thesis by presenting
both the basic worry which underlies the predicativist objection to classical mathem-
atics, and the predicativist response to that worry. ¿e worry is that quantication
over open-ended totalities, such as that of the sets of natural numbers, is unclear,
and so unsuitable to serve in denitions. ¿e proposal is that such denitions can
2 I owe the phrase to Coa, Semantic tradition, though the same thought is expressed by Wittgenstein:
‘Arithmetic as the natural history (mineralogy) of numbers.’ (Wittgenstein, RFM p. 229, §IV.11.)
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be avoided, and that we can instead develop mathematics using sets dened by
unproblematic (in particular arithmetical) means.
Chapter 4 deals with the negative side of the predicativist project, making a case
that the epistemology of classical mathematics is signicantly more problematic
than that for predicative mathematics. ¿e focus is on the key distinction between
classical and predicative mathematics, their treatment of the continuum. I discuss
three broad styles of justication of the classical view of the continuum. ¿e rst
route is based on the claim that our understanding is mediated bymeans of logic, and
our understanding of the second-order consequence relation. ¿e second endorses
the set theoretic project as our route to understanding the continuum. ¿e third
simply takes the classical continuum as given to us in intuition. I suggest that none
of these approaches is adequate to the task.
Chapter 5 aims to dispel the worry that predicativism might collapses into math-
ematical intuitionism. I assess some of the arguments for intuitionism, especially
Dummett’s argument from indenite extensibility. Broadly speaking, I endorse
Dummett’s argument, though I disagree with him as to its upshot. I argue that the
natural numbers are not indenitely extensible, and that, although the continuum is,
we can nonetheless make some sense of classical quantication over it. We need not
reject the Law of Excluded Middle.
Chapter 6 is concerned with explaining the predicative conception of set, as it is
developed in both Das Kontinuum and in Principia Mathematica. I criticize both
Russell’s arguments for the axiom of Reducibility (which undoes the mathematical
eect of his predicativity requirement), and Gödel’s arguments against the Vicious
Circle Principle.
Chapter 7 explores appropriate formal theories for developing predicative math-
ematics, and examines how and where predicative mathematics ts into the ‘Reverse
Mathematics’ programme. It discusses the scope of predicatively acceptable math-
ematics, and whether impredicative mathematics can be justied by appealing to its
indispensability (either to the natural sciences, or to mathematics itself).
Chapter 8 concludes with some reections on what has been achieved, and what
remains to be done.
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Chapter 2
History
One way in to the issues surrounding the predicativist programme is through the
historical development of impredicative mathematics. ¿e crucial moment in this
story is Cantor’s proof of 1874 of the uncountability of the set of the real numbers.
But crucial moments can only be seen as such in their wider context, and the story
starts rather further back, and runs somewhat further forward.
¿e main force driving the changes to mathematics was the programme of the
rigorization of analysis: innitary set theory and the modern conception of the
continuum both arose from this programme. ¿is story is a largely familiar one, and
so it is presented here fairly briskly, largely by way of headline reminders: however, I
try to draw out some aspects of the story which are relevant to predicativism, and
which are not always stressed as much as they merit, or explained in quite the way
that is done here.
¿is chapter falls into three sections. ¿e rst, §2.1, covers the back-story: the
development of themathematics of continuousmagnitude into themodern discipline
of analysis, and in particular the eorts to make analysis rigorous. It takes us up to
Dedekind’s account of the real numbers, which is where set theory, and in particular
the idea of arbitrary innite collections, enter the story.
§2.2 is devoted to Cantor’s set theory, which arose from somewhat dierent
considerations, but which developed into a general theory of (potentially arbitrary
innite) collections, and hence into a foundational theory for the real numbers.
§2.3 looks at some of the repercussions of Cantor’s set theory: at its development
into modern set theory, at the hands of Zermelo, and at the criticisms and concerns
17
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caused by the set-theoretic paradoxes, and by the Axiom of Choice. ¿ese debates
constituted the beginnings of the ‘crisis in the foundations’, and formed the intel-
lectual background to the revisionary projects of Hilbertian nitism, Brouwerian
intuitionism, and Weylian predicativism.
2.1 ¿e back-story
2.1.1 Beginnings: Irrationals, the innite, and the development of naive
analysis
According to tradition, it was a member of the school of Pythagoras who rst demon-
strated the existence of irrational magnitudes: the length of the diagonal of a unit
square,
º
2, is not precisely equal to any ratio of those units. ¿is result gave the rst
suggestion that the scale of continuous magnitudes introduces complexities which
are not found in the arithmetic of discrete quantity.
Aristotle distinguished between the two sorts of quantity, and claimed that it is
in the continuous that we rst encounter the innite, through repeated (in theory,
unlimited) division of an interval.1 ¿is provides a model: our idea of potential
innity is a description of some idealized process that can be carried on without
limit.
Aristotle’s opinion on the innite, as on much else, became the starting point for
later thought. Most importantly, Aristotle claimed that the actual innite could not
exist: the only innite domains which are possible are potentially innite.
¿e innite is not that of which nothing is outside, but that of which
there is always something outside. [...] Nothing is complete which has
no end, and the end is a limit.2
¿is Aristotelian injunction against the actual innite was modied in medieval
thought to the view that only God is actually innite; but the eect was much the
same, in keeping the innite rmly beyond of the reach of mathematics. Augustine,
for instance, insisted that although the innite sequence of natural numbers is
uncompletable for us, it is grasped as nite by God:
1 Aristotle,¿e Physics 200b17, . 2 Ibid. 206b33–207a15.
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Let us then not doubt that every number is known to him ‘of whose un-
derstanding,’ as the psalm goes, ‘there is no set number.’ [...] Wherefore,
if whatever is comprehended by knowledge is limited by the comprehen-
sion of him who knows, assuredly all innity is also in some ineable
way nite to God because it is not incomprehensible for his knowledge.3
¿e traditional attitude of extreme caution towards the (actually) innitely large
and the innitely small was, in practice at least, cast aside when the innitesimal
calculus was developed by Leibniz and Newton. While Newton’s kinematic uxions
were very dierent from Leibniz’s innitesimals, both accounts had similarly shaky
foundations: they made essential use of a concept of limit which was not properly
understood, and of series (innite sums) without an understanding of whether or
not they would converge. Certain quantities were regarded as at some times being
equal to zero, and at other times as being legitimate divisors.
Analysis, the branch of mathematics which was based on these foundations,
quickly grew to resemble the Wild West. ¿e Bernoulli brothers, for instance ‘did
extensive work concerning series, and they showed almost no awareness of any
need for caution. Wrong results were described as paradoxes.’4 ¿e general ethos is
well-expressed by the maxim attributed to d’Alembert: Go forward, and faith will
come to you!5
¿is was not an unreasonable attitude. ¿e methodology was to use whatever
mathematical techniques were available, even though they were known sometimes
to lead to nonsensical results, and to check the answers by calculation. ¿is quasi-
experimental method led to many important new results, and progress in mathemat-
ics went hand-in-hand with progress in physics, which both provided conrmation
of the mathematics used, and suggested new mathematical problems to study. (Par-
ticularly fruitful for analysis was the consideration of the motion of a vibrating
string.) Mathematics became, in part, a branch of physics:
¿e mathematics did not stand on its own. [. . . ] Since nothing could be
proved in a reliable way, one tried to conrm the results of a mathemat-
ical derivation on some independent grounds. If a result was contrary
3 Augustine, City of God XII, xix; p. 91 of vol. IV (quoting Psalm 147:5). Cantor seems to have been
much taken with this idea, and with the idea that his theory of the innite could give us knowledge
of the divine. See Hallett, Cantorian set theory p. 35. 4 Lavine, Understanding the Innite p. 22.
5 Quoted Coa, Semantic tradition p. 25.
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to expectations, it was o en dismissed.6
2.1.2 ¿e rigorization of analysis
¿e conceptual chaos did not go entirely unchallenged. Berkeley’s criticisms of the
calculus,7 in particular his sardonic characterization of Newton’s uxions as ‘the
ghosts of departed quantities’, are now well-known among philosophers; but they
had little inuence on the mathematical community of the time.8
However, towards the end of the eighteenth century, the worries seem to have
become more prevalent. One instance of this is the mathematical prize essay com-
petition announced by the Berlin Academy in 1784:
It is well known that highermathematics continually uses innitely large
and innitely small quantities. Nevertheless, geometers, and even the
ancient analysts, have carefully avoided everything which approaches
the innite; and some great modern analysts hold that the terms of the
expression ‘innite magnitude’ contradict one another. ¿e Academy
hopes, therefore, that it can be explained how so many true theorems
have been deduced from a contradictory supposition, and that a prin-
ciple can be delineated which is sure, clear — in a word, truly mathem-
atical — which can appropriately be substituted for ‘the innite’.9
Lagrange attempted to meet the challenge: his ¿eorie des fonctions analytiques
(1797) attempted to found calculus algebraically, avoiding the problematic notions
of limit and continuity. But the attempt proved to be unworkable.10
¿e Academicians were not seeking rigour for the sake of it. (Indeed, rigour is
rarely pursued for its own sake. Bolzano and Frege are notable exceptions to this
rule; the reward for their supererogation was to have their work largely ignored by
6 Lavine, Understanding the Innite p. 28. 7 Berkeley,¿e Analyst. Or a Discourse [. . . ] (1734);
the title of the pamphlet is worth giving in full:¿e Analyst. Or a Discourse Addressed to an Indel
Mathematician. Wherein It Is Examined Whether the Object, Principles, and Inferences of the Modern
Analysis Are More Directly Conceived, or More Evidently Deduced, than Religious Mysteries and Points of
Faith. ‘First Cast the Beam Out of ¿ine Own Eye; and¿en Shalt ¿ou See Clearly to Cast Out the Mote
Out of ¿y Brother’s Eye.’ (¿e reference is to Matthew, 7:3.) 8 Lavine, Understanding the Innite
p. 24 suggests that the earlier criticisms of Bernard Nieuwentijdt were more widely read: certainly he
prompted a reply from Leibniz. Mancosu, ‘Metaphysics of the calculus’ discusses some other early
criticisms of the calculus. 9 Quoted in Grabiner,¿e Origins of Cauchy’s Rigorous Calculus pp. 41–2.
10 Ibid. pp. 36, 44.
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the mathematical community.) ¿e call for rigorous explanation of mathematical
talk of the innite came largely for reasons internal to mathematics. In particular, it
was the research programme which began with the vibrating-string problem (and
Fourier’s mathematically very similar problem of heat ow) which created the need
for an increase in rigour; or to be more precise, it was the fact that this research
programme was being pursued with the limited computational resources of the time.
Euler had been interested in series of numbers, where the problematic results caused
by divergent series can easily be spotted by summing the rst few terms: but Cauchy,
developing his work on Fourier series, was investigating series of functions. Here
calculation was simply unfeasible: the only way to tell computationally if a series of
functions f(x) = Σªi=0 fi(x) is convergent was to pick a few points to try. But even if
each point one tried could be seen to converge quickly, the possibility remains that
one had simply picked the wrong points. Clearly a better way was needed to know
when limits can safely be taken, and it was above all this problem that prompted
Cauchy’s ground-breaking work of the 1820s.11
Bolzano’s proof of the Intermediate Value ¿eorem is also particularly note-
worthy, despite its very limited immediate impact: it was published as his Rein
analytischer Beweis des Lehrsatzes, dass zwischen je zwei Werthen, die ein entgegenge-
setztes Resultat gewähren, wenigstens eine reele Wurzel der Gleichung liege (1817).
Bolzano’s aim was to avoid geometric intuition, and instead to prove the result by
calling only on very basic assumptions about numbers and functions. ¿e object
was not just an epistemological one — to achieve greater certainty for the results —
but a semantic or a logical one: the object was to expose interrelations and better
to systematize mathematics, to clarify the meaning of mathematical claims, and to
identify what their grounds were.12 And similarly, this question of the grounds of
the truth of a mathematical statement is not so much an epistemological question
(how do we come to know?), as a metaphysical one: In what does the truth of a
statement consist? Bolzano’s desire to expel intuition from analysis (like Frege’s
desire to expel intuition from arithmetic) needs to be understood as taking issue
with Kant’s doctrine that the statements of mathematics are synthetic.
¿e work on functions and series of functions in eighteenth and nineteenth-
century analysis went hand-in-handwith a broadening of the class of functionswhich
11 Lavine, Understanding the Innite p. 32. 12 For discussion of some of the issues here, see Coa,
Semantic tradition Ch. 2.
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were considered. Euler, for instance, dened a continuous function to be one which
was given by a single analytic expression, i.e. an algebraic expression built up from
polynomials and trigonometric functions. But he also considered a broader class
of functions, given by possibly dierent analytic expressions on dierent intervals,
as giving possible descriptions of the initial state of a vibrating string. (¿e main
reason why the vibrating string problem and the problem of heat-transfer in a bar
were such fertile research programmes was that in both cases, the initial condition
can be any piecewise continuous function.)
Integration was traditionally understood as the inverse of dierentiation, but this
denition did not apply smoothly to piecewise analytic functions (as the dierential
may not exist at certain points), and was not of much use when considering functions
which were not the dierentials of known functions. Such considerations motivated
Cauchy to give (in 1823) an independent denition of the integral, as the limit of
a sum of rectangles.13 ¿is denition provided a justication for Fourier’s use of
integrals of functions which were not given by analytic expressions.
In 1829, Dirichlet gave the function
f(x) = 0 for x > Q
1 for x > R −Q
as an example of a functionwhich could not be integrated, an explicit case of allowing
wholly non-analytic means to dene a function. And in 1837, Dirichlet gave the rst
truly modern denition of a continuous function as any association of values to
arguments that is single-valued and varies continuously. Later, Riemann extended
Cauchy’s methods for integration, and gave an example of a function that was
integrable, but had innitely many discontinuities in every interval, however small.
¿is broadening of the concept of ‘function’ is o en described as a move away
from the idea of a function as given by some sort of rule or denition and towards
the idea of a function as an arbitrary correlation of values to arguments.14 But we
should be wary of taking this to mean that Dirichlet’s concept of function included
unspeciable correlations of argument and value, rather than just leaving it open how
such a correlation was to be given. I will return to this important point in Ch. 3.3.6
below.
13 Grabiner,¿e Origins of Cauchy’s Rigorous Calculus pp. 140–145. 14 E.g. Lavine, Understanding
the Innite again.
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2.1.3 ¿e arithmetization of the reals — Dedekind
One object of the rigorization of analysis was to pull the discipline away from its
reliance on geometric intuition; and one result of this was the discovery of some of
the close ties between analysis and arithmetic. ¿is sentiment was well-expressed by
Kronecker:
¿us arithmetic cannot be demarcated from that analysis which has
freed itself from its original source of geometry, and has been developed
independently on its own ground; all the less so, as Dirichlet has suc-
ceeded in attaining precisely themost beautiful and deep-lying arithmet-
ical results through the combination of methods of both disciplines.15
A notable example was Dirichlet’s proof of 1837 that any arithmetic progression
containing two relatively prime terms must contain an innite number of primes.
¿is was remarkable for using essentially analytic methods (continuous variables
and limits), and also for its non-constructive character. It can be taken as the birth
of analytic number theory
On the other hand, algebraic methods were also applied with great success to
geometry. Most notably, the investigation of the real numbers by means of (what
became known as) Galois theory led to impossibility proofs for the famously elusive
Euclidean problems of squaring a circle, doubling a cube and trisecting an angle;
and also to positive results such as Gauss’s construction for the 17-gon.16
It was discovered by these methods that as well as the surds, irrational quantities
known as such to the Greeks, there are also real numbers which are transcendental,
that is, which are not roots of rational polynomials. (¿ose reals which are roots
are called algebraic reals.) Liouville’s somewhat articial example of Σªn=110−n! was
followed by proofs that the familiar numbers e and pi were transcendental (due,
respectively, to Hermite in 1873 and Lindemann in 1882). It was in this context
(in 1874, in fact) that Cantor published his rst proof of the uncountability of the
real numbers generally. Given that the algebraic numbers are easily shown to be
countable, this can be taken as a proof of the existence of transcendental reals; indeed,
as a proof that almost all of the reals are transcendental. (We will return to this in
§2.2 below.)
15 Kronecker, Vorlesungen über Zahlentheorie I p. 5; quoted in Stein, ‘Logos, logic, and logistiké’.
16 Stewart, Galois ¿eory is an excellent textbook for this material, and gives some of the historical
background.
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¿e discovery of transcendentals presses the question: What are the reals? It
came to be seen that the most fundamental part of the programme of the rigorization
of analysis was the task of giving a rigorous denition of the real numbers from
which all of their properties could be deduced. It was Dedekind who rst tackled
the job in 1872.17
Dedekind’s objective can be seen as an extension of Bolzano’s: to give a founda-
tion for the real number system that did not appeal to geometrical intuition. Instead,
the basis was to be arithmetical, and Dedekind could appeal to good authority here:
it appears as something self-evident and not new that a theorem of
algebra and higher analysis, no matter how remote, can be expressed
as a theorem about natural numbers, — a declaration I have heard
repeatedly from the lips of Dirichlet.18
¿e crucial step in Dedekind’s account was the construction of the real number
system from the rationals. Dedekind introduced the notion of a ‘cut’ in the ration-
als, that is, a partition of the rationals into two classes, such that the rst class is
closed downwards (any rational less than any member of the rst class is also in
the rst class), and the second class is closed upwards. Some of these cuts, such asbq > Q S q < 13,q > Q S q C 13g, are produced by rational numbers, in the sense
that there is either a smallest rational in the upper class, or a largest in the lower
class; but others, such as `q > Q S q < 0 - q2 < 2,q > Q S q A 0 & q2 C 2e are not
produced by any rational. We can dene in the obvious ways operations on cuts
which are analogous to the arithmetical operations on rationals. For example, if
we have cuts α = `A1,A2e ,β = `B1,B2e, we can dene α + β to be `C1,C2e, where
C1 = q > Q S §r > A1§s > B1 . r+s C q, andC2 = Q−C1. Similarly, an obvious order
relation can be dened on the cuts. ¿e domain of all possible cuts of the rationals,
equipped with these arithmetic-like operations and the order relation, forms a sys-
tem of ‘numbers’ which can be identied with the reals. (Dedekind famously did
not make this identication, instead regarding the reals as new items corresponding
to the cuts, and formed from them by a process of abstraction; but this ontological
shue does not aect anything here.) Dedekind succeeded in proving some of the
fundamental theorems of analysis, such as the convergence of bounded monotone
17 Dedekind, Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen. 18 First preface to Dedekind,Was sind und was sollen
die Zahlen? p. 35.
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sequences, from the fact that the reals are complete, in the sense that considering
cuts of real numbers does not lead outside the reals.
Lurking unnoticed was the crucial assumption, that the innity of possible cuts
of the rationals, including those that cannot be nitely specied, can legitimately
be considered as a denite domain. As Kanamori has argued, the work here was
seminal not just for the classical understanding of the continuum, but also for the
set-theoretic considerations which were used:
¿e formulations of the real numbers advanced three important predis-
positions for set theory: the consideration of innite collections, their
construal as unitary objects, and the encompassing of arbitrary such
possibilities.19
Lipschitz objected20 that Dedekind’s statement of the ‘continuity’ (i.e. connec-
tedness) of the real line was unnecessary, as no-one could conceive of a line without
that property. Dedekind atly rejected this: ‘If space has at all a real existence it
is not necessary for it to be continuous.’21 ¿e point was demonstrated by Dede-
kind’s example of the existence of models (to use modern terminology) of Euclidean
geometry where the co-ordinates of all of the points are algebraic numbers: ‘the
discontinuity of this space would not be noticed in Euclid’s science, would not be
felt at all.’22 Dedekind’s response here makes clear not only his commitment to
the programme of rigorization, but also suggests a theme that will be picked up in
chapter 7 below: that for scientic purposes, we do not in fact need to assume as
much as the classical continuum.
2.1.4 ¿e arithmetization of the reals — Kronecker’s programme
Kronecker was the most prominent early critic of the kind of set-theoretic account of
the real numbers championed by Dedekind. Kronecker emphasized the importance,
to all of mathematics, of construction or computation, founded ultimately on the
natural numbers. He was therefore happy to work with specic irrational numbers,
19 Kanamori, ‘Cantor to Cohen’ p. 3. Cantor also developed a theory of the real numbers, based on
Cauchy sequences rather than cuts. However, the dierence of implementation is relatively supercial.
20 Dedekind, Gesammelte mathematischen Werke vol. III. 21 (I.e. connected.) Dedekind, Stetigkeit
und irrationale Zahlen §3 = Dedekind, Essays on the ¿eory of Numbers p. 12 22 First preface to
Dedekind,Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen? = Dedekind, Essays on the ¿eory of Numbers p. 38
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but regarded the consideration by Dedekind and Cantor of the domain of reals, or
of arbitrary reals, as an illegitimate departure from this foundation.
Kronecker was wholly in the tradition of the rigorization of analysis; but he
thought that this tradition had taken a wrong turning. To put the matter neutrally,
we can see that there was at least a fork in the path: one path forward had been
forged by Dedekind and Cantor, and was followed by most mathematicians; but
Kronecker took a dierent path.
Kronecker is sometimes taken to have been opposed to all use of irrationals in
analysis.23 In fact, his view was that
one should only work with specic irrational numbers; starting to talk
about the totality of irrational numbers would mean leaving the found-
ations [i.e. arithmetical laws] on which the irrational number was con-
structed.24
Kronecker is o en caricatured as an obstructive conservative— or reactionary—
inmathematics; but his work can instead be seen as the start of a positive programme
in foundations — to rigorize analysis and abstract algebra not set-theoretically, as
Dedekind and Cantor were doing, but arithmetically and algorithmically.
Kronecker can be seen in some respects as a forerunner of Weyl’s predicativism;
but his constructivism applied also to arithmetic. One example of this is Kronecker’s
‘completion’ of the proof of Dirichlet’s theorem on arithmetical progressions men-
tioned above: what Kronecker did was to make the proof constructive, though he
took himself to have lled in gaps in the proof. Sieg has suggested that the recent
results of the Simpson school of Reverse Mathematics concerning systems conser-
vative over Primitive Recursive Arithmetic should be seen as partial realizations of
Kronecker’s Programme (rather than Hilbert’s).25 As we shall see, Weyl was happy
to take a more full-bloodedly realistic attitude towards arithmetic.
2.2 Cantor’s theory of the innite
Dedekind’s work on the foundations of the real numbers (and indeed more explicitly
his work on the foundations of the natural numbers) had appealed at crucial places
23 See Edwards, ‘Kronecker’s views’ for rebuttal of this. 24 Ibid. Material in brackets mine. 25 Sieg,
‘Relative consistency’, with reference to Simpson, ‘Partial realizations’.
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to what we now see as set theory. In essence, Dedekind needed to quantify over all
innite sets of a certain sort; but he seems initially not to have recognized any need
for caution here.26 As the set theoretic paradoxes show, however, caution, and an
adequate theory of innite sets, are needed. ¿e theory which came to be accepted
as lling the gap was Cantorian set theory, and it is to this that we turn now.
¿e starting point for Cantor’s investigations into the transnite was a problem
from analysis: the representation of analytic functions as Fourier series. (¿is area
of mathematics grew from Fourier’s investigations of heat-ow, mentioned above.)
Cantor showed that such a representation is unique if a certain convergence condition
holds everywhere on the interval; but also if the condition holds everywhere except
on a nite set of points. Indeed, Cantor showed that the representation is unique
for a function even under the weaker condition that the set Aof points where the
convergence condition fails is such that A′ is an isolated set.27
Cantor thus began to consider the operation of going from a set of points P to
the set of its limit points, its ‘derived set’ P′. ¿is is a monotone operation (if P b Q,
then P′ b Q′), and it can be repeated indenitely (write P(0),P(1), . . .P(n+1) for
P,P′, . . .(P(n))′). Cantor showed that the uniqueness theorem continues to hold
if the set of exceptional points P has P(n) = g for some natural number n; and he
then considered what he (initially) wrote as P(ª), where
P(ª) =def 
n>NP(n),
i.e. the set of those points which are in all of P,P′,P′′, . . . .
And of course we can continue applying the operation to obtain P(ª+1), P(ª+2),
. . ., P(ª.2) = n>N P(ª+n), . . . . Initially, Cantor described these superscripts as
‘symbols of innity’: they were simply a way of indexing innite iterations of the
operation of taking limit points. However, the treatment of innite point-sets as
objects to which operations could be applied, rather than merely as collections, was
a signicant move.
26 Dedekind’s later response to the paradoxes (‘he almost arrived at doubts, whether human thinking
is completely rational’, Bernstein reported), and his consequent reluctance to republishWas sind und
was sollen die Zahlen? are discussed in Sieg, ‘Relative consistency’. 27 A member x of a subset A
of the real line is an isolated point if there is an open interval (a,b) which contains x and no other
member of A. Conversely, a point y is a limit point of A (whether or not y > A) if every open interval
which contains y also contains some point of Aother than y. A set which consists entirely of isolated
points is isolated. If a set A is isolated, the set of limit points of A, written A′, is disjoint from A, i.e.
A9 A′ = g.
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Cantor realized that what was important for the uniqueness theorem was how
‘concentrated’ the set of exceptional points was, and that the derived set operation —
or rather, how far it could to be iterated before the set vanished — gave a measure of
this.
For the elaboration of his proof of the uniqueness theorem, Cantor needed to
make the real numbers of the interval amenable to mathematics, and he therefore
gave a denition of the real numbers (in terms of Cauchy sequences, rather than
cuts as Dedekind did). Cantor and Dedekind both recognized the need for an axiom
that asserted that to each of their real numbers, there corresponded a point on the
line. Kanamori describes this as ‘a sort of Church’s ¿esis of adequacy for the new
conception of the continuum as a collection of objects.’28
¿e event whichmarks the beginning of set theory in something like the modern
sense is Cantor’s proof of the uncountability of the reals. His rst proof, of 1874, was
not the famous diagonal proof, which came some years later, but was instead analytic
in nature. It is a reductio of the hypothesis that there is an enumeration of the unit
interval. ¿e idea is to develop in parallel two monotone subsequences from this
enumeration, one increasing and one decreasing, and then to show that the limit(s)
of the sequences cannot be in the enumeration.
On the other hand, Cantor showed that both the rational numbers, and the
algebraic numbers, can be enumerated. Cantor’s proof was therefore a new proof for
the existence of transcendental numbers.
It should be noted that both this analytic proof, and Cantor’s later diagonal proof
of the uncountability of the reals, are entirely constructive: given any sequence of
reals (e.g. an enumeration of the algebraic reals), each proof gives a method for
constructing a real which is not in that sequence.
¿e crucial step, however, was Cantor’s interpretation of the uncountability
result: he assumed that the real numbers were a denite domain, and so that they
formed a set, and then took his proof as showing that it was a set of a larger innite
size than that of the natural numbers. Equinumerosity of sets — the existence of
a bijection between them, uniquely pairing o their elements — was taken as the
criterion of the sets being of the same size (whether or not the sets were innite).
But it was the understanding of the continuum as a denite domain which really
opened the way to set theory, and it was unargued for. Hallett29 discusses Cantor’s
28 Kanamori, ‘Cantor to Cohen’ p. 3. 29 Hallett, Cantorian set theory.
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commitment to what motivated the assumption: Cantor believed that any potential
innity is always secondary to a completed (denite) innite domain. But this is of
course no less problematic.
A particular spur to the development of set theory was the continuum problem,
which immediately arose from this interpretation of the uncountability proof. If
there is more than one ‘size’ of innite set (‘power’, or later ‘cardinality’, when Cantor
came to regard these sizes as a new sort of number), then it is natural to ask how
many there are. In particular, are there any cardinalities between that of natural
numbers (ℵ0, as Cantor called it) and that of the continuum? Cantor thought not:
this is (the initial form of) his Continuum Hypothesis. Cantor’s attempts to prove
CH continued throughout his career. (We return to the open status of CH in Ch. 4.1.3:
here we just review — necessarily very briskly — some Cantorian background.)
Cantor’s approach to the Continuum Hypothesis involved the consideration of
the derived set operation. In order to explore the continuum, the ‘innite symbols’
which index the iterations of this operation needed to be dened independently of
the point sets, and an in a way which would make clear how far such iterations could
go, rather than simply being introduced ad hoc. ¿is meant setting up the ordinals
as numbers in their own right, and was marked by the notational change fromª
(suggesting potentiality) to ω (the last letter of the Greek alphabet, suggesting a
completed innity).
¿e ordinals were justied, for Cantor, by their use as the order types of well-
ordered sets. (A well-ordered set is a set ordered so that any non-empty subset of
it has a least element.) Cantor suggests that the ordinal numbers are formed by
abstraction: by taking a well-ordered set, and abstracting away from the particular
elements it contains, leaving only the structure of the well-ordering.
Ordinals dier only in length, and are themselves well-ordered by length. As
Cantor seems to have realized quite early on, this gives rise to a paradox, now known
as the Burali-Forti paradox: the set Ω of all ordinals, being well-ordered, must have
an ordinal measuring its length; but this ordinal must be greater than any of the
ordinals in Ω; which contradicts the initial assumption that Ω contains all of the
ordinals. Cantor seems not to have been troubled by this: he simply concluded that
Ω, the collection of all ordinals, is not a set: it is an ‘inconsistent multiplicity’, part of
the ‘Absolute’ innite, as opposed to the (mathematically tractable) transnite.
¿e connection between ordinals and the concept of ‘power’ (or cardinal size)
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was an important strategy for Cantor in his eorts towards proving the Continuum
Hypothesis. Cantor recognized that the ordinals could be classied according to the
power of the sets of which they were well-orderings. Indeed, his endorsement of the
cardinals as a sort of number came from the idea that they arose from well-ordered
sets by a second process of abstraction: the rst disregarded the elements, but kept
the ordering, to give the ordinal corresponding to the set; and the second disregarded
even the ordering, to give a cardinal number that would be shared by any two sets
which were equinumerous.
Cantor’s classication of the ordinals was into ‘number classes’. ¿e rst number
class comprised the nite ordinals, which he identied with the ordinary natural
numbers. ¿e second number class comprised the countable ordinals: those ordinals
(such as ω,ω+ 1, . . . ,ω.2, . . . ,ωω, . . .) which were the order-types of well-orderings
of the natural numbers (or any other equinumerous set). But Cantor claimed that
this did not exhaust the ordinals: he came to think that the second number class
formed a set which was not itself countable.
¿e argument he gave for this is that no countable sequence s of countable
ordinals can include every countable ordinal. First extract a strictly increasing
subsequence s′ from s (take s′0 = s0, and then set s′n+1 to be sm, withmminimal such
that sm A s′n, if one exists). If s′ is nite, then its last element, α, is the greatest element
in s, and so its successor α+ is a countable ordinal not in s. But if not, the supremum
of s′ is a countable ordinal not in s. Like the arguments for the uncountability of
the reals, this argument is perfectly constructive; the questionable assumption is
simply that the domain of countable ordinals forms a set. Cantor was aware that the
domain of all ordinals is ‘an inconsistent totality’ (as he called it), but he does not
seem to have worried whether the domain of countable ordinals was inconsistent,
or whether the only ordinals are countable ordinals.
¿ese number classes gave rise to Cantor’s alephs as a scale of cardinalities. ¿e
rst number class is a set consisting of the natural numbers, and has cardinality ℵ0.
¿e second number class comprises the countable ordinals, and is of a greater innite
cardinality, which Cantor called ℵ1. ¿e third number class comprises those ordinals
with cardinality ℵ1, and is itself a set of cardinality ℵ2; and so on. ¿e continuum
problem then becomes the question of where the cardinality of the continuum ts
into this scale. Despite his best eorts, Cantor was unable to prove his Continuum
Hypothesis.
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2.3 A er the paradoxes
As we have seen, although Cantor was never very precise about which collections
formed sets, he certainly did recognize that not all of them could. Lavine suggests
that Cantor’s idea of set was fundamentally a combinatorial or essential notion;
the guiding intuitive idea being that a set is built up by the successive addition of
elements to it.30
Frege, in contrast, developed a set theory based on the idea of sets as the exten-
sions of concepts. A concept carves the universe of objects into two: those which
fall under the concept and those which lack it. ¿e symmetry between the two cases
means that it is natural, on this view of sets, to take the sets to be closed under com-
plementation; whereas this is certainly not the case on a combinatorial view. Frege
famously made the assumption that there is a set corresponding to every concept in
Axiom V of the logical system of his Grundgesetze.
It was Russell’s paradox which showed conclusively that the assumption was
false: not every concept determines a set. It was in the a ermath of this that modern
axiomatic set theory began to be built, primarily by Zermelo, on the basis of Cantor’s
ideas. ¿e debate around the paradoxes (Russell’s, and the others which shortly a er-
wards became known) prompted a great deal of critical thought on the foundations
of set theory, and it was in this context that the notion of impredicativity was rst
formulated.
2.3.1 ¿e Axiom of Choice
If Russell’s paradox showed conclusively that not every concept determines a set,
Zermelo’s Axiom of Choice made more explicit the assumption that there are sets
which are not determined by any concept (at least, by any concept nitely built up
from some unproblematic base). ¿e axiom appeared rst in Zermelo’s proof of
1904 of the Well-Ordering Principle, which formalizes Cantor’s principle that every
set can be ‘counted’ by (i.e. put into bijective correspondence with) an ordinal.31
In 1900, Hilbert had listed various issues concerning the continuum as the rst
two items in his famous list of open problems in mathematics. One of these was to
settle the status of Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis. But in order for the question
30 Lavine, Understanding the Innite. 31 ¿e story is told in depth by Moore, Zermelo’s Axiom; but
the brisk account here will pick out some relevant points.
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of the Continuum Hypothesis to be meaningful, we need to know rst that the
continuum— the collection of real numbers — is in fact a set.
Although Cantor had recognized that not every property determined a set — or,
as he put it, that not every multiplicity is consistent — Hilbert noted that Cantor
had given no criterion for distinguishing consistent from inconsistent multiplicities.
Hilbert therefore asked for a proof of the ‘existence of the totality of real numbers
or — in the terminology of G. Cantor — the proof of the fact that the system of
real numbers is a consistent (complete) set’.32 Because of his general belief that in
mathematics, consistency entails existence, Hilbert suggested that this could be
achieved by showing an axiomatic characterization of the reals to be consistent.
Another problem which needed to be dealt with before the Continuum Hypo-
thesis could be tackled is that of showing that the continuum can be well-ordered: if
not, then it is not equinumerous with any of the alephs.33 Hilbert therefore asked for
a specic well-ordering of the reals.
In 1904, Julius König delivered an address to the International Congress of
Mathematicians containing a proof that the continuum cannot be well-ordered.34
¿e proof was quickly shown to be fallacious; although König’s reasoning was valid,
it relied on a lemma (due to Bernstein) which did not hold in full generality. But the
episode apparently caused a nasty shock to Cantor and his followers, and brought
home the need for more secure foundations for Cantorian set theory. It was this
which prompted Zermelo to seek out an assurance against any possible repair of
König’s proof: Zermelo proved rigorously the principle that any set can be well-
ordered.35
Cantor had used the Well-Ordering Principle freely, apparently relying on the
intuitive argument that any set can be well-ordered simply by an informal recursion
on the ordinals, at each successor stage making an arbitrary choice from among the
elements not already chosen. (Some form of the Axiom of Replacement is actually
needed to ensure that anything for which this process fails to terminate is not a set;
though as mentioned above, this view of the boundary between set and ‘inconsistent
32 Hilbert, ‘Über den Zahlbegri ’ 33 If there is a bijection between the continuum and some aleph,
then that clearly induces a well-ordering on the continuum. 34 ‘Julius König’ was the name under
which the Hungarian mathematician Gyula Kőnig published his work in German journals. (Kőnig’s
Lemma is named a er his son, the pioneering graph theorist Dénes Kőnig.) 35 König withdrew his
claim in a note published in 1905, but subsequently made another attempt to show that the continuum
could not be well-ordered, using an argument based on Richard’s Paradox: see Ch. 3.3.2 below.
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totality’ was certainly a part of Cantor’s thinking.)36
Cantor’s argument was unt for the purpose: it is questionable whether an
innite succession of arbitrary choices is even coherent. Zermelo’s proof made
explicit appeal to the Axiom of Choice, which avoided all objectionable appeal to
intuitive psychological ideas of ‘choice’ or iterating a process through time. ¿e new
axiom made a bald assertion of commitment to the existence of a choice set for any
disjoint family of non-empty sets: such a choice set would contain one element of
each member of the family.
Zermelo’s proof was published in 1904,37 but was very heavily criticized. Zermelo
responded four years later38 with an article which included a revised proof and a
reply to some of the criticisms.
¿e Axiom of Choice is very dierent from the other axioms, which Zermelo
laid out in his second paper of 190839: the axioms of the Empty set, Pair-set, Sep-
aration, Union, Powerset, and Innity all assert the existence of sets by specifying
exactly which members they are to have. In contrast, the Axiom of Choice is a bald
existential: a choice set could only be ‘constructed’ by making an innity of arbitrary
choices.40 As is characteristic of modern set theory, a problematic intuitive idea of
construction was replaced by the simple existential assumption that a set with the
desired properties exists.
¿e story of the introduction and reception of the Axiom of Choice is a familiar
one. Here, let’s just emphasize that the way in which the Axiom of Choice was
justied represents a curiously radical anti-foundational move by Zermelo. A very
similar move was also made by Russell in his justication of the Multiplicative axiom
(the form of Choice used in Principia), but especially (because it is essential to the
programme of Principia) in his justication of the Axiom of Reduciblity.41
¿is new step was the adoption and advocacy of a ‘regressive’ or ‘quasi-inductive’
methodology for mathematics: axioms were justied on the basis that they had
desirable consequences and no known undesirable ones; or that they had been used
(though perhaps implicitly) by many mathematicians without leading to contradic-
tion. ¿is move is presumably at least in part a result of the idea that the set-theoretic
36 See Cantor, ‘Letter to Dedekind [1899]’, and Zermelo’s comments on it (p. 117 of the English
translation). 37 Zermelo, ‘Beweis (1904)’. 38 Zermelo, ‘Neue Beweis (1908)’. 39 Zermelo,
‘Untersuchungen’. 40 Zermelo’s rst axiom, Extensionality, has a special status in a dierent way: it
is denitional or analytic in character. See Boolos, ‘¿e iterative conception’ pp. 27–28 for discussion.
41 See Ch. 6.2 below for a discussion of the content of Reducibility.
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paradoxes had shown intuition to be ‘bankrupt’, and invalidated appeals to obvious-
ness.
As Zermelo wrote,
[in deciding on axioms] there is at this point nothing le for us to do
but to proceed [...] starting from set theory as it is historically given, to
seek out the principles required for establishing the foundations of this
mathematical discipline. In solving this problem we must, on the one
hand, restrict these principles suciently to exclude all contradictions
and, on the other, take them suciently wide to retain all that is valuable
in this theory.42
¿e regressive method, or rather what it represents, the break with the ultimate
reliance on self-evidence, is perhaps the most distinctive part of the modern attitude
to mathematics.
2.3.2 Poincaré on the paradoxes
Perhaps themost prominent of the critics of the directionmathematics had takenwas
Poincaré. Poincaré anticipated some of the basic ideas of Weylian predicativism, and
indeed is responsible for the concept of predicativity. Unfortunately, his writings are
somewhat fragmentary, and his (changing) views are nowhere set out very clearly.43
Here, a lightning tour will have to suce.
Poincaré’s views on set theory seem to have developed mainly in the course of
a debate with Russell on the paradoxes. Russell’s initial diagnosis of the paradoxes
was that they involved ‘self-reproductive’ concepts: any set of items all of which fall
under such a concept gives rise to a more extensive collection of such items. With
the Burali–Forti paradox, for example, the supremum of any set of ordinals is itself
an ordinal not in that set. So the attempt to form a set of all such items is doomed to
failure.44 But Russell seems to have been happy to think of some innite collections
as completed or actual, in contrast to Poincaré.
Although Poincaré was not a systematic philosopher, and, as mentioned, his
writings on set theory present his views as they developed, certain key ideas remained
42 Zermelo, ‘Untersuchungen’ p. 200. 43 A helpful overview of Poincaré’s thought on mathematics is
given by Folina, Poincaré. 44 Russell, ‘Some diculties’. Russell’s diagnosis is closely related to Dum-
mett’s notion of indenite extensibility, to which we will return in Chapter 3.2.2 and in Chapter 5.1.2.
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constant, and the most important of these was his rejection of actual innity. ‘¿ere
is no actual innite; the Cantorians forgot that, and they fell into contradiction.’45
By ‘Cantorian’, Poincaré seems to have meant the whole tendency of modern set-
theoretic mathematics. And while his pronouncement is clearly overstated — there
is no obvious link between acceptance of actual innity and paradox — Poincaré
was pointing to what he saw as a deep-rooted malaise within this tendency, of which
the paradoxes were a symptom.
It was in the debate of 1905–6 between Russell and Poincaré on the paradoxes
that the concept of predicativity rst appeared. It was clear that the comprehen-
sion principle needed to be restricted to avoid paradox, and various ways of doing
this were entertained. Russell described a membership condition as predicative,
for a given approach to set theory, if a class corresponded to it. Poincaré argued
that the paradoxes arose from ‘vicious circles’, and proposed this as a way to distin-
guish the ‘predicative’ (admissible) classes, which obeyed it, from the ‘impredicative’
classes which did not. Obeying the Vicious Circle Principle is the sense of the word
‘predicative’ which has stuck.46
Poincaré viewed the mathematics of the innite as being concerned not directly
with innite objects such as sets — he did not believe that there were actual innities
— but with quasi-linguistic descriptions or rules for generating or constructing an
unending sequence of objects: for instance, the natural numbers.
Because of this stress on the innite as being always potential, many of Poincaré’s
statements involve talk of collections growing or classications being disrupted. One
diculty with taking the notion of the potential innite as primary is knowing what
to make of such reference to temporal notions: presumably the idea of sets being
constructed in time is metaphorical, but it is unclear how or for what we could cash
the metaphor in. ¿e temporal notions could of course be replaced with modal ones,
but that is not obviously any better.
What is clear, despite the somewhat vague and metaphorical nature of some
of Poincaré’s statements, is his rejection of impredicative quantication. While the
temporal metaphor of the continuing formation of innite domains drives Poincaré’s
thought, the distinction between predicative and impredicative classes arises from
this:
45 Poincaré, ‘Les mathématiques et la logique [1906b]’ §XV. 46 Russell’s ideas will be discussed
more fully in chapter 6.1—2 below.
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[...] there emerges a distinction between two types of classication
applicable to the elements of innite collections, predicative classica-
tions, which cannot be disrupted by the introduction of new elements,
and non-predicative classications for which the introduction of new
elements requires constant reshaping.47
For example, if we imagine the natural numbers being generated one by one, each
can be classied as odd or even, and obviously the classication of a number as
odd will not be disturbed by the numbers which are generated later. On the other
hand, a classication of natural numbers according to whether or not they belong
to all of an indenitely extensible class of sets of naturals — that is, the formation
of the intersection of that class — is liable to be disrupted by the formation of new
members of that class. (An example of this, to which Poincaré o en turned, is
Richard’s paradox, which is discussed in Ch. 3.3.2 below.)
Poincaré linked belief in the actual innite with the acceptance of impredicative
denitions:
It is the belief in the existence of the actual innite which has given
birth to those non-predicative denitions. Let me explain. [...] In
these denitions the word ‘all’ gures [...]. ¿e word ‘all’ has a very
precise meaning when it is a question of a nite number of objects;
to have another one, when the objects are innite in number, would
require there being an actual (given complete) innity. Otherwise all
these objects could not be conceived as postulated anteriorly to their
denition, and then if the denition of a notion N depends upon all the
objects A, it may be infected with a vicious circle, if among the objects A
are some indenable without the intervention of the notion N itself.48
¿is focus on the problematicmeaning of quantication over certain innite domains
is something to which we will frequently return.
¿e rejection of the actual innite means that innite collections can only be
specied by giving rules for indenitely continuing some construction. For Poin-
caré, the prohibition on impredicative denitions comes as a consequence of what
constructions are possible. It is impossible to construct an object according to an
47 Poincaré, ‘La logique de l’inni [1909]’ p. 463 = Dernières pensées, p. 10 =Mathematics and Science,
p. 47. 48 Poincaré, ‘Les mathématiques et la logique [1906b]’ §XV.
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impredicative specication, because such a specication refers to the object itself, or
to sets or domains of quantication to which the object belongs. For the specication
to have the intended meaning, therefore, the object must already exist. (¿is view of
the predicativity constraint is to be distinguished from Russell’s. Russell thought of
VCP as a logical principle.)49
Such construction rules are essentially linguistic, and Poincaré insisted that the
only mathematical objects which should be admitted are those which are denable
in a nite number of words. ¿is ‘denitionism’ (or ‘pragmatism’, as he termed it)
will be discussed in Ch. 3.3.1 below.
It might be expected from all this that Poincaré would be systematically predic-
ativist. But in fact, Poincaré seems to have been happy to accept classical analysis, as
based on the impredicative least upper bound principle: because the (geometrical)
continuum is antecedently existent, we can pick out elements however we like. (See
Ch. 4.4 for more discussion of this position, which takes the continuum as given to
us in intuition.)
Overall, Poincaré did not provide a clear anti-classical programme for mathem-
atics, or a well-developed philosophy which might underpin such a programme, so
much as a collection of ideas and suggestions. Drawing out those ideas would be a
very worthwhile task, though not an easy one. It is, however, not a task which can
be attempted here.
2.3.3 Das Kontinuum and Brouwer’s ‘revolution’
¿e predicativist programme proper was begun by Hermann Weyl’s monograph of
1918, Das Kontinuum. ¿e exploration and development of the ideas it presented
will be my main concern in the rest of this thesis; here, I will restrict myself to a few
remarks to place the book in its historical context, by way of introduction.
To state the obvious, that context is the explosion of work on the foundations on
mathematics which began with Frege and Cantor and lasted until the 1930s. And
one part of that, as we have just seen, is the radical shi in the understanding of the
nature of mathematics which is entailed by the conscious adoption of the regressive
method. ¿e fork in the path which Kronecker had rst noticed was now clearly
visible. Weyl’s predicativist programme needs to be understood as being an attempt
to vindicate and return to the traditional conception of mathematics as based on
49 Steiner, ‘Review of Folina (1992)’ p. 254.
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rationally or intuitively compelling rst principles.50
¿e attempt is a rejection of the counsel of despair that motivated the regressive
method. Das Kontinuum begins with a general philosophical discussion on the
nature of judgement, and the enterprise is deeply foundational. One example of this
isWeyl’s endorsement of the traditional characterization of the axioms as self-evident
truths:
Mathematics concerns itself with pertinent, general, true judgments.
Among these are a few which are immediately recognized as true, the
axioms, say U1,U2,U3,U4, which are such that all other pertinent, gen-
eral true judgments are logical consequences of these few [...]51
(Weyl was of course writing well before the Incompleteness theorems.)
Weyl described how he saw his foundational and revisionary programme in the
preface to Das Kontinuum:
It is not the purpose of this work to cover the ‘rm rock’ on which the
house of analysis is founded with a fake wooden structure of formalism
[...]. Rather, I shall show that this house is to a large degree built on
sand. I believe that I can replace this shi ing foundation with pillars of
enduring strength. ¿ey will not, however, support everything which
today is generally considered to be securely grounded. I give up the rest,
since I see no other possibility.52
¿e ‘sand’ on which classical analysis was built was the idea of arbitrary innite sets
and functions:
¿e notion that an innite set is a ‘gathering’ brought together by inn-
itely many individual arbitrary acts of selection, assembled and then
surveyed as a whole by consciousness, is nonsensical; ‘inexhaustibility’
is essential to the innite.53
However, as Weyl later pointed, a key assumption of Das Kontinuum was that ‘one
may safely treat the sequence of natural numbers as a closed sequence of objects.’54
50 Weyl does not himself use the vocabulary of ‘predicative’; though in the section of Das Kontinuum
where he acknowledges the similar work of Russell and the Vicious Circle Principle, he adds: ‘Of
course, Poincaré’s very uncertain remarks about impredicative denitions should also be noted here.’
Weyl,¿e Continuum p. 47. 51 Ibid. p. 17. 52 Ibid. p. 1. 53 Ibid. p. 23. 54 Weyl, Philosophy of
mathematics p. 60.
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From this arithmetical foundation, Weyl built up a family of explicitly denable
properties, sets and functions, which he contrasts with the
completely vague concept of function which has become canonical in
analysis since Dirichlet and, together with it, the prevailing concept of
set.55
It might be helpful at the outset to position the predicativist programme in
relation to the two other revisionary programmeswhich arose out of the foundational
crisis: Hilbertian nitism, and Brouwerian intuitionism.
Weyl’s aim was to found mathematics predicatively, while Hilbert’s aim, at least
on a certain reading, was to found mathematics nitistically.56 SoWeyl’s programme
was more modest than Hilbert’s in that it took more for granted, as a legitimate
part of the ground —Weyl took all of classical arithmetic as unproblematic, while
Hilbert restricted himself to nitary arithmetic. (With the benet of philosophical
hindsight and a great deal more mathematical logic than was available to Weyl and
Hilbert, we may identify Weyl’s base theory as rst-order Peano Arithmetic, and
Hilbert’s as Primitive Recursive Arithmetic.) Weyl’s programme was also less ambi-
tious than Hilbert’s in that Hilbert was determined to justify classical mathematics
in its entirety (including Cantor’s ‘paradise’), whereas Weyl was happy to jettison
those parts of mathematics which could not be justied predicatively. Perhaps the
most fundamental dierence, though, is that Weyl did not envisage any sort of
proof-theoretic reduction: this was Hilbert’s great innovation. ¿e justication of
higher mathematics that Hilbert sought did not involve attributing any meaning
to its statements, but was purely formal: the justication for a calculus of higher
mathematics was to be that it might lead to quicker proofs of contentful results,
and could not lead the mathematician into a (contentful) falsehood. For Weyl, in
contrast, all of mathematics was to be contentful.
Another comparison is with Brouwerian intuitionism. It is particularly important
to get straight on the relationship between Weylian predicativism and intuitionism
becauseWeyl himself came, just a few years a erDas Kontinuum, to reject his earlier
views in favour of intuitionism. (Predicativism has ever since been tainted with guilt
by association.) As Weyl bombastically wrote in 1921, in the paper credited with
starting serious debate over intuitionism:
55 Weyl,¿eContinuum p. 23. 56 It is in fact arguable that Hilbert was rather less of a ‘foundationalist’
than he is o en taken to have been.
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So I now abandon my own attempt and join Brouwer. In the threatened
dissolution of the state of analysis, which is beginning, even though
as yet few recognize it, I tried to nd solid ground without leaving the
order upon which it rests, by carrying out its fundamental principle
purely and honestly. And I believe this succeeded — as far as it could
succeed. For this order is itself untenable, as I have now convincedmyself,
and Brouwer — that is the revolution!57
(In fact, Weyl himself admitted to not fully understanding certain parts of Brouwer’s
thought, and Majer has suggested that Weyl’s ‘intuitionism’ is better understood as a
form of nitism.)58
¿e fundamental dierence between intuitionism andWeyl’s predicativism lies in
their divergent attitudes to the Law of the Excluded Middle. Both schools of thought
agree that LEM is not generally valid; but while intuitionism develops mathematics
without LEM, predicativism can be seen as the restriction of mathematics to areas
for which (the predicativist believes) LEM can be justied. Crucially, rst-order
arithmetic (with classical quantication over the natural numbers) is one such
area. (See below (Ch. 5.2.3; Ch. 6.5), where I argue that Gödel’s negative translation
shows that LEM for arithmetic can be justied.) ¿e predicativist approach to the
continuum, then, is to avoid the real indenitely extensible continuum as much
as possible, and instead to work with a surrogate: the arithmetically denable real
numbers.
2.4 Conclusions
¿e story briskly presented above has covered the development of modern mathem-
atics, together with some of the dissenting voices who expressed misgivings about
that development and began to suggest other ways of proceeding.
In particular, the focus has been on the innite. ¿e innity of the natural
numbers has presented no serious conceptual problems to mathematics (though
there are of course very fundamental philosophical questions around arithmetical
truth, and very deep open questions in number theory). In contrast, the continuous
innite — the real line — has been highly problematic.
57 Weyl, ‘Grundlagenkrise’. (Mancosu’s translation, modied.) For the history of the foundational
crisis around intuitionism, see Hesseling, Gnomes in the Fog. 58 Majer, ‘Dierenz zwischen Brouwer
und Weyl’.
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¿e modern conception of the continuum developed hand-in-hand with the set
theory which underlies it. ¿e theory was strikingly ad hoc; this was only brought
out clearly by the explicit adoption of the regressive method, but was present before.
Particularly striking is the anomalous position of the continuum in Cantor’s set
theory.
¿e suggestions of Kronecker and Poincaré led up to Weyl’s eventual proposal
of a coherent predicativist alternative to the ‘classical’ story. It is to the philosophical
motivations behind Weylian predicativism that we will now turn.
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Chapter 3
Predicativism
¿e purpose of the current chapter is to set out the stall for predicativism. I clarify
what I mean by predicativism, and develop some of the motivation behind the posi-
tion. However, those motivations will be further developed later on in the thesis. In
the next two chapters, which discuss in greater depth the classicist position (Chapter
4) and the intuitionist and nitist positions (Chapter 5), the predicativist alternative
is the foil. In Chapter 6, the basics of the predicativist view — the predicativist
concepts of property and set — are established. ¿e technical implementation of
predicativism within formal systems for mathematics is only possible a er this work,
in Chapter 7. What follows in this chapter is therefore somewhat programmatic.
¿e fundamental point which emerges is that the predicativist’s rejection of
classical set-existence principles stems from, and is justied by, a conception of
certain mathematical domains as open-ended (or indenitely extensible, as we will
say). Most importantly, these include the domain of sets of natural numbers, and the
domain of real numbers. (¿ese two are in fact equivalent, given a certain amount
of coding, and I shall o en talk about them interchangeably as ‘the continuum’.)1
¿e domain of natural numbers, however, is denite, that is, not open-ended.
Quantication over open-ended (i.e. indenitely extensible) domains raises
serious issues. ¿e predicativist programme is to avoid such quantication, at least
1 ¿e domain of characteristic functions of sets of natural numbers, 2N, is clearly also the domain of all
binary fractions, and so all real numbers, in the interval [0, 1]. ¿is closed interval is cardinally equi-
valent to the real line, and if the end-points are removed, the resulting open interval is homeomorphic
(i.e. topologically equivalent) to the real line. In Simpson, Subsystems of Second Order Arithmetic
pp. 9–12, real numbers are represented as certain sets of naturals via several layers of coding.
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in the crucial context of set-denitions, and to see how much mathematics can be
developed without it.
In §3.1, I discuss the meaning of predicativity and the basic worry behind prob-
lematically impredicative denitions: those denitions that involve quantication
over open-ended domains. §3.2 presents the argument that quantication over open-
ended domains is insuciently determinate in its meaning to serve in denitions.
In §3.3, I argue that certain domains, including that of the sets of natural numbers,
are open-ended in the relevant sense. I explain how this thought can be motivated
by ‘denitionism’, and how this leads the predicativist to reject uncountable totalities
(more precisely: to view uncountable domains as indenitely extensible). Finally,
§3.4 claries the form of predicativism I am presenting, and positions it in relation
to other views which have been given similar labels.
Before we launch in, a note on terminology is in order. First, the word ‘domain’.
As I will use it, it is no more ontologically committing than the use of the plural
idiom. ‘¿e domain of natural numbers’ is just a way of referring to all of the natural
numbers at once. (¿e words ‘collection’ and ‘totality’ are used similarly by others.)
It is important to stress that there is no assumption that such a ‘domain’ must be
some single, set-like object: I do not assume the ‘all-in-one principle’.2
Second, the phrase ‘indenitely extensible’. ¿is is a Dummettian term of art
which I have borrowed, and we will be particularly concerned to pin the notion
down in Ch. 5. For now, I will also use the more impressionistic term ‘open-ended’.
¿e primary bearers of indenite extensibility are concepts; but the ‘indeniteness’
that is at issue concerns the extensions of those concepts, and I will generally speak of
the domains themselves as indenitely extensible. Roughly, an indenitely extensible
concept is one such that if we have a clear conception or characterization of a domain
of items all of which fall under that concept, then we can, by making reference to
that domain, give a characterization of a more extensive domain of items all of
which fall under the original concept.3 ¿e process by which we move from one
characterization to another is called the ‘principle of extension’. ¿e characterization
is rough in that it is le vague just what ‘a clear conception or characterization of a
domain’ is. I do not have a fully general account of this to oer; but it will become
clear in the course of the thesis (and especially of Ch. 5) why I think that we can credit
ourselves with a clear conception of some domains and not of others. (Note, though,
2 ¿e term derives from Cartwright, ‘Speaking of Everything’. 3 Cf. Dummett, ‘What?’ p. 441,
quoted on p. 115 below.
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that ‘concept’, as used here and throughout this thesis, is the (approximate) equivalent
of Frege’s Begri or Russell’s ‘propositional function’, whereas a ‘conception’ is a more
general view one might have about how things are in some respects, in some region
of reality.) I use ‘denite’ as an antonym to ‘indenitely extensible’.
Note that ‘indenitely extensible’ is primarily concerned with what we can and
cannot do or conceive of, rather than with how things are independently of us.
However, I will argue in Ch. 5.3.1 that in mathematics, what there is cannot be wholly
independent of what we can conceive of.
It is o en thought that there is a set corresponding to each denite domain: the
set which has as members just those things. I have no quarrel with this, but it is not
important for my purposes.
3.1 Motivations
At its narrowest, predicativism is the doctrine that mathematical denitions must
be predicative, and that mathematics can or should concern itself only with objects
which are so denable. Impredicative denitions are those which fall foul of the
Vicious Circle Principle: that is, they quantify over domains which include (or
depend upon) the item being dened. I am here concerned only with what has been
called ‘predicativism given the natural numbers’; worries about the impredicativity
of the natural numbers themselves4 will be addressed only very briey, in §3.4.1
below.
¿e predicativist programme, as initiated by Weyl in Das Kontinuum and de-
velopedmore recently by Feferman, among others,5 is to develop as much of classical
mathematics as is possible in a predicatively acceptable manner. ¿e programme has
an epistemological pay-o, in that predicative methods are more constructive than
others; and it has an ontological pay-o, in that it dispenses with the extravagant
ontology of (standard, impredicative) set theory.
One motivation for predicativism was well expressed by Quine (quoted in §1.1
above): ‘it realizes a constructional metaphor’. ¿e value of this is not so much that
it makes the consistency of predicative mathematics obvious; it is that it ensures that
the content of the claims of predicative mathematics is clear, because the objects
4 Such as those which have been expressed e.g. in Parsons, ‘¿e impredicativity of induction [1983]’.
5 See in particular Feferman, ‘Systems of predicative analysis [I]’ and the papers collected in Feferman,
In the Light.
46 CHAPTER 3. PREDICATIVISM
dealt with are all capable of explicit denition. ¿e importance of this denability of
all mathematical objects, or ‘denitionism’, is discussed in §3.3.1 below.
A standard modern account of impredicativity is the following:
a denition ... is impredicative if it denes an object which is one of the
values of a bound variable occurring in the dening expression [...].6
¿is makes clear the crucial role of quantication. As already mentioned, we are
helping ourselves to the natural numbers, and so need not worry about their deni-
tion; so the rst problematic case, on which we will mainly focus, is the denition
of sets of natural numbers. Such denitions are impredicative if they contain quan-
tiers ranging over all of the sets of natural numbers (or of course if they contain
quantiers ranging over even ‘worse’ domains, such as the sets of the sets of the
natural numbers); and conversely, a denition of a set of naturals is predicative if it
contains no quantication at all, or only quantication over the natural numbers
themselves.
As Poincaré, Ramsey, and Quine have all stressed,7 the issue is not the legitimacy
of impredicative specications, but rather the legitimacy of the assumption that
there exist objects which satisfy those specications. If we have already been given
an adequate specication of some objects, then an impredicative re-specication
of one of those objects by means of a quantication over that domain is entirely
unobjectionable, even though the domain of quantication includes the very object
being specied. Ramsey’s example of such a case of harmless impredicativity is ‘the
tallest man in the room’. A common mathematical example is a specication of a
natural number as the smallest satisfying a certain condition. If we say that a is the
least F, a = µxFx, then the denition is ∀x(x = a  (Fx & ∀y(Fy  x B y))),
and the bound variable y in the denition ranges over the natural numbers, of which
one is a, the deniendum. But this is unproblematic, regardless of whether or not
we know which number a is, because the quantication is over the natural numbers,
and each of the naturals has a predicative canonical specication in terms of zero
and the successor function.
So when is an impredicative specication problematic? Well, suppose that we are
trying to specify a set which consists of objects of some previously recognized sort;
for example, natural numbers. Our set will contain those natural numbers which
6 Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel and Lévy, Foundations of set theory p. 38. 7 See especially Quine, Set ¿eory
and its Logic p. 242.
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satisfy some property. For our specication to be legitimate, the property needs to be
well-dened and unambiguous. We will demand that it is given by a formula ϕ(x)
in some mathematical formal language, which contains one free variable. ¿e set A
can be written as x > N S ϕ(x). ¿e simplest case is where ϕ is a quantier-free
formula of arithmetic. Less trivial is the case where ϕ contains quantiers which
range over the natural numbers.
We might imagine forming A by going through the natural numbers one by
one, putting in 0 just in case ϕ(0), 1 just in case ϕ(1), and so on. But when ϕ(x) is
complex, there is no guarantee that we would be able to do this, even in principle:
it may require the solution of as-yet unsettled problems in number theory. If we
assume, though, that there is a fact of the matter, independent of our knowledge, as
to whether or not ϕ holds of any particular natural number, then the specication
makes sense.
Now consider specications which feature quantication over the sets of natural
numbers. For example, consider the impredicative specication: A is the intersection
of all those sets of naturals which satisfy condition B, i.e. A= x > N S ∀X(B(X) 
x > X). To determine whether 0 > A, we need to know whether 0 is in every B-set.
But if A is itself a B-set, then we are led in a circle.8
But is this just an epistemological problem? Is the problem just a problem for
us? We cannot use the obvious route to determine which numbers the set contains;
but that in itself does not mean that the set is ill-dened.
If we suppose that the sets of natural numbers are just as determinate as the
naturals themselves, then there is indeed no reason to be worried. On this suppos-
ition, ∀X(B(X)   x > X) is a determinate property of natural numbers, and so
determines the set Aof those numbers which satisfy it.
¿e predicativist, however, is not willing to make the supposition of determinacy
for the sets of natural numbers: instead she sees them as open-ended, as will be
explained below. It is this open-endedness that means that quantication over the
sets does not always have a determinate meaning, and that therefore makes the
circularity of an impredicative set-specication into something viciously circular.
¿e simplest way to respect this scruple is to require that the specication of a set of
natural numbers may not contain quantication over the sets of natural numbers.
8 A real example of just this sort is Kleene’s set O of notations for recursive ordinals, which is dened
by a Π11 formula. See Feferman, ‘Systems of predicative analysis [I]’ for discussion.
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(¿is is the simplest, but not the only way for the predicativist to go; see §3.3.4 below
on ramication.)
3.2 Open-endedness and quantication
Why does the open-endedness of a domain raise problems for the meaningfulness
of classical quantication over that domain? ¿is is an issue which will be dealt with
in more detail Chapters 5 and 6; but the main arguments are presented here by way
of introduction.
3.2.1 ‘Any’ and ‘all’
One expression of the open-endedness thought is the distinction between generaliz-
ations made with ‘any’ and those made with ‘all’. ¿is distinction was rst explicitly
drawn by Russell. (Russell in fact attributes the idea to Frege, but this attribution is
dubious given Frege’s absolutism about the domain of quantication.)
Intuitively, ‘any’ expresses schematic generality, whereas ‘all’ expresses the logical
product of its instances. ¿emeaning of ‘all’ is therefore dependent on a determinate
range of instances. ¿e use to which Russell put the distinction was to generalize
over domains which are not determinate: indenitely extensible domains, such as
the domains of propositions and properties.
In the case of such variables as propositions or properties, ‘any value’
is legitimate, though ‘all values’ is not. ¿us we may say: ‘p is true or
false, where p is any proposition’, though we cannot say ‘all propositions
are true or false’. ¿e reason is that, in the former, we merely arm an
undetermined one of the propositions of the form ‘p is true or false’,
whereas in the latter we arm (if anything) a new proposition, dierent
from all the propositions of the form ‘p is true or false’. ¿us we may
admit ‘any value’ of a variable in cases where ‘all values’ would lead to
reexive fallacies; for the admission of ‘any value’ does not in the same
way create new values.9
Russell refers to the sort of variable which features in an ‘any’ generalization — what
are now called seen as either free or schematic variables — as a ‘real variable’; and to
9 Russell, ‘¿eory of types’ p. 158.
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the variable in an ‘all’ generalization — a bound variable — as an ‘apparent variable’.
From the standpoint of modern formal logic, free rst-order variables are a
minor technicality. Some systems of rst-order logic permit them, but some do not,
and without any loss of expressive power. If we do allow formulae with free variables,
then the usual semantic treatment for them is straightforward: a formula featuring
a free variable, ϕ(x), comes out as true on all interpretations just in case ∀xϕ(x)
comes out true.
However, schematic letters which appear in predicate position are more inter-
esting. In the standard presentation of rst-order Peano Arithmetic, the induction
scheme is an example of such schematic generality. In the formal context, it is of
course laid down what the legitimate substitution instances are; but the informal idea
behind it is an open-ended one: we endorse the induction scheme because we are
happy to commit ourselves to accepting induction not only for all of the predicates
in our current language, but also for any predicate we may in the future come to
consider meaningful.
(Why should we be happy to commit ourselves to this? Why is induction so com-
pelling? Just because the antecedent of an instance of induction, ϕ(0)&∀x(ϕ(x) 
ϕ(sx)), gives us, by repeated modus ponens, that ϕ(x) holds of 0, of s0, of ss0, . . .
— and these are all of the natural numbers.)
¿is is more or less the opposite of Kreisel’s view of axiom schemes: Kreisel
claims that the only possible reason for asserting a scheme is a commitment to the
corresponding second-order axiom.10 On the second-order view, there is some xed
and all-encompassing domain of properties (or sets) of natural numbers, and what
we really want to do is to say that induction holds for all of the members of that
domain.11 But Kreisel’s second-order view demands more of the asserter than a
genuinely schematic understanding does: namely, an understanding of that domain.
¿e two sorts of generalization — schematic and logical product — behave
dierently. Most notably, ‘any’ generalizations cannot be embedded in the scope
of other logical operators: as Russell expressed it, ‘¿e scope of a real variable can
never be less than the whole propositional function in the assertion of which the
said variable occurs.’12 A striking consequence of this is that, as negation must have
10 For more discussion of this point, see e.g. Parsons,Mathematical ¿ought and its Objects p. 270.
11 Feferman, ‘Reecting on incompleteness’ gives a formal analysis of the power of schemata intended
to apply to expansions of the language. 12 Russell, ‘¿eory of types’ p.159.
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a narrower scope than the generalization, there are ‘any’ generalizations which can
neither be endorsed nor rejected. As Russell put it:
When we assert any value of a propositional function, we shall say
simply that we assert the propositional function. . . . . Similarly we may
be said to deny a propositional function when we deny any instance of
it. We can only truly assert a propositional function if, whatever value
we choose, that value is true; similarly we can only deny it if, whatever
value we choose, that value is false. Hence in the general case, in which
some values are true and some false, we can neither assert nor deny a
propositional function.13
¿e unembeddability of schematic generality means that quantication which is so
understood cannot appear in denitions.
3.2.2 Indenite extensibility
A dierent expression of the same basic thought, that quantication must be un-
derstood dierently when its domain is open-ended, is to be found in Dummett’s
argument that quantication over indenitely extensible domains must be intuition-
istic rather than classical.14 Of course, intuitionistic quantication is considerably
more exible than schematic quantication: it can be meaningfully negated and
embedded.
Sullivan uses the striking analogy of a checkerboard to make vivid just what it
is about some domains — such as the domain of objects in physical space — that
makes them denite rather than indenitely extensible. ¿e idea is that each square
of the checkerboard — each position in space — may or may not contain a star, and
that the squares are the only positions where a star may be. If we are interested in
the question of whether any of the stars has a certain property ϕ, then we know in
advance that either there exists a particular square which contains a star which is ϕ;
or on the other hand if there is no such square, then we know that every star is ϕ.
What the checkerboardmakes vivid is the idea of reality settling the matter when
we put to it any well-dened predicate. ¿ere is, so to say, a canonical presentation
of each star as the star occupying such-and-such a square of the checkerboard. ¿is
13 Russell, ‘¿eory of types’ p.157. 14 ¿is argument is the ‘new argument’ for intuitionism, in
Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics. Sullivan, ‘Dummett’s case’ gives an excellent exposition.
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canonical presentation means that we know in advance what it would be to have a
witness for an existential claim; and, conversely, we know what it would be for there
to be no such witness.
¿e contrast is with cases when reality is not determinate in this way, when the
domain of quantication is in some sense open-ended, and there is no uniform way
of dening all of the items in that domain. What is characteristic of such cases is
that there is no scheme of canonical presentation of all of the potential witnesses. As
Dummett writes,
If we choose to explain the concept real number in a Dedekindian
manner . . . by saying that a real number is required to have determinate
relations of magnitude to rationals, we say nothing about the manner
in which an object having such relations is to be specied, but simply
leave any purported specication to be judged on its merits when it is
oered.15
¿e thought is that with an existential quantication over such a domain, although
it is quite possible to have a good witness for an existential claim, and quite possible
that we could nd a general proof of the converse universal, in the absence of either,
it is unclear just what the quantication means.
As is well-known, the conclusion drawn by intuitionists is that it is unjustied
to claim that the quantied sentence must be either true or false; they therefore
propose a whole-scale revision of logic which avoids commitment to bivalence. But
a more immediate conclusion is that, as quantication over open domains does
not, in general, have a determinate meaning, such quantication cannot appear in
legitimate denitions.
¿e predicativist proposal is twofold. First, that the natural numbers are a denite
domain, with a canonical notation in terms of zero and the successor operation
serving as a checkerboard. Second, that the best response to the open-endedness of
certain domains (such as the domain of the sets of natural numbers) is not to try
to nd weakened logical principles which can justiably be applied to indenitely
extensible domains, but rather to require quantication in denitions to be over
denite domains. ¿ese claims are explored and defended in Chapter 5 below. What
we turn to rst, though, is why we should think that the domain of sets of natural
numbers is open-ended.
15 Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics p. 319.
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3.3 ¿e indenite extensibility ofP(N)
¿ere are two sorts of reason for thinking that the continuum — i.e. the sets of
natural numbers — is indenitely extensible. ¿e negative sort of reason is that the
alternative is so problematic. ¿e problems that are faced by that alternative — the
classical view of the continuum as a denite domain — are the subject of Chapter 4.
But there is a positive reason as well: denitionism.
3.3.1 Denitionism
A strand of thought which runs through Poincaré, the French analysts (notably Borel,
Baire, and Lebesgue), and Weyl is what might be called denitionism: the doctrine
that mathematics should concern itself only with objects which can be dened.16
Poincaré’s denitionism is expressed in his comment on the set-theoretic para-
doxes:
I think for my part, and I am not the only one, that the important point
is never to introduce objects that one cannot dene completely in a
nite number of words.17
In Das Kontinuum, Weyl’s commitment to denitionism is shown by his insist-
ence that innite sets must be given by rules, and the detailed way in which such
rules are built up from basic arithmetical properties:
I contrast the concept of set and function formulated here in an exact
way with the completely vague concept of function which has become
canonical in analysis since Dirichlet and, together with it, the prevailing
concept of set.18
By ‘the completely vague concept of function’, Weyl means allowing arbitrary and
unspeciable correlations of values with arguments to count as legitimate functions.
It is denitionism which is the basic motivation for Poincaré’s and Weyl’s re-
jection of impredicative specications; however, denitionism is plainly in need of
elaboration, raising as it does the questions of what a legitimate denition is, and
what it means for mathematics to ‘concern itself ’ with certain objects. Predicativism
is one way of eshing out the denitionist thought into a philosophy of mathematics.
16 Maddy uses the word ‘denabilism’ for the position. 17 Quoted in Kline,Mathematical ¿ought
p. 1003. 18 Weyl,¿e Continuum p. 23.
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Denitionism can bemotivated by a whole range of considerations. For Poincaré,
the doctrine seems to have beenmotivated by a rejection of the idea of the completed
innite, and by his conviction that the only things which can be the subject of
(contentful) mathematics are nite objects such as denitions. However, we need
not go as far as atheism about the completed innite: we could just content ourselves
with agnosticism. ¿e denable sets are manageable objects to reason with, and
(as we shall see in Chapter 7) such reasoning is surprisingly powerful. Why, then,
should we want to worry ourselves with the mathematics of undenable sets, which
raises such thorny epistemological problems?
3.3.2 Richard’s Paradox
Richard’s paradox of denability, published in a one-page paper of 1905,19 shows that
there is an essential open-endedness to the notion of legitimate denition. When
combined with denitionism, this vindicates the predicativist view that certain do-
mains— notably the real numbers, and the sets of natural numbers— are themselves
open-ended.
Richard points out that the set E of real numbers which can be dened using
nitely many words (from a xed vocabulary) is clearly countable, and that we can
therefore diagonalize to dene, again using only nitely many words (again from
that vocabulary), but this time making reference to E, a real number which is not in
E:
Let p be the nth decimal of the nth number of the set E; we form a
numberN having zero for the integral part and p+1 for the nth decimal,
if p is not equal either to 8 or 9, and unity in the contrary case. ¿is
number N does not belong to the set E because it diers from any
number of this set, namely from the nth number by the nth digit. But
N has been dened by a nite number of words. It should therefore
belong to the set E. ¿at is a contradiction.20
Richard’s paradox is standardly seen as being a genuine paradox, on a par with
the Liar, for natural languages, which allow semantic reection. ‘Denable’ is as
problematic as ‘true’, and for similar reasons: both are standardly classed as semantic,
19 Richard, ‘Principes des mathématiques’. 20 Ibid.
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rather than set-theoretic paradoxes. As such, the standard resolution is to discern in
the reasoning an equivocation on the concept denable in a nite number of words.
A properly formalized version of the argument might consider a language L0
with no means of semantic reection; in this case, the reasoning about what is
‘denable in L0’ would need to take place in a metalanguage, L1, and the paradox is
of course avoided, because the diagonal number p is denable in L1, but not in L0.
Or we might instead have a series of partial denability predicates D0,D1, . . .
(analogous to partial truth predicates) in a single xed language L′, in which D0
would intuitively mean ‘denable by an open sentence of L′ not containing any Di’,
D1 would mean ‘denable by an open sentence of L′ not containing any Di for i A 0’,
and so on.
Either way, the argumentation, when repeated, generates a hierarchy, either of
metalanguages L1,L2, . . ., or of partial denability predicatesD0,D1, . . .; and in both
cases, of nested sets of ‘denable reals’ E0 ø E1 ø . . .. ¿is is what is meant by saying
that the denable reals (or, of course, the denable sets of naturals) are open-ended.
3.3.3 König and Cantor on Richard’s paradox
A telling side-line to the story is the use König made of Richard’s reasoning in a
new argument he gave against the possibility of well-ordering the continuum.21 ¿e
nitely denable real numbers are countable, and so if the continuum were well-
ordered, there would be a rst real in the ordering which is not nitely denable;
but that is a denition of it. Cantor’s response to König is instructive here. Cantor
seems to have accepted the denitionist demand that every mathematical object
must be nitely denable; but as the continuum is uncountable, there must be an
uncountably innite number of basic (undened) concepts which can feature in
such denitions. In a letter to Hilbert, he wrote:
Every denition is essentially nite, that is, it explains the concept to
be determined through a nite number of already understood concepts
B1,B2,B3, . . .Bn.
‘Innite denitions’ (which are not possible in nite time) are absurdit-
ies.
21 König, ‘Mengenlehre und das Kontinuumproblem’. König’s earlier argument was mentioned in
Ch. 2.3.1 above.
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If König’s claim that the ‘nitely denable’ real numbers formed a to-
tality with cardinality ℵ0 was correct, it would imply that the whole
continuum is countable, which is certainly wrong.
¿e question then is what error lies behind the apparent proof of this
false statement?
¿e error (which also occurs with emphasis in Poincaré’s note in the
last issue of the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale), seems to me to be
this:
It is assumed that the system B of concepts B, which must be used in
the denition of individual real numbers, is nite, or at most countably
innite.
—¿is assumptionmust be an error, as otherwise we would have the
false theorem that the continuum is of power ℵ0.
Am I mistaken, or am I right?22
¿emodern consensus is that Cantor was indeed mistaken. We surely cannot
claim to ‘already understand’ uncountably many primitive concepts. A language
which contained an uncountable number of primitive predicates would clearly be
unlearnable and unusable — at least by nite creatures such as us. ¿e fact that
Cantor was forced to accept such ‘denitions’ shows the tension in his idea of a
universe of sets that is uncountable but not arbitrary.
3.3.4 Ramication
¿e hierarchy of denable sets (or reals) that Richard’s paradox gives rise to leads to
a choice for predicativist mathematics: either to consider only those sets denable
in a xed initial language, or instead to ramify. To ramify is to consider, as well as
these (‘level 0’) sets, further levels of denable sets, each of which can include in
their denitions quantication over the sets of earlier levels.
Consider again the case of specifying a set of natural numbers. ¿e predicativist’s
worry is that the domain of all of the sets of natural numbers is not denite, and
that quantication over that domain is not legitimate, at least in set specications.
Suppose instead that we settle on some restricted means of formal set specication,
22 Cantor, letter to Hilbert, 8.8.1906. From Cantor, Briefe p. 178. (My translation.)
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which do not allow us to specify a set of natural numbers by a formula which involves
quantication over the sets of natural numbers. Now it seems that the domain of
sets of naturals which are speciable by these means is a denite domain, over which
we can legitimately and meaningfully quantify. ¿ere is, therefore, no objection on
the predicativist view to the following procedure of ramication. Call those sets of
naturals level 1 sets; and then say that level 2 sets can be specied by means which
include quantication over the level 1 sets. Continue similarly to form level 3 sets,
and so on.
However, the decision as to whether or not to ramify a system of predicative
mathematics turns out not to be a matter of any great philosophical signicance.
It is always legitimate to ramify, and as we shall see in chapter 7, ramication can
bring with it a certain increase in mathematical power when it is carried on into the
transnite. But for most of this thesis, we will focus the discussion on unramied
predicative theories of the natural numbers, for this will suce to illustrate the
conceptual security and the mathematical power of predicative mathematics.
3.3.5 Uncountability
¿e predicativist view, then, is that the only denite domains are those which consist
of members which can be completely dened by nitary means. As legitimate
denitions are nite constructions in a nite alphabet, there are only countably
many denitions, and so such domains can be at most countably innite.
¿e question then arises of how the predicativist is to understand what are
normally taken as demonstrations of the existence of uncountable domains. ¿e
most famous case for the existence of uncountable domains is of course Cantor’s
Diagonal Argument.
¿e Diagonal Argument can be seen as a reductio of the assertion that there is a
counting of the powerset of the natural numbers, i.e. a surjective f  N (P(N).
Consider the set of naturals Df = n S n ¶ f(n): then the assumption that Df =
f(m) for some natural numberm leads to the conclusion that m > Df m ¶ Df,
which is absurd. What is to be noted is that the argument is constructive relative to
f: given any function f  N(P(N), it gives us an explicit set Df which is not in
its range.
¿e position that Cantor’s argument threatens is what we might call ‘strict coun-
tablism’: the view that every domain is (nite or) countable. ¿e strict countablist
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would be forced into the awkward position of denying some part of the (very ele-
mentary) reasoning in the argument.
¿e predicativist, on the other hand, accepts the conclusion that the domain
of sets of natural numbers is not countable; but this conclusion is understood as
meaning that the domain is indenitely extensible, rather than that it is a denite
domain of some larger innite size. It should be noted that this is just what the
classical set theorist is forced to say about the domain of ordinals, or of the domain
of sets in general. If the domain of all of the sets is ‘too big’ to form a set, might not
the same be true of the continuum? ¿e predicativist challenge to the classicist can
be simply put as the question: What reason is there for believing in the principle
that entails the existence of the continuum— the powerset axiom?23
For the predicativist, sets of natural numbers are given by means of principles
of denition or set-construction. Any xed list or collection of such means will
give rise to only countably many sets, and therefore the means of denition can
always be expanded — the process of diagonalizing will always give rise to more sets.
What is unjustiable is the classical assumption that there is some sort of a limit
to this process: a completed totality or denite domain of all of the sets of natural
numbers, a totality of which the diagonal set of any sequence of members is already
a member.24 Poincaré nicely expresses the situation:
Richard’s proof teaches us that, whenever I break o the process, then
there is a corresponding law, while Cantor proves that the process can
be continued arbitrarily far.25
And what goes for sets of natural numbers also goes for real numbers. For
the predicativist, then, the continuum is not a mathematical object: we cannot
unproblematically employ classical quantication over it. ¿e ‘Weylian number
system’, comprising those reals which are denable by the arithmetic means that
Weyl outlines in Das Kontinuum, is obviously incomplete, in that we can diagonalize
out of it: that is to say, we can dene in terms of it a real number which it does
not include. But what recommends it is that it is a denite domain, over which we
23 ¿is question is the germ of the whole of the negative part of this thesis. It is given further force by
the morass which surrounds the Continuum Hypothesis, which will be discussed in §4.1.3 below. ¿e
question is further discussed from various angles by Hallett, Cantorian set theory. 24 See § 4.3.4
below for further discussion of the countablist construal of the Diagonal Argument. 25 Poincaré,
‘Über transnite Zahlen’ pp. 46–47.
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can meaningfully quantify classically, and that it is rich enough to allow the natural
development of large parts of classical analysis.
Although the idea of an innite powerset is perhaps the obvious route to the
idea of uncountability, another route seems to be given by considering the set of all
countable ordinals. ¿e predicativist’s objection here is, again, simply to ask: Why
should we suppose that there is any such set?26 ¿e objection is given substantial
force by the paradoxes; in particular the Burali-Forti paradox, which tells us that there
is no set of all of the ordinals. Unless we already know that there are uncountable
ordinals, we have every reason to be wary of the assumption that there is a set of all
of the countable ordinals. But of course the only grounds for the belief that there are
uncountable ordinals are the very arguments in question. It seems that there is no
non-circular route to the Cantorian higher innite.
3.3.6 ¿e arbitrary innite
¿e history of the broadening of the concept of ‘function’ in the course of the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries is o en told as a move from the idea of a function as
some sort of ‘analytic expression’ — a function described by means of an expression
built up from polynomials and trigonometric functions — and to the modern idea
of a function as any association of arguments with unique values. And this was what
was suggested in the potted history of chapter 2 above.
But the discussion of denitionism above allows us to see that the important
development as far as predicativism is concerned is not the broadening in permiss-
ible methods of function denition, so much as the consideration of a domain of
functions, of which some are not denable at all; it is that which led to impredicative
specications, that is, the use of quantication over that domain of functions in a
specication of one of its members. I will use the phrase ‘arbitrary function’ for the
concept of a correlation of arguments with unique values, regardless of whether it
can be given by a nite rule.
While historically it was with the consideration of functions that these issues
rst arose, it should be kept in mind that the situation with other innite objects —
most importantly, arbitrary real numbers and arbitrary sets of natural numbers — is
exactly the same.
¿e move to arbitrary functions has nothing to do with the move out from
26 See the discussion in §2.2 above.
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functions dened by nice algebraic expressions to a broader class of functions which
are dened by increasingly ad hoc means. ¿e example given by Riemann of a
(Riemann-) integrable function which has innitely many discontinuities in every
interval is not, in the relevant sense, an arbitrary function, precisely because it is an
example. ¿at is to say, it is not arbitrary, because it completely dened by a nite
rule.
But in general, to specify an arbitrary function — or to switch to the simpler
case, a real number — requires an innite amount of information. In certain cases
this is not so: there clearly are real numbers which are nitely speciable, such as
2
3 ,pi, and the real between 0 and 1 with binary digits given, at each place, by whether
or not the Turing machine with that number halts.27 But we have every reason to
believe that systems of notation or description which we could use would only get
us countably many real numbers.
¿e important conceptual leap is the leap to the idea of a domain of quantication
which includes reals, or functions, regardless of whether or not they are denable.
¿is leap takes us from an understanding of quantication over functions which is
compatible with schematic quantication (‘if you give me a function, I’ll give you
a Fourier series for it’), to the classical understanding of such a quantication, as
the logical product of all of the members of the domain — in this case, the function
space RR. It is the leap from talk of ‘any’ function to talk of ‘all’ functions.
On the older conception, the domain of functions was open-ended. Hypothes-
ized generalizations about any function could be established on the basis of schematic
reasoning, or refuted by producing a counterexample; but in the absence of either,
such a claim had no determinate content.
Of course, it is quite coherent for a constructivist to suppose that all of the
functions that there are are denable by certain specied means; and in this case
there is no dierence between schematic and classical universal quantication over
all of the functions. But as a matter of fact, the denable functions were understood
as being open-ended. ¿e discussion of Richard’s paradox above shows why: given
the domain of items which are dened by any given formally laid down means of
denition, there will be a diagonalization which is not denable in the original sense,
but clearly is a legitimate denition in the informal sense.
An implementation of the positive predicativist project will involve placing
27 ¿e point of the last example is to show that the denable reals are not just the Turing computable
reals.
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certain restrictions on the denition of functions and sets: such denitions must be
predicative. But this requirement follows from the basic criticism of the Cantorian
approach, which predicativists and intuitionists share. It is not that the Cantorian
is over-liberal in the function or set denitions she countenances, that she allows
in particular items that are too gruesome to be stomached; the objection is that the
Cantorian takes herself— extravagantly— to be considering the set of all real-valued
functions, including those without any denition at all. (Which is, on the classical
view, almost all of them.)
¿e Cantorian picture is of a denite domain which includes all arbitrary func-
tions, as well as those given by rules. ¿e way in which this picture makes itself felt
is through the assumption that quantications over such a domain have determin-
ate meaning; most egregriously, for the predicativist, in the assumption that such
quantication may legitimately feature in denitions.
Consider the following argument. We can imagine an early nineteenth-century
analyst, who is aware that there are functions with innitely many discontinuities.
He claims that nonetheless, for every function and every interval, there is at least
one point in that interval where the function is continuous. He is then confronted
with Dirichlet’s example of a totally discontinuous function. He protests: But that
isn’t the sort of thing I meant! ¿at isn’t a proper function!
For such a dispute to be possible, there must be a dierence in opinion of the
meaning of the quantier phrase ‘all functions’. Such disputes were in eect prevented
by the adoption of a completely general denition of a function: any single-valued
correspondence of reals with reals is a function. Which is to say: anything goes. But
is this explicit dropping of restrictions enough to determine a univocal meaning for
the phrase ‘all functions’? ¿e Cantorian assumption is that mathematical reality is
enough to settle the matter. ¿ere is obviously much that can be said on the matter;
but the modest predicativist point is simply that there is an assumption here which
the classicist needs to make and which the predicativist does not.
3.4 Predicativism
As discussed in the introduction, the position I put forward in this thesis is a form
of evangelical predicativism. My central criticism of impredicative classical mathem-
atics is not that it is inconsistent or incoherent: it is that I do not see any reason to
3.4. PREDICATIVISM 61
believe it to be true. Nothing that I have to say gives any reason to think that a system
such as ZF is inconsistent. I do raise doubts as to the clarity of the intuitive model
of ZF— the iterative hierarchy of sets. As the only positive reason to believe that a
fundamental mathematical theory is consistent is that we have a clear intuitive model
of it, if such doubts can be sustained, mathematicians should be less condent in the
consistency of ZF than they currently are. But such considerations are inevitably
rather nebulous; all that can ultimately be said is that, despite my best eorts, I have
not found the explanations classicists have oered to be satisfactory.
I am aware that I cannot hope to make a wholly compelling case for the evan-
gelical position given current constraints of time and space. I hope, however, to do
enough to show that the evangelical position is worthy of consideration, and so to
shi at least some of the burden of proof onto the defender of the classical status quo.
In particular, I will argue that one currently popular line of defence for the realistic
acceptance of classical mathematics, the scientic indispensability argument, fails to
support impredicative mathematics.
¿e indispensability argument derives from Quine. ¿e idea is that mathematics
is an essential part of our total scientic theory, and that our reason for holding
mathematics true is of the same sort as our reason for holding true any (other)
scientic belief: mathematical truth, like the rest of scientic truth, is ultimately
empirical. I will deal more fully with the subject of indispensability arguments in §7.2
below; but, to briey anticipate that discussion, I will argue that the Quinean line,
when augmented with some consideration of the extent of predicative mathematics,
leads to the conclusion that impredicativemathematics does not earn its keep. It is not
a working part of our scientic machinery, but, to use Quine’s words, ‘mathematical
recreation’, and as such is ‘without ontological rights.’28
At this point, it is as well to clarify how my use of the label ‘predicativism’ relates
to that of others. Feferman29 notes that intermediate between the predicative and
the Cantorian conception of sets is what he calls the ‘constructive’ conception, which
permits, besides predicative set denitions, generalized inductive denitions of vari-
ous sorts, allowing one to form the smallest sets satisfying certain closure conditions.
Feferman cites Lorenzen,Wang andMyhill as writers who have explored this broader
conception, and regrets that Lorenzen and Wang used the term ‘predicative’ to refer
to it.
28 Quine, ‘Reply to Parsons’ p. 400. 29 Feferman, ‘Systems of predicative analysis [I]’ pp. 4–5
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It should be noted that Feferman himself seems to endorse such an intermediate
position: he describes himself not as a predicativist, but as an antiplatonist with
predicativist sympathies. He accepts the legitimacy of certain formal systems which
go well beyond the limits of predicative mathematics, because they can be justied
proof-theoretically by means of iterated inductive denitions such as Lorenzen and
Wang studied.
I shall follow Feferman’s narrower use of ‘predicative’, but not his use of ‘con-
structive’: ‘constructive’ is useful and now well-established as a broad-brush term
for the whole tendency within foundations which is sceptical of modern classical
mathematics, and is prepared to consider revisions.
3.4.1 ‘Given the natural numbers’
¿e position I am exploring and promoting in this thesis is predicativism given the
natural numbers. ¿e signicance of the qualication is that the position takes for
granted the arithmetic of the natural numbers. I should make it clear at once that I
mean rst-order classical arithmetic: I will argue in Ch. 4.2 that the second-order
consequence relation is not something we can claim to have a purely logical grasp
of. ¿e legitimacy of this ‘taking for granted’, and what in fact it amounts to, are
explored in Ch. 5.2; but my concern in this thesis is primarily with the philosophy of
analysis (and higher mathematics more generally), and not with the philosophy of
arithmetic.
Taking arithmetic for granted is the route advocated by Poincaré and followed
by Weyl; it contrasts, of course, with the logicist position of Russell and Whitehead
in the Principia. Russell and Whitehead wanted to explain arithmetic as a body of
logical truths, though to carry this out they found themselves forced to assume, as a
supposedly logical axiom, the existence of an innity of individuals. One might well
think that this is not substantially better than simply postulating the existence of the
natural numbers themselves.30
¿e reason that Poincaré and Weyl gave for taking the natural numbers for
granted, as their starting point, was essentially the same reason that Kant gave: the
truths of arithmetic are synthetic a priori, and our knowledge of them derives from
30 It is in fact somewhat more modest: Principia’s axiom of innity assumes that the individuals are
simply innite, and it is then proved (without the use of any Choice assumptions) that the system’s
natural numbers, two types up, are Dedekind innite. See Boolos, ‘Honest toil’.
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intuition. In particular, Poincaré and Weyl both lay great stress on the intuition of
iteration as our route to the natural number concept, and therefore on arithmetical
induction as primitive.31
It has been argued by various writers that the natural numbers can only be fully
characterized by impredicative means.32 It is induction that is blamed for the impre-
dicativity: the natural numbers are supposed to be characterized axiomatically; that
is, the Peano axioms serve as a sort of implicit denition of the concept of natural
number. But among those axioms are instances of induction which involve quantic-
ation over the natural numbers. (¿is is why the denition of the natural numbers in
Principia depends essentially on the Axiom of Reducibility, which eectively licenses
impredicative set specications.)
I will argue in Ch. 5.2.2 that instances of the rst-order induction scheme are
not in fact formally impredicative. But the broader question is whether the natural
numbers stand in need of the sort of characterization which is being oered. ¿e role
that induction plays in the characterization is to weed out non-standard elements.
But we do not arrive at our conception of the natural numbers by rst thinking of
some larger domain, and then throwing elements away until we are le with the
minimal collection which contains zero and is closed under the successor operation.
In reality, the process is quite the reverse: we build up from zero. ¿enatural numbers
are zero, the successor of zero, the successor of the successor of zero, and so on. And
a er coming to that conception of the natural number structure, we can then see
that the Peano axioms hold of it.
¿ere is of course much more to be said about how we come to understand the
natural number structure; the simple point being made here is that our grasp of the
natural numbers comes from understanding the iteration of the successor operation,
and that they can therefore be seen as being built up in parallel with the numerals.
What this gives us is a disanalogy between the natural numbers, on the one hand,
and the sort of sets which the predicativist rejects, on the other. ¿ose sets are given
by impredicative specications, and in general there is no way of building them up
from below in a nitary step-by-step fashion in the way that the naturals can be
generated. ¿is disanalogy is a reason to think that the naturals are a legitimate
starting point, and so also a reason to think that the position I am advocating, which
31 Goldfarb, ‘Poincaré against the logicists’. 32 See e.g. Parsons, ‘¿e impredicativity of induction
[1992]’, Nelson, Predicative Arithmetic, Dummett, ‘Gödel’s theorem’.
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takes the naturals for granted and then proceeds in accordance with a predicativity
requirement, is one that is indeed worth exploring.33
3.4.2 Conclusion
¿is chapter completes the introductory part of the thesis: as such, I have issued
several promissory notes which I will try to redeem later on. To help make clearer
what has and what hasn’t been achieved so far, I shall here briey reiterate the main
points of the chapter.
Predicativism is driven by the concern that quantication over open-ended
domains may not be determinately meaningful. Domains for which we have a
uniform system of notation (which gives a name to each of the elements of the
domain) are not open-ended in this way. ¿e paradigmatic example of such a
domain is the domain of natural numbers, for which we have the numerals as a
notational system. All such domains are at most countably innite; they lack the
arbitrariness which is the hallmark of the uncountable. We cannot simply wish away
the uncountability of the continuum: but as quantication over the continuum is
highly problematic, we must avoid such quantication in our denitions.
33 Isaacson has inuentially argued that there is a distinct sort of arithmetical knowledge which
grounds rst-order Peano arithmetic. See Isaacson, ‘Arithmetical truth and hidden higher-order
concepts’, Isaacson, ‘Some considerations on arithmetical truth and the omega-rule’.
Chapter 4
Classicism about the continuum
¿e thesis of this chapter is that there are serious prima facie problems with the
classical view of the continuum. ¿ese problems comprise a good case that it is
worth at least exploring possible alternatives to classicism.
¿e charge I make against classicism is not that it is incoherent; it is simply that
it is very dicult to explain in detail what the position really is, and very dicult to
see either how anyone could come to such a conception, or why it should be thought
true.
¿e structure of this chapter is as follows. §§4.2–4.4 deal with three dierent
routes to classicism: second-orderism, according to which our grasp of the classical
continuum ows from our grasp of the natural numbers together with a logical
understanding of the subsets of the naturals; Cantorianism, according to which
it ows from a mathematical understanding of the powerset of the naturals; and
intuitivism, which takes the continuum as primitively given to us in intuition. §4.1
deals with some preliminaries: I explain the taxonomy of classicism that I have
adopted; and I explore the issue of the ContinuumHypothesis, which to some extent
cuts across the taxonomy.
4.1 Preliminaries
What are the commitments of contemporary mathematical practice?
Here is a list of some commitments that concern the innite: ¿ere are
actually innite combinatorial collections, most centrally some set that
will serve as the natural numbers and some set that will serve as the
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power set of that one, which gives us the real numbers. ¿ose collections
exist in some sense that licenses reasoning about them impredicatively.1
¿e above quotation nicely expresses the standard view of the ontology behind
arithmetic and analysis — what I will call the classical view. On this view, both the
collection of natural numbers, and the arithmetical continuum (the collection of its
subsets) are denite domains. In keeping with the Kreisel–Dummett dictum that the
important philosophical issue is the semantics of mathematics, not the ontology, I
will focus on the cash-value of this: the classicist takes statements involving arbitrary
quantication overN andP(N) to be meaningful and to have determinate truth-
values (even though in many cases we may not be able to discover them).
On the classical view, then, every sentence in the language of second-order
arithmetic (analysis, as logicians call it) is, when given the standard interpretation,
determinately either true or false, quite independently of us, and of our ability to
know which it is.
¿e predicativist view, which I am expounding, opposes this: it takes there to
be an important dierence between the domains N andP(N). ¿e predicativist
agrees with the classicist that the natural numbers are a denite domain, and so
agrees that arithmetical statements (statements in the language of rst-order arith-
metic) are meaningful and have determinate truth-values; but she rejects this for the
arithmetical continuum, i.e. the powerset of the natural numbers.
¿e predicativist contention is of course more general, in that it rejects the
conception of the classical powerset of any innite set. But, again, I focus here mostly
on the rst and simplest case, which is also the most important for mathematics.
Anti-classicism — that is, scepticism about the classical view — may or may
not be the result of predicativist sympathies. In most cases, though, the dialectic
between the classicist and the anti-classicist runs something like this. ¿e anti-
classicist demands that the classicist explain what exactly it is that the classicist
believes, or that she explain how the uninitiated (or sceptical) could ever get to a
classical conception of the continuum.
¿e classicist perhaps tries to respond to these question, but, as we will see, some
common responses do not get very far. But a very popular alternative move for the
classicist is a tu quoque style of argument: to insist that, although classicism might
seem a little mysterious, and although these questions are very hard to answer to the
1 Lavine, Understanding the Innite p. 157.
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sceptic’s satisfaction, as a matter of fact, everyone (or almost everyone) already has a
classical conception of the continuum; and that therefore the sceptical view really is
sceptical, in the sense of being a falsehood universally acknowledged as such (though
it may be dicult to know just what is wrong with the position or how to refute it).
¿e existence of this shared classical conception of the continuum is shown (the
classicist claims) by various shared, largely unproblematic practices which require
such a conception for their underpinning (or at least require for their underpinning
foundations which can also support classicism). Popular candidates for practices
which supposedly reveal classical commitment include our free use of the concept of
the ancestral of a relation, and our ready acceptance of classical arithmetic, as well
as aspects of language use such as the plural idiom and quantication into predicate
position. I will attempt to undermine such arguments by showing either that the
practices appealed to are more problematic and questionable than is assumed by
the classicist, or that they do not in fact lend the support for classicism about the
continuum that is claimed for them.
4.1.1 Taxonomy: three routes to classicism
A defence of classicism about the arithmetical continuum might take one of three
broad paths: one path is to take second-order logic seriously as logic, and so to see
the truths of analysis as logical consequences of (sentences expressing) the structure
of the natural numbers. I will call this the second-orderist path. ¿e second approach
is conceptually more economical, but is ontologically somewhat proigate (at least in
its usual form): it views analysis as a special branch of amore general set theory. I will
call this the Cantorian path. ¿e third approach is to take the classical continuum
as in some sense intuitively given. An obvious route would be to appeal to our
geometric intuition of the continuity of space (or of lines in space), and to explain
the real numbers on that basis. I will call this approach ‘intuitivism’ (though with
some reluctance).
Second-orderists view the classical domain of sets of natural numbers as some-
thing which is logically given when the naturals numbers are: analysis is just arith-
metic plus logic. While second-order logic is very o en seen as (at least a part of)
our route to a grasp of the natural numbers, second-orderism is independent of, and
not to be confused with logicism: logicism is the position that the natural numbers
themselves are given to us logically. Second-orderists need not (and generally do
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not) take such a view: it is now very widely held that it is not a logical truth that
there are an innite number of objects. What distinguishes second-orderists is in-
stead their view that what there is (mathematically speaking) suces to completely
determine the truth-value of sentences featuring second-order quantication over
what there is. In the case of the arithmetical continuum, the second-orderist could
have a (rst-order) domain consisting just of the natural numbers, and justify or
analyse classical analysis as the second-order theory of these objects. (Such a view
may sidestep worries about the Continuum Hypothesis, as we will see below.)
On the Cantorian view, there are not really two sorts of quantication, one over
natural numbers and one over sets of natural numbers: there are just two sorts of
objects, natural numbers and sets of natural numbers. What sets of natural numbers
there are is a consequence of general principles of set existence; but the sets of
naturals are abstract objects in the world, just as the numbers are; and as such it is at
least logically possible that there were fewer sets of naturals than there actually are. (It
is not important for my purposes to distinguish between set-theoretic reductionist
Cantorians who take the natural numbers actually to be sets, and non-reductionist
Cantorians who take them to be urelemente.) In brief: for the Cantorian, analysis is
given by arithmetic together with the set concept. As such, the Cantorian views both
the arithmetical continuum and the natural numbers as mathematical structures to
be investigated by means of a standard (rst-order) mathematical theory.
In this, the Cantorian agree with the intuitivist, who appeals to (perhaps geo-
metrical) intuition to justify a mathematical theory of the classical real numbers.
However, the intuitivist route also has similarities to second-orderism, in terms of
its (apparent, relative) modesty: it does not obviously commit itself to the existence
of sets such as ℵ17.
My three-fold distinction is, to repeat, among classicists about the arithmet-
ical continuum: that is, those who believe that every sentence ϕ of the language
of second-order arithmetic, L2A, has a determinate truth value. Second-orderists
believe this because they take themselves to have a logical understanding of what it
is for something to be a full model of a second-order theory, and because on this
assumption, Dedekind’s proof of the categoricity of second-order Peano arithmetic
(PA2) tells us that there is, up to isomorphism, only one such model of PA2, which
will of course settle the truth-value of any sentence of L2A.
Cantorians and intuitivists are not prepared to take second-order logical con-
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sequence as being unproblematic or fundamental in this way: they instead defend
themeaningfulness and bivalence of ϕ > L2Awith reference to a pair of mathematical
structures N,P(N) over which, respectively, the rst- and second-order variables
of L2A range. (Most commonly, these structures are identied with certain sets —
the von Neumann ordinal ω and its powerset — in a background set theory such
as ZFC, though this, too, is an optional extra. I will, however, sometimes make this
convenient identication to smooth the exposition.)
¿e appeal to direct geometrical intuition of the continuum is clearly dierent
from the other two approaches. However, the distinction between second-orderists
and Cantorians should perhaps not be taken too seriously: I make the distinction
here primarily for expository convenience.2 My concern in this chapter is to criticize
the argument that we have sucient grasp of the continuum to justify impredicative
mathematics, and my discussion falls into three parts, according as my opponents
account for their grasp by logical, by mathematical, or by intuitive means.3
4.1.2 Taxonomy: rst-order and second-order
¿e second-orderist is committed to full second-order logic. But as the adjective
suggests, other ‘logics’ are also sometimes called second-order, and with good reason.
For instance, the subsystems of second-order arithmetic discussed in Simpson’s book
of that name are not theories in a background of full second-order logic.4 Such
theories are indeed o en called two- (or many-) sorted rst-order theories.
¿ere are (at least) three notions of second (or higher) ‘order’ which are run
together in this terminological morass; and it is as well to try to distinguishing these
as a preliminary to our discussion. A theory may be:
(a) interpretationally second-order in that it has, as its intended model, two (or
more) essentially dierent sorts of objects: urelemente, and sets or collections of
urelemente (and perhaps also sets or collections of those, and perhaps beyond);
(b) presentationally second-order, in that, in addition, the language of the theory
distinguishes between these two (or more) sorts of object by featuring two (or
more) sorts of variables;
2 Shapiro, for instance, notes that the acceptance of what he calls ‘working realism’ in set theory comes
to much the same thing as acceptance of second-order logic: see Shapiro, Foundations p. 255. 3 See
Moore, ‘Beyond rst-order logic’ for discussion. 4 Simpson, Subsystems of Second Order Arithmetic.
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(c) fully second-order, in that, further, a structure is to count as a model of the
theory only if it has the second-order variables ranging over the full classical
powerset of the domain.
It is precisely because the Cantorian (unlike the second-orderist) does not take
the idea of the full classical powerset of an innite domain to be unproblematically
logical, and so cannot accept a fully second-order theory of the continuum, that she
needs a formal theory of the continuum. Such a formal theory may not, on pain of
circularity, be fully second-order; but it may well be presentationally second-order.
An example of a formal theory which is presentationally second-order is the
standard, recursively axiomatized, formal second-order theory of arithmetic PA2.5
Iterative set theories such as ZF and its relatives are presented in single-sorted
languages; though they could perhaps be argued to be interpretationally transnitely
higher-order, based as they are on an idea of rank. (In contrast, for example, to type-
free systems such as Quine’s NF.) But it is not necessary to take a view on this here.
Set-class theories, such as NBG andMK, are straightforwardly interpretationally
second-order, given the distinction they draw between sets and classes; again, they
may or may not be presented in a two-sorted language.
4.1.3 ¿e ContinuumHypothesis
One problem which seems at rst to confront classicists of whatever stripe is the
Continuum Hypothesis, CH, and so, before turning to discuss the three routes to
classicism, I want to pause here to briey note that a classicist’s judgement on its
status can depend on the route to classicism which she takes. As we saw in Ch. 2,
CH is the hypothesis, made by Cantor soon a er he recognized the uncountability
of the continuum, that its cardinality is ℵ1, the smallest it could be.
But as is familiar, the standardly accepted principles of set theory fail to settle the
matter: they are compatible with both the truth of CH (as Gödel showed in 1940),6
and with its falsity (as Cohen showed in 1963).7
¿e fact that CH continues to be ‘wide open’ is something of a scandal given its
fundamental position. As Scott writes:
5 However, a variant presentation of this theory can be given in a one-sorted language. In such a case
one requires predicates meaning (intuitively) ‘. . . is a number,’ ‘. . . is a class.’ 6 Gödel,¿e Consistency
of the Axiom of Choice. 7 Cohen, ‘Independence of CH’.
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Is it not just a bit embarrassing that the currently accepted axioms for
set theory (which could be given — as far as they went — a perfectly
natural motivation) simply did not determine the concept of innite
set even in the very important region of the continuum?8
Cantor, famously, regarded CH as hugely important and worked at it incessantly,
on several occasions taking himself to have found a proof. Cantor of course believed
CH to be true; ℵ1 is certainly the tidiest cardinality for the continuum, and so this
would be in keeping with Cantor’s deeply held (and religiously motivated) belief that
the realm of the transnite was not in the least arbitrary.
Received opinion among present-day set theorists seems to be against CH, if
only on the grounds that a larger continuum makes life more interesting. But a
more fundamental question is whether CH has a truth-value at all. In the wake
of Cohen’s proof, many suggested that set theory would bifurcate into ‘Cantorian’
(where CH holds) and ‘non-Cantorian’ set theories (where the negation of CH holds),
just as geometry bifurcated into Euclidean- and non-Euclidean geometries a er it
was shown that the parallel postulate and its negation were both consistent with
Euclid’s other axioms. As Scott wrote,
Cohen’s ideas created so many [consistency] proofs that he himself was
convinced that the formalist position in foundations was the rational
conclusion.9
Kreisel has famously defended the meaningfulness of CH on second-orderist
grounds.10 Cohen’s proof shows that dierent models of rst-order set theory have
‘continua’ of dierent sizes. But we have known since Skolem that rst-order theories
with innite models cannot be categorical. And Zermelo showed, in modern terms,
that second-order set theory, ZF2, is quasi-categorical: any two models dier only
in respect of their height, that is to say in how many ordinals they contain. In all of
them the referent of ‘P(ω)’ is the real powerset of ω; and it is the case that, either
this set has cardinality ℵ1 in all of the models, or it has some other cardinality κ in
all of the models. ¿e only trouble is that we do not know which. Kreisel’s position
is a (particularly strong) form of second-orderism.
CH can be formulated as a sentence of pure second-order logic:
∀X(CONT(X) (ALEPH-1(X))),
8 Scott, ‘Foreword’ p. xv. 9 Ibid. 10 Kreisel, ‘Informal Rigour’.
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whereCONT(X) abbreviates the claim thatX is continuum-sized, andALEPH-1(X)
says that X is of cardinality ℵ1.11
So the classicist, who by denition believes in the determinacy of truth-value
for sentences of L2A and so a fortiori of sentences of pure second-order logic, seems
to be committed to the determinacy of the meaning and truth-value of CH.
But this appearance is misleading, at least for some second-orderists. For a
second-orderist whose domain consists just of the natural numbers, CH is vacuously
true: the second-order variables range only over properties of natural numbers, and
obviously their extensions— sets of natural numbers — are either nite or countably
innite. ¿ere is nothing continuum-sized or ℵ1-sized in the range of the variable X,
and so the biconditional is vacuously fullled.
CH can be formulated in a way meaningful to those who accept only countably
many objects: but this formulation requires third-order arithmetic:∀Ξ(CONT(Ξ) ALEPH-1(Ξ)). 12
To take stock, then: CH is not aworry for the strictly arithmetical second-orderist,
i.e. the second-orderist whose rst-order mathematical ontology is limited to the
natural numbers. (¿is is on two assumptions. First, that her non-mathematical
ontology is also nite or countable, or at least not obviously of the power of the
continuum. Second, that she is not tempted into accepting the meaningfulness
of third-order logic.) ¿e question of CH does not arise on such a view, because
there are no (rst-order) objects corresponding to the real numbers, and the only
second-order items are the sets of natural numbers.
Weston, in contrast, defends the meaningfulness and univocality of CH on non-
logical grounds.13 He rejects Kreisel’s second-orderist approach for various reasons
(some of which are not very dierent to those I present below). But he claims that
the continuum is a determinate object, on the grounds that it is physically realized,
11 CONT(X) can be §C§R(ALEPH-0(C) & ∀x∀y(Rxy  (Xx & Cy)) &∀Y(Y b C   §x∀y(Rxy Yy)) & ∀x∀y((Xx & Xy& ∀z(Rxz Ryz))  x = y));
ALEPH-1(X) abbreviates ∀Y.Y b X   (FIN(Y) - ALEPH-0(Y) - Y  X); FIN(X) is INF(X), where INF(X) is the obvious second-order statement that X is Dedekind innite,§Y(Y ø X& Y  X); X  Y abbreviates the statement that there is a bijection between X and Y, say§R[∀x(Xx   §y(Yy&Rxy&∀z(Rxz  y = z)))&∀y(Yy  §x(Xx&Rxy&∀z(Rzy  x = z)))];
ALEPH-0(X) abbreviates the statement INF(X) & ∀Y(Y b X   (Y  X - FIN(Y))); and nally
X b Y abbreviates ∀x(Xx   Yx). See Shapiro, Foundations for further details and discussion.
12 ¿e abbreviations here can simply be the third-order versions of what was given in the note above.
13 Weston, ‘Kreisel and CH’.
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and that not only classical mathematicians, but also constructive mathematicians of
Bishop’s school share the same conception of it.
¿e claim that the classical continuum is physically realized seems to me to
be highly problematic. While the real numbers are used ubiquitously in physics,
this does not seem to commit physicists to the Dedekind completeness of the set of
points in a spatial interval any more than the use of continuous supply and demand
curves in economics commits economists to the claim that goods and money are
continuously divisible and can be exchanged in arbitrarily small quantities.
For his claim that Bishop-style constructivists share the classical conception of
the continuum, Weston gives as evidence the fact that Bishop’s denition of a real
number is in terms of sequences which satisfy a constructive convergence criterion;
and he suggests that a classicist can see that all and only the real real numbers will
satisfy such a condition.
But all that this shows is that the classicist can agree with Bishop’s denition of
the real numbers. ¿e question of what real numbers there are comes down to what
sequences of rationals there are which will satisfy Bishop’s convergence criterion.
And there is every reason to think that the classicist believes in more sequences of
rational numbers (ones which have impredicative denitions, for example) than
Bishop does (or indeed, than the predicativist does).
¿e conclusion I would suggest from this highly problematic status of CH is that
there is a general reason to be suspicious of the classicist’s claim to have succeeded
in pinning down the (classical) continuum, in whatever way she purports to have
done this. However, as we shall see, this conclusion needs to be qualied somewhat.
4.2 Second-orderism
An illustration of received philosophical opinion on the nature of the second-order
logical consequence relation is given by Michael Dummett (in his discussion of one
part of the platonist philosophy of mathematics he opposes):
¿at there may be mathematical facts that we shall be forever incap-
able of establishing [. . . .] is normally admitted on the ground that
our inferential powers are limited: there may be consequences of our
initial assumptions that we are unable to draw. If these are rst-order
consequences, we could ‘in principle’ draw them [. . . ]. If they are second-
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order consequences, we may be unable even in principle to see that they
follow.14
¿e picture is that although there is not and cannot be an eective method for
drawing out all of the second-order consequences of a set of axioms, what those
consequences are is nonetheless entirely determinate. In the matter which concerns
us here, the second-orderist stance is that our grasp of the meaning of second-
order quantication is what underwrites a determinate conception of the classical
continuum.
In opposition to this, I argue that the second-order consequence relation is highly
problematic, and that insofar as we do understand second-order quantication,
it cannot be plausibly claimed that this is logical understanding: it is instead by
(implicit) appeal to some sort of set theory.
4.2.1 ¿e meaning of the second-order quantiers
¿e standard second-orderist view (for example, as outlined in Shapiro, Foundations)
is that themonadic second-order universal quantier∀X simplymeans for all classes;
or for all concepts, or properties, or propositional functions, or subsets of the domain;
or whatever. ¿e metaphysical nature of the items referred to by the predicates,
and over which the predicate variables range is not the point here. To vindicate
classicism, the important thing is quantity, not quality: there need to be suciently
many extensionally distinct items; there needs to be at least one item for each possible
extension.
But which are the possible extensions? ¿is is the very question the second-
orderist is trying to answer. What we can say is that the domain of extensions
should not be an extensible one:15 the collection of extensions should be closed
under diagonalization. As we will see in a moment, this requirement can only be
formulated because the case in which we are interested here is one where the natural
numbers are rst-level objects, and so the classes we are concerned with are classes
of natural numbers.
(It is worth noting in passing that another consequence of insisting that the
natural numbers are present is that we can limit our discussion of second-order
14 Dummett, ‘What?’ p. 431. 15 ‘Domain’, here as elsewhere, is not meant to be ontologically
committing to a third-order entity, a class of classes or suchlike: it is used simply as the most convenient
form of expression.
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logic to monadic second-order logic with no loss in power or generality. ¿is is
because primitive recursive pairing functions are available, so quantication over
polyadic predicate variables or function variables can be eliminated. ¿is makes the
discussion somewhat smoother than it would otherwise be.)
By saying that we require the classes to be closed under diagonalization, what
I mean is that we require that for any sequence of classes X1,X2, . . ., the domain
will also contain the extensions i > N S Xi(i),i > N S Xi(i), and so forth.
And what does ‘and so forth’ mean? Again, this is more or less the whole point at
issue. One of the predicativist’s objection to the second-orderist is the narrower
point about the problematic impredicativity of classes such as the diagonal ones
just dened; but the broader and more basic problem is that the second-orderist is
simply incapable of fully stating what it is that she believes in. ¿e best we can do
is to say that the second-orderist’s domain of extensions should be large enough to
validate the impredicative class-abstraction principle,
§X∀x(Xx ϕ(x)),
where ϕ is any formula of the full second-order language (as usual, not containing
x or X free). (If there are parameters in ϕ, i.e. free variables other than x or X, the
principle is to be understood as being prenex universally quantied.)
But insisting on the abstraction principle is not enough to capture the second-
orderist position. ¿is is because from the second-orderist’s perspective, there will
be countable models of this principle; or indeed of any principle that can be written
down and is open to interpretation. ¿e second-orderist is forced simply to bang the
table: to say, loudly, that all possible extensions just means all possible extensions.
¿e standard semantics explains the second-orderist view more fully. In the
semantics for a rst-order language, an interpretation I with domain D assigns to
each variable x an element of D; to each n-place predicate a subset of Dn; and a
quantied formula (∀x)pis true on I i all x-variants of Imake ptrue. (An x-variant
of I is an interpretation which is either I itself, or diers from I only be assigning
to x a dierent element of the domain.) Similarly, for second-order languages, an
interpretation assigns to each monadic predicate-variable X a subset of D; and the
formula (∀X)p is true on I i all X-variants of Imake p true.
As the last clause shows, the notion of all of the subsets of the domain — the
classical powersetP(D)— is central to full second-order logic.
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¿e full second-order semantics just sketched can of course be seen as a special
case of so-called rst-order semantics for monadic second-order languages: here the
range of the second-order quantiers is stated explicitly as part of the interpretation.
As well as D, a set SD of subsets of D is given; and the X-variants considered are
those which (may) assign a dierent member of SD to the variable X.
¿e Cantorianmakes sense of the second-order quantiers by choosing, for their
range SD, the full powersetP(D). ¿e Cantorian’s understanding of second-order
logic is mediated by her supposed mathematical knowledge of the powerset. ¿e
second-orderist, on the other hand, credits herself with understanding of the quanti-
ers by virtue of immediate, logical knowledge of their range. For this knowledge
of the domain of classes to be logical knowledge, it must presumably be based on
an understanding of a general notion of property or logical class, as opposed to a
mathematical notion of combinatorial collection, which is the supposed basis of the
Cantorian’s knowledge.
4.2.2 Second-order logic as logic
It is o en said in favour of second-order logic that there are many arguments we
nd intuitively valid which are most naturally formulated in second-order terms.
(A toy example is this: John is tall; Mary is tall; therefore there is something that
John and Mary have in common. In fact, the conclusion of this argument is a logical
truth on the second-order story. ¿e argument is of course valid; but then so too
is the argument: John is bald; Mary is tall; therefore there is something that John
and Mary have in common. ¿ere is always something that John and Mary have in
common, namely the property of being either John or Mary.)
It should be emphasized that such arguments are not relevant to our present
concern. Whatever moves in such arguments we nd logically compelling are simply
candidate axioms or inference rules for a logical calculus which is to represent our
(idealized) inferential practice.
If we believe that our idealized inferential practice must be recursively axiomat-
izable, then it is clear that these candidate axioms can never serve as evidence that
the appropriate semantics for our logical practice is the full second-order semantics,
because no recursively axiomatizable logical calculus can be sound and complete for
that semantics. (¿is familiar fact follows from the Dedekind’s Categoricity¿eorem
for second-order arithmetic, together with Gödel’s rst Incompleteness ¿eorem.)
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It is this that suggests that full second-order semantics is a part of meaning which
would necessarily transcend our use of language.
I would argue that there are good reasons to think that our idealized inferential
practice must be recursively axiomatizable; but to pursue this would take us too far
aeld. But even those who are sceptical of the claim should recognize that the set
of all of the candidate axioms which have actually been proposed is a recursively
enumerable set. (In fact, it is presumably just the union of a small nite number of
axioms, and the instances of a small nite number of axiom schemes.) Similarly, the
inference rules which have been proposed as candidates are recursively specied
and recursively based.
It might be objected that logicians do consider theories such as ‘true arithmetic’
(the set of sentences of the language LA of rst-order arithmetic (with addition and
multiplication) which are true on the standard interpretation), and non-eective
rules of inferences such as the ω-rule for arithmetic (which allows one to infer ∀xFx
from the innite set of premises F0,F1,F2, . . .). But in practice, as a matter of fact,
they do so from within some recursively axiomatizable meta-theory — normally
ZF set theory or something similar. Reasoning with non-formal systems is done by
working inside some formal system. Of course, mathematics is done informally; but
it is an important regulative ideal for mathematics that if any stage of a proof were
to have doubt cast on it, it could be formalized to remove such doubt.
It might be suggested that although the current basic principles of mathematics
are formal, in the future, there may be proposals of candidate axioms or rules which
are not. I am unworried by this apparent possibility, though: I believe that it is only
apparent, and that our idealized inferential practice must remain formal. But if our
concern is just with logico-mathematical practice as it exists, it is enough for our
purposes here to note that this practice is, as a matter of fact, formalizable.
Boolos has given a related argument that an adequate account of our inferential
practice would be a second-order account.16 He gives an example of a ‘curious
inference’ which (unlike the arguments just mentioned) is rst-order valid; which
has concisely stated premises and conclusion; but which would require for its proof
(in standard systems of rst-order logic) more symbols than there are leptons in the
observable universe. Alternatively, the conclusion can be proved from the premises
in a few dozen lines by using a standard deductive system for second-order logic.
16 Boolos, ‘A curious inference’.
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Boolos comments:
Since Skolem’s discovery of non-standard models of arithmetic, it has
been well known that there are simple and fundamental logical con-
cepts, e.g., the ancestral, that cannot be expressed in the notation of
rst-order logic. It is also well known that there notions of a logical
character expressible in natural language that cannot be expressed in
rst-order notation. And it is increasingly well understood that it is
neither necessary nor always possible to interpret second-order formal-
isms as applied rst-order set theories in disguise. ¿us although the
existence of a simple rst-order inference whose validity can be feasibly
demonstrated in second- but not rst-order logic cannot by itself be
regarded as an overwhelming consideration for the view that rst-order
logic ought never to have been accorded canonical status as Logic, it is
certainly one further consideration of some strength for this view.17
It should be pointed out, however, that the ‘curious inference’ is one which
can straightforwardly be interpreted as applied rst-order set theory. Boolos is
quite right to point out that the reasoning we use to see the validity of the curious
inference is clearly not the unfeasibly long pure rst-order argument. But again,
any candidate principle for reasoning which we might propose, to account for our
nding the inference compelling, is just that: another candidate for inclusion in our
idealized inferential practice. As such, it cannot be evidence that our logical practice
requires the assumption of full second-order semantics. ¿e other items on Boolos’s
charge-sheet are discussed below.
4.2.3 Arbitrary concepts
¿e basic objection to second-orderism is the notion of concept that it requires; in
particular, it needs a notion of concept which includes arbitrary concepts. To be
clear: ‘arbitrary concepts’ are those which need not be given by any nite rule. ¿e
question is where we can get a notion of concept suitable for the second-orderist’s
purposes.
Clearly the Tractarian or Armstrongian view of concepts, on which they are
appropriate components of states of aairs (revealed by logical analysis or by physics)
17 Boolos, ‘A curious inference’ pp. 379–380. Emphasis in original.
4.2. SECOND-ORDERISM 79
will not do. On such a view of concepts, there would presumably be only nitely, or
at most countably many concepts, and so would not be closed under diagonalization;
and so the concepts could not be the basis for a classical continuum. ¿e second-
orderist needs a notion of concept that is ‘thinner’, more pleonastic than this.
As mentioned earlier, it is a logical truth, on the second-order account, that John
and Mary have something in common: namely, the concept of being John or being
Mary. And that obviously generalizes: we can construct a concept true just of those
objects given in a nite list. But of course it is the innite case that we are interested
in. Here too, some concepts will be given by a rule. (For instance, the concepts
with co-nite extensions can be given by listing the objects of which they are false;
the concepts even number and prime number can be given by simple arithmetical
expressions.) But if our rules are to be rules for us, things that we could (perhaps
only in principle) understand or follow, they must be nite; for example, expressions
formed of a nite number of symbols from a nite alphabet. And there can only be
countably many such nite rules, while there are supposed to be uncountably many
concepts in the domain of the second-order variables. ¿erefore, almost all of these
concepts are undenable.
¿e simple fact that we do not have symbols for these concepts does not in itself
mean that it is not legitimate to quantify over them all. A er all, we do not have a
name for every grain of sand in the desert, but that does not stop us from being able
to quantify over them.
What we do have, though, is the ability in principle to get acquainted with and
name any particular object, including any particular grain of sand. (So, at least, we
classically suppose.) Whereas it is much more questionable that we could, even
in principle, become acquainted with wholly arbitrary concepts, conceived of as
corresponding to arbitrary subsets of an innite domain.
Why is there a disanalogy here between unnamed objects and unnamed con-
cepts? I suggest that this is because our understanding of concepts derives from our
understanding of the compositional structure of complete propositions, in a way
that our understanding of objects does not.18 As such, the concepts are indenitely
extensible, just as the propositions are: we can form new propositions by quantica-
tion, and so new concepts from those propositions. In contrast, the objects are not
18 To put the matter in Kantian terms, we have a robust ‘concept of object in general’, but no similarly
robust concept of concept in general. See Parsons,Mathematical ¿ought and its Objects Ch. 1 for some
discussion of the issues here.
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indenitely extensible in this way, unless we accept impredicative functions from
concepts to objects, as are entailed by Hume’s Principle, for example, or Axiom V.
A proposition can be decomposed by seeing it as functionally dependent on one
of the objects which features in it; that function is a concept. For Frege, a concept
is a function from objects to truth-values; for Russell, a concept (or ‘propositional
function’, as he called it) is a function from objects to propositions. On the level of
language, we get a predicate by taking a declarative sentence and replacing a singular
term in it with a variable.19
But substituting a variable for a singular term only gives us the idea of an ‘ob-
jective predicate’: that is, an F such that Fa says about a what Fb says about b.20
¿e idea that the second-orderist needs is not an ‘objective predicate’ but rather
something more like Ramsey’s idea of a propositional function in extension: this
is a purely arbitrary correlation of objects with propositions. In Ramsey’s example,
ϕ(Socrates)may be: Queen Anne is dead; while ϕ(Plato)may be: Einstein is a great
man.21 Or, if we are working in the Fregean framework, what the second-orderist
needs is the idea of a purely arbitrary correlation of objects with truth values.
Either way, the problem with Ramsey’s propositional functions in extension or
with arbitrary Fregean functions from objects to truth values is that we do not have
a genuine functional connection between the argument and the value; we just have a
19 Of course, as Ramsey famously pointed out in ‘Universals’, thus far there is perfect symmetry
between predicates and names: a name can be viewed as what is le a er taking a predicate out of
a simple sentence. But a restriction to simple sentences is question-begging, as ‘simple’ here means
subject–predicate. And in the general case, as Ramsey recognized (‘Universal and the “Method of
analysis” ’) there is a dierence: ‘Wise, like a ϕx in Mr Russell’s system, determines the narrower range
of propositions “x is wise” and the wider one “f wise,” where the last range includes all propositions
whatever in which wise occurs. Socrates, on the other hand, is only used to determine the wider range
of propositions in which it occurs in any manner; we have no precise way of singling out any narrower
range.’ Ramsey then continues, somewhat mysteriously: ‘Nevertheless this dierence between Socrates
and wise is illusory, because it can be shown to be theoretically possible to make a similar narrower
range for Socrates, though we have never needed to do this.’ I do not know what Ramsey had in mind
here; but I suggest that his second thought is the right one, and that there is an important dierence in
the combinatorial behaviour of the words ‘Socrates’ and ‘wise,’ and in the worldly items to which they
refer. 20 ¿e phrase ‘objective predicate’ is due to Sullivan, ‘Wittgenstein on FoM’. In the presence
of impredicative set theory, the arbitrary predicates which the second-orderist needs are of course also
‘objective predicates’ expressing set-membership claims. (¿is recalls Russell’s argument for the Axiom
of Reducibility: see Ch. 6.2 below.) But to appeal to set theory here is to give up on second-orderism
in favour of Cantorianism. 21 Ramsey, ‘Foundations’ p. 215.
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table listing, for each argument, what the value is. And if we have an innite domain
of arguments, it is unclear what sense we can make of such a table.22 Whether or
not we can nd some way of making sense of the idea of such arbitrary correlations,
what seems highly questionable is that they have anything to do with logic: that these
apparently ungraspable concepts play an essential role in an adequate explanation of
our inferential practice.
4.2.4 ¿e plural alternative
So far, I’ve cast doubt on the idea that full second-order quantication (that is, quan-
tication over a denite domain of all arbitrary sets of objects) is a genuinely logical
notion. It might be objected, however, that this notion is one that we are committed
to by our use of the plural idiom in natural language, or by our understanding of the
ancestral of a relation, or of arithmetic. In this and the next few subsections, I will
argue that these objections are misplaced.
George Boolos, as we have already seen, has been a great champion of second-
order logic, and his work has been responsible for much of the increase in philo-
sophical acceptance of second-order logic from the 1970s onwards. Perhaps his most
important contribution has been in developing the interpretation of second-order
logic as a logic of plurals. ¿is interpretation is used to great eect in the sort of tu
quoque gambit mentioned above: Boolos argues that we are already committed to
second-order logic by our use of the plural idiom in natural language.23
¿e standard account of the intuitive meaning of the rst-order existential quan-
tier (applied to a predicate) is in terms of there being an object in the domain:§xϕ(x) says that there is an object x which satises the open sentence ϕ. Boolos’s
suggestion is that the (monadic) second-order existential quantier can be under-
stood precisely analogously by talking of there being some objects: §Xϕ(X) say that
there are some things, X, which satisfy the open-sentence ϕ.24 We might talk of
22 Wittgenstein seems to be making the same criticism when he writes: ‘Ramsey’s theory [...] makes
the mistake that would be made by someone who said that you could use a painting as a mirror as
well, even if only for a single posture. If we say this we overlook that what is essential to a mirror
is precisely that you can infer from it the posture of a body in front of it, whereas in the case of the
painting you have to know that the postures tally before you can construe the picture as a mirror
image.’ Wittgenstein, PG p. 315. 23 Boolos, ‘To be is to be a value of a variable’; Boolos, ‘Nominalist
platonism’. 24 On the plural account, the universal second-order quantier needs to be introduced
as an abbreviation for §.
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X as ‘a plurality’; but this is loose talk, and potentially misleading. Second-order
logic does not commit us to objects such as ‘pluralities’ (or classes or concepts): all it
commits us to is what we are already committed to by our acceptance of rst-order
quantication, namely the objects of the domain themselves.
Boolos points out that this interpretation of second-order logic is potentially
autonomous, in the sense that a model-theoretic explanation of the satisfaction of a
sentence (of second-order logic) by a structure can be given on the basis of second-
order logic, rather than piggy-backing on set theoretic concepts in the meta-theory.
According to Boolos, all of this shows, rst, that accepting second-order logic
does not commit us to a domain of classes or sets over which the second-order
variables range; and second, that the presence of plural quanticational idioms in
natural language (‘¿ere are some horses all of which are faster than Zev’, and so
forth) shows that, like Monsieur Jourdain, we have, without knowing it, been talking
in second-order logic all along.
If the rst, ontological claim is sustained, then a good deal that I have written
so far about second-order logic might seem objectionable, or indeed misleading.
For I have repeatedly said that the classical understanding of the second-order
quantiers is as ranging over the powerset of the domain of objects. But in fact the
dierence between conventional set talk and Boolosian plural talk is something of
an irrelevance here. As mentioned above, the key issue is not whether, in talking of
pluralities of objects, we should or should not treat these as further entities over and
above the original objects. ¿e issue is whether we can make sense of the idea of
arbitrary pluralities of objects. So even if second-order logic can be shown to have
no new ontological commitments, that does not seem to make any easier the task of
explaining the meaning of the second-order quantiers.
¿e second point is more to our present concern. But suppose we accept that
natural language involves primitive plural quanticational idioms. ¿at does not
in itself show that in using these idioms we are already committed to arbitrary
pluralities of the worrying kind. In fact, as we’ll see, predicatively specied pluralities
seem to suce for all of the plausible cases. So there is no quick route from claims
about plural idioms in natural language to the conclusion that we have the sort
of understanding of pluralities that could underpin a construction of the classical
continuum.
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4.2.5 Arithmetic and the ancestral
Dedekind’s categoricity theorem for second-order arithmetic can be combined with
the non-categoricity of rst-order arithmetic to give another instance of the ‘tu
quoque’ gambit. ¿e argument runs like this: of course we have a grip on the natural
numbers (up to isomorphism, at least, i.e., with regard to their mathematical proper-
ties); but a rst-order understanding couldn’t give us that; so evidently we do grasp
second-order logic.
As is familiar, what allows arithmetic to be axiomatized categorically in second-
order logic is that the ancestral relation can be dened: this lets us form the transitive
closure of the successor relation. And a variant of the argument is simply to say that
the ancestral is something which we all clearly understand.
¿e argument fails. Second-order logic is substantially more powerful than is
needed to specify the naturals up to isomorphism: there are various weaker logics
(weak second-order logic, ancestral logic, logic with a innity quantier, andω-logic)
all of which allow arithmetic to be axiomatized categorically, and none of which
requires a grasp of the domain of all arbitrary subsets of the domain of objects.25
¿ese logics all eectively have a notion of nitude ‘built in’; this is the source of
the increase of expressive power which they have over rst-order logic, which cannot
express nitude in general. And it is our grasp of the primitive idea of nite iteration,
I suggest, that is the source of our knowledge of the natural numbers. (Lavine26
follows Poincaré and Weyl in arguing that grasp of the concept ‘nite’ cannot, on
pain of circularity, be explained by means of a formal mathematical theory, because
the notion of nite is needed to give an account of what a proof (or even a sentence)
in such a theory is. ¿is seems at least debatable: surely it is not necessary to have a
theory of our syntax, even an implicit one, before we can work with it? Surely it is
enough that the sentences and proofs we construct and consider are, as a matter of
fact, all nite in the absolute sense?27)
What is important to note, though, is that the cluster of notions here — nite,
25 A useful summary discussion is in Shapiro, Foundations § 9.1. To speak in terms of the intuitive
interpretations: weak second-order logic has class variables which range only over nite subsets
of the domain of objects; ancestral logic has a primitive operator which gives, for any relation, the
ancestral (i.e. the transitive closure) of that relation; logic with an innity quantier is self-explanatory;
and ω-logic has a primitive binary relation < which is order-isomorphic to the natural numbers.
26 Lavine, Understanding the Innite pp. 161–2. 27 See Goldfarb, ‘Poincaré against the logicists’ for
discussion of Poincaré’s argument of this sort.
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ancestral, natural number — are considerably more primitive than the notion of
all arbitrary classes; and that this primitiveness is formally reected in the fact
that the logics based on these notions are provably weaker than full second-order
logic. (Boolos recounts a question once put to him: ‘Do you mean to say that
because I believe that Napoleon was not one of my ancestors, I am committed to
such philosophically dubious entities as classes?’28 ¿e answer is of course no. But
I suggest, contra Boolos, that our philosophical doubts should focus not on the
ontological price of classes, but on the conceptual problems which aict full second-
order logic, regardless of whether it is explained in terms of arbitrary classes or in
terms of arbitrary pluralities.)
I am not here proposing that any of these intermediate logics should be deemed
‘logic’ in the honoric sense of universally rationally compelling, or should be taken as
an appropriate background system in which to formalize our ordinary mathematical
practice. ¿ese logics are model-theoretic logics,29 i.e. they are non-formal. ¿ey are
characterized by their semantic features, and the semantics is, in each case, strong
enough to deliver the categoricity of the natural numbers. By Gödel’s Incompleteness
¿eorems, semantic entailment which is that strong can never be captured by a
formal deductive consequence relation. ¿ere is simply no such thing as working
(giving a proof) in such a non-formal logic. ¿ey are of interest as objects of study
in mathematical logic (noting their relative expressive capabilities, for instance);
but that is to view them from outside. To the extent that such study is rigorously
formalized, it is formalized in rst-order terms (in practice, almost always in a
standard rst-order set theory such as ZF).
However, the moral is that the tu quoque argument fails: there is a large and
important gap between the power of conceptual resources which could account
for our grasp of the natural number structure, and those which could account
for a grasp of the full second-order consequence relation. To concede that we do
understand arithmetic does not mean also conceding that we understand second-
order quantication.
28 Boolos, ‘Nominalist platonism’ p. 73. 29 In the sense of Barwise and Feferman,Model-theoretic
Logics.
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4.2.6 ¿e Full Induction Axiom
A variant of the argument considered above cites our commitment to the full second-
order axiom of arithmetical induction.30 If we are committed to that, the argument
goes, then we must be committed to full second-order logic.
If we are working in pure number theory (intending, that is, that the domain
contain nothing but the natural numbers), the Induction Axiom may be formulated
thus: ∀X([X0 & ∀y(Xy  Xsy)]  ∀xXx).
In words: every subset of the domain which includes zero and which is successor-
closed is the whole domain. ¿e Induction Axiom can indeed be seen as an inductive
denition of the natural numbers, and it may seem wholly unobjectionable. It is
certainly very hard to see how room could be found for disagreeing with it. Any
property of natural numbers which we consider, if it applies to zero, and if it is
successor-closed, clearly applies to all of the natural numbers.
¿e sceptic’s objection is not so much to the induction axiom as to the classical
interpretation of it: in particular, to the interpretation of the initial quantier as
ranging over every member of the classical powerset of the domain. ¿e sceptic
— or the wary — does not think that there might be some collection of natural
numbers which would be a counterexample to the induction axiom; just that we
cannot make sense of the domain of collections of natural numbers, and so that
we cannot legitimately quantify over them all. (¿is is the worry which Gentzen’s
consistency proofs for arithmetic are designed to soothe.)31
In terms of formal mathematical practice, there are predicatively acceptable
formal systems which contain the full induction axiom in its form above; for ex-
ample, the system ACA0 with which we will be much concerned later.32 What is
not predicatively defensible is to insist upon a classical interpretation of the second-
order quantiers. ACA0 is predicatively acceptable because it has a predicative
class-comprehension axiom scheme. ¿e only sets to which the induction axiom
can be applied in ACA0-proofs are those which have been given by a previous applic-
ation of the comprehension scheme; and these are just the extensions of arithmetical
30 Kreisel, ‘Informal Rigour’ is a locus classicus. 31 Gentzen, ‘Neue Fassung’. 32 See especially Ch. 7.
In brief, though, ACA0 is a system which conservatively extends PA by the addition of predicative
classes.
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formulae.33 ¿e point is that commitment to the Induction Axiom does not entail
commitment to the full second-order consequence relation.
To sum up the discussion of second-orderism, we have found no good reason
crediting ourselveswith a logical understanding of the full second-order consequence
relation. We have also found some reasons — the dubious notion of arbitrary
property that is required, as well as the severing of logic from formal reasoning —
for actively thinking that we do not have such an understanding. Second-orderism
does not seem to be a promising route for a justication of the classical view of the
continuum.
4.3 Cantorianism
¿e Cantorian approach, let’s recall, seeks to explain how we can have a classical
understanding of the continuum by appealing to a general grasp of the set concept
(where sets are conceived as combinatorial collections, rather than as extensions of
properties). It is a mathematical project, and aims to develop a formal mathematical
theory of the continuum: it therefore cannot be fully second-order (in the terms of
§4.1.2 above).
¿eCantorian position is committed to developing a formal theory of the natural
numbers and the arithmetical continuum. Since the First Incompleteness ¿eorem,
it has been clear that there is no hope of developing such a formal theory which
will logically entail all of the truths even among just the Π01 sentences of arithmetic.
¿e Cantorian position is that notwithstanding these limits to our knowledge of
arithmetic (and all the more so of the limits to our knowledge of the continuum),
our concept of set is suciently determinate that (at least) every sentence of the
language of second-order arithmetic does succeed in being either true or false about
a determinate part of the world: the natural numbers and the continuum.
¿is conception — alone, or as part of a broader conception of the set-theoretic
universe — justies the adoption of certain axioms. In particular, and distinctive of
Cantorianism, for my purposes here, the conception of the continuum (and perhaps
also of further innite powersets) is taken to justify the axioms of (some system of)
33 In fact, because the comprehension axiom of ACA0 is restricted to arithmetical formulae (those
without bound class variables), the induction axiom of the system is weaker than the induction scheme:
the theory ACA, which has the full induction scheme for any formula of the language, is stronger than
ACA0.
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formally impredicative set theory.
One notable example of such an axiom is the impredicative class comprehension
axiom, in the context of a formal theory of second-order arithmetic such as PA2, or
of a set-class theory such asMK.34 Others are the set-theoretic axioms of Separation
and Replacement.
4.3.1 Coming to graspP(N)
¿e now-standard justication for Cantorian set theory is the so-called iterative
conception of the set-theoretic universe.35 Crudely put, the story is that we start o
with some urelemente, or indeed (to keep things tidier) nothing at all; at each stage,
we consider all of the sets we can form from the objects we already have; these are
new objects; and then we keep going. A little less crudely (and taking the pure set
route), as a transnite recursion we have:
V0 = g
Vα+ =P(Vα) 8Vα
Vβ = 
α<βVα for β a non-zero limit.
Spelling out V as built by a transnite recursion makes it clear that the iterative
story relies, eectively, on the ordinals. ¿is suggests that the story is not autonomous,
but instead relies on our already knowing about all of the ordinals. However, if we
start o only knowing about the ordinals up to ω+ ω, say, we will nd at Vω+2 sets
which are uncountable von Neumann ordinals: so the set theory itself witnesses
larger ordinals than those we started out assuming. And we can use these ordinals
to continue iterating the hierarchy a very long way indeed.36)
To justify standard Cantorian set-theory, there are two particularly important
steps we need to justify: the stages indexed by ω and by ω+1. ω is the rst limit-stage,
which comes immediately a er all of the stages indexed by natural numbers. ¿e
34 PA2 is also frequently referred to as Z2, a er the use in Hilbert and Bernays, Grundlagen. I avoid
this terminology because of the possible confusion with set theories. (Shapiro, for instance, uses ‘Z2’
to mean (the axioms for) ZFC2, a notational variant ofMK.) 35 Standard accounts are to be found
in Wang, ‘¿e concept of set’, Shoeneld, ‘Axioms of set theory’. 36 In fact, by a trick due to Scott,
‘Axiomatizing set theory’, the construction can be performed without invoking any ordinals at all.
Potter, Set ¿eory and its Philosophy gives an introductory account of set theory based on Scott’s idea.
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legitimacy of this step is considered problematic by nitists: it is a step with no
immediately preceding step, and so the construction of Vω is a supertask.
It is stage ω + 1 which is relevant to our concern here, the justication of the
classical continuum. Indeed, it makes no dierence for our purposes if, instead of
the hierarchy of V, the pure sets, as is standardly considered, we consider instead
starting with the natural numbers as urelemente; in this case, our problem comes at
the rst level. Either way, the problematic step is the rst innite powerset we are to
take, and therefore the rst point at which we need to consider arbitrary subsets of
what we have so far.
In looking for an intuitive route to the concept of the collection of every arbitrary
subset of the naturals, a natural place to start is by considering a supertask that can
give us one such arbitrary subset. One such supertask would be to run through
the natural numbers one by one, deciding, of each one, whether or not it is to be
included by some random process such as tossing a coin.
However, an innite sequence with a random choice at each step is something
that we might well scruple at; and Russell did scruple at it, in his discussion of the
Axiom of Choice. Consider the famous millionaire who has ℵ0 pairs of boots andℵ0 pairs of socks. How many socks does he have?
¿e pairs are given as forming an ℵ0, and therefore as the eld of a
progression. Within each pair, take the le boot rst and the right
second, keeping the order of the pair unchanged; in this way we obtain
a progression of all the boots. But with the socks we shall have to choose
arbitrarily, with each pair, which to put rst; and an innite number of
arbitrary choices is an impossibility.37
¿e thought is that the only grip nite creatures like us can get on the innite is by
means of some sort of a rule. And Russell is by no means alone in subscribing to this:
Poincaré andWeyl certainly agreed. ¿e acceptance of an arbitrary innite collection
such as is produced by such a supertask is a — perhaps the—mark of the acceptance
of the innite as actual, rather than merely potential; and it is very dicult to see
what could be said in favour of the actual innite which might persuade anyone with
doubts.
But there is a larger obstacle to overcome in order to justify the stage ω+ 1. Even
if we grant the intelligibility of such a supertask of innite arbitrary selection, and
37 Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy p. 126.
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hence the acceptability of one such arbitrary set of naturals, we still do not get a grip
on the domain of all sets of natural numbers. ¿at would come if we were to credit
ourselves with a conception of all possible outcomes of the supertask; but here the
‘all’ is precisely the problematic concept which wanted explaining. Even repeating
the supertask countably many times (not counting any duplicates!) is of no help: as
the constructive part of Cantor’s ¿eorem shows, a countable collection of subsets
of N is not closed under diagonalization: so no such countable collection can be the
classical continuum.
We are not forced to countenance an uncountable innity as actual, even if we
are persuaded by the consideration of step-by-step supertasks to accept the countable
innite as such.
It is worth noting that even hard-nosed Cantorians must accept that there is a
somewhat mysterious character to the powerset of the natural numbers: in technical
terms, it is non-absolute, meaning that it cannot be specied except by means of
quantication over the whole set-theoretic universe. ¿e undeniable indenite
extensibility or open-endedness of the universe of sets is therefore reected in the
unlimited richness of the continuum.38
4.3.2 V = L
¿ere are, as we have just seen, serious problems with the supposition that we have
a clear conception of the powerset operation as applied to innite sets. It might
be thought that Gödel’s Axiom of Constructibility (V = L) oers an alternative
justication of impredicative set theory. Gödel proved that the constructible universe,
L, is a model of the axioms of ZF. And so it would seem that a grasp of L is enough
for the Cantorian’s purposes.
¿e real powerset operation is arguably objectionable because it is supposed
to contain all of the subsets of a given set x, and because the axiom scheme of
Separation (which species which subsets there are) is impredicative, in that its
instances assert the existence of subsets of x which are dened by means of formulae
involving quantication over the whole set-theoretic universe, including x.
In contrast, the constructible hierarchy, L, is built by a sort of constructive
analogue to the powerset operation. ¿is operation, µ, takes a set x to the set of
38 See Hallett, ‘Putnam and the Skolem paradox’ for discussion of the interrelation between impredic-
ativity, non-absoluteness and unrestricted quantication in set theory.
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all of those subsets of x which can be dened by means of formulae of which the
parameters and quantiers are restricted to x.
L0 = g
Lα+ = µ(Lα) 8 Lα
Lβ = 
α<βLα for β a non-zero limit.
Gödel showed that the constructible hierarchy L, the structure produced by this
transnite recursion, is an ‘inner model’ of the axioms of ZF, including the Powerset
axiom and the (full) Separation scheme.
We write Ξ(y) to say that y is constructible, i.e. is in L. To show that the Separa-
tion scheme holds, what needs to be established is that for any formula Φ(y), there
is an ordinal ρ for whichΦLρ(y) ΦΞ(y): that is, that there is an ordinal level ρ
of the constructible hierarchy which reects Φ in the sense that the restriction of
the quantiers and parameters in Φ to that level is equivalent to the restriction of Φ
to the whole of L.39
¿is requires that we go far enough in building the constructible hierarchy:
we need to make use of the uncountable ordinals from our background set theory.
Gödel himself put the matter this way: with the constructible universe,
all impredicativities are reduced to one special kind, namely the exist-
ence of certain large ordinal numbers (or well-ordered sets) and the
validity of recursive reasoning for them.40
¿e construction of an ‘inner model’ is not autonomous: we need to have accep-
ted the axioms of ZF before we can construct L, a model of those axioms. ¿e fact
that the method of building L is so ‘constructive’ means that L can be shown to be
well-ordered, which proves the consistency of the Axiom of Choice with the other
axioms of ZF; and in fact L is so well-behaved and non-arbitrary that the Continuum
Hypothesis also holds in it. But the inner model is of no use if we want to justify the
axioms of ZF themselves. In the absence of an independent route to the uncountable
ordinals which are needed in the construction, the constructible hierarchy is no help
at getting the uninitiated (or the predicativist sceptic) to a classical conception of
the continuum.
39 See Devlin, Constructibility for details. 40 Gödel, ‘Russell’s mathematical logic [1944]’ p. 147.
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4.3.3 Countable models of set theory
A natural rst thought is that Cantorianism is doomed to failure. Any formal theory
of the continuum will be inadequate because of the Downward Löwenheim-Skolem
¿eorem: such a rst-order theory will have a countable model, and so is a miserable
failure as a theory of the continuum.
I will argue that the upshot of this is broadly correct, though the details are a
little more complicated. ¿e mere existence of unintended models for a theory does
not, I claim, show that theory to be inadequate as a description of the intended
structure; but, in general, the smallest model of a theory cannot be said in any real
sense to be unintended as a model of that theory. It is, on the contrary, precisely
what the axioms explicitly guarantee to exist, and no more. A countable model
will of course be unintended by a Cantorian, in that it is unfaithful to the informal
understanding of the continuum that motivated the axioms in the rst place: but
for the Cantorian to argue thus is for her to give up on the Cantorian project of
justifying a mathematical theory of the continuum, and instead, as we will now see,
to retreat into the obscurity of second-orderism.
To see a countable model of ZF set theory as being unintended is to bring to
bear a conception which goes well beyond the axioms. ¿e conception most o en
appealed to here is of course second-orderism: the informal notion of unintended
model is replaced by the notion of ‘non-standard model’ as formalized by Montague.
Montague dened a non-standard model of a rst-order theory axiomatized by (a
nite number of axioms and) a single axiom-scheme to be a structure which does
not satisfy (on the standard semantics, of course) the corresponding second-order
theory (that is, the theory which has a single Π11 axiom instead of the rst-order
scheme).41
Such an appeal to the second-order consequence relation to x the intended
interpretation may well be coupled with a continued use of rst-order set theory,
perhaps because of the practical benets of a compact and complete logic; but the
underlying philosophical justication makes it clearly a species of second-orderism;
as such, it is subject to my criticisms in §4.1 above.
41 Montague, ‘Set theory and higher-order logic’. Familiar examples of such theories are PA and PA2;
ZF and ZF2; and for analysis, the rst-order axioms for an ordered eld together with a scheme for
Dedekind-completeness, and the corresponding theory with the second-order completeness axiom.
See Shapiro, Foundations p. 110 for further details.
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If she is not to retreat into second-orderism, theCantorianmust take the view that
our knowledge of the powerset operation is not logical knowledge, but is nonetheless
clear and direct: rather than owing from the axioms, our pre-formal understanding
of the powerset operation is what the axioms try (imperfectly) to express.
It is familiar that no formal theory with innite models can be categorical.
(To repeat: By ‘formal’, I mean that we are restricting ourselves here to rst-order,
axiomatizable theories.) ¿e Löwenheim-Skolem theorem tells us that there will be
models of every innite cardinality. And so in particular, there are countable models
of set theory.
But the familiarity of all this should not blind us to the unsatisfactory situation
with regard to set theory in particular. Mathematicians normally work as if they had
a rm grasp of the concepts of countability and uncountability, but this of course
derives from their understanding of set theory. It is, a er all, in a background set
theory that model theory is done, and that results such as the Löwenheim-Skolem
theorem are proved.
In response to such worries, Cantorians tend to fall back on the ‘tu quoque’
gambit. An analogy is drawn between the case of set theory and the case of arithmetic,
and it is suggested that doubts which non-standard models may raise about the
former apply just as well to the latter, where they are clearly unacceptable; and so we
should dismiss such doubts altogether. I would suggest that this is rather too quick.
For one thing, the unacceptability of such doubts about arithmetic is a fact which
cuts both ways. ¿e anti-Cantorian may well suggest that it is simply much more
plausible to table-bangingly claim that we have a clear intuition of the natural number
sequence (which formal systems attempt to capture, though of course incompletely)
than it is to claim that we have such an intuition of the continuum. (Not to mention
the rest of the set-theoretic hierarchy.)
But more substantially, there is also a signicant limitation to the analogy
between the cases. ¿ere is an important dierence in the nature of the non-standard
models: all models of arithmetic include the natural numbers; non-standard models
of arithmetic have additional elements. On the other hand, models of set theory do
not, in general, have full powersets; it is only standard models of set theory which
do.
¿e signicance of this contrast becomes clear when we remind ourselves that
such models are innite mathematical objects; as such, they are only encountered or
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dealt with by us indirectly, mediated by description. And a description or conception
of a non-standardmodel of arithmetic requires a prior grasp of the standardmodel of
arithmetic, the real natural numbers: one has to say to oneself, there’s 0, 1, 2 and so on,
and there are other elements, not in that series. A non-standard model of arithmetic
is not something that one could get hold of by mistake when being introduced to
the innite by means of the rst-order Peano Axioms (or indeed of the axioms of
induction-free arithmetic): either one remains a strict nitist and so refuses to accept
the axioms, or one comes to an understanding of the natural number series.42 But
in the case of set theory, a description of a non-standard model need not require
a grasp of the problematic concept of the full powerset. Non-standard powersets
fall short of the real thing; and so the Cantorian position gives rise to the sceptical
worry that in aiming for the real continuum, we might not have made it all of the
way; or indeed that dierent people might have got hold of dierent ersatzes.
¿e upshot of this is that a formal system of set theory is of no help in giving us
a conception of the continuum. ¿e axioms may be motivated by such a conception:
but they are not adequate to express it.
But does all of this leave open the possibility of combining standard (impredicat-
ive) set theory with the view that there are no real uncountable innities? Wright
has suggested it does. I will argue not.
4.3.4 Wright’s Skolemism
Wright43 has sketched a line of argument based on the Löwenheim-Skolem¿eorem
to the eect that a formally impredicative set theory such as ZF can be coherently
adopted without thereby incurring a commitment to the classical continuum, or
indeed to any uncountable sets at all. While the philosophical position advanced in
‘Skolem and the skeptic’ is certainly not a classical view of the continuum, I discuss
it here because it is intended as a justication of a classical mathematical theory of
the continuum.44 ExaminingWright’s criticisms of Cantorianism will, I hope, bring
out more clearly the predicativist alternative.
Wright’s brand of Skolemism is to be sharply distinguished from traditional
42 ¿is point is made forcefully by Dummett in ‘Gödel’s theorem’. 43 ‘Skolem and the skeptic’.
44 It is unclear whether or notWright’s position is classical in my ocial sense of vindicating bivalence
for L2A, but it would seem not. ¿e theorems of ZF do not settle the truth-values of all of the rst-order
sentences of arithmetic, never mind all of those of analysis (second-order arithmetic).
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Skolemism, the set-theoretic relativism about countability allegedly propounded
by Skolem himself. Skolemist relativism was supposed to threaten the coherence
of the idea of uncountability by suggesting that it might always be possible to nd
a perspective from which any given, supposedly uncountable set can be seen in
fact to be countable. ¿is line of argument is now generally agreed to be confused.
Why? Well, the usual thought these days45 is, roughly, that not everything is up
for grabs; that is, not everything is a candidate for reinterpretation; or at least, not
everything all at the same time. From whatever perspective is our current resting
place, if we accept the axioms of ZF, then we are committed to uncountable sets.
We may always be able to reect on our previous mathematical practice; this will
involve a move to a new perspective, from which, perhaps, we may look back at the
set we previously called ‘the continuum’, and see that this set can in fact be put into
bijective correspondence with the natural numbers: but this possibility does nothing
to impugn the coherence of our current background notion of uncountability.
Wright’s form of Skolemism is based on a dierent line of thought from that of
the traditional Skolemist, and is supposed to lead to a somewhat dierent conclu-
sion. Wright’s conclusion is that the intended interpretation of ZF (an uncountable
universe of sets), while perhaps not internally incoherent, is at least not captured—
or not forced upon us— by the axioms; it is open to us to accept ZF and yet remain
countablist.
In some passages, Wright seems to be arguing merely that the axioms of ZF are
not adequate as an introduction to the uncountable universe of the intended model;
and I think that this point is well taken. If the ZF axioms are to be taken seriously
and accepted on their ownmerits (rather than taken in a formalistic spirit), then they
stand in need of justication. Cantorianism is one attempt at such a justication.
Wright gives a dierent justicatory story, which does not involve commitment
to uncountable sets. I have already discussed the diculties facing the Cantorian
attempt; and I think that Wright’s attempt faces equally serious diculties.
¿e Cantorian claims to have a conception of the iterative hierarchy — an
uncountable universe of sets — and argues that the ZF axioms are true of this
universe. (I assume for simplicity that the axioms are presented in a form with the
quantiers which appear explicitly restricted so as to range only over the sets. ¿e
Cantorian believes that all of the sets are in the iterative hierarchy, and so holds the
45 As expressed, for example in Benacerraf, ‘Skolem and the skeptic’.
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axioms true simpliciter.) Wright attempts to describe a countable universe of sets, of
which the ZF axioms are true.
It is the countable submodel form — henceforth, SMT— of the Löwenheim–
Skolem theorem that Wright appeals to: this asserts that any uncountable model of
a rst-order theory has a countable submodel. If we apply this theorem to the case
of a standard (transitive, uncountable, set-) model of ZF, SMT gives us a countable
submodel with a domain of real sets such that all of the members of the sets in the
domain are also sets in the domain, and that the relation-symbol ‘>’ is interpreted in
the submodel as the real membership relation.46
SMT tells us that, if ZF has an uncountable set model, then there are countable
such models. (Note that the hypothesis is signicantly stronger than the mere
consistency of the axioms: the hypothesis requires the axioms to be sound, that is,
true of an (uncountable) universe of sets.) What Wright needs to show is that such a
countable model can coherently be seen as a universe of set theory, i.e., as all of the
sets that there are. Only this would show that the axioms of ZF can be justied by a
story on which the universe of sets is countable.
Wright claims that there is a perspective from which the Diagonal Argument
serves to show merely ‘that there is no recursive enumeration of all recursively
enumerable innite decimals.’47 It seems that the countable universe whichWright is
suggesting as a possible model for ZF consists just of eectively enumerable sets. He
regards the restriction to such sets as something that is not ruled out by the explicit
content of the axioms of ZF— though this is surely wrong, as I shall show— and
can therefore only be ruled out by informal explanation. Wright claims that in order
to make sure that a trainee set theorist gets hold of a standard interpretation of set
theory, complete with uncountable sets, the Cantorian must give such an informal
explanation; andWright then criticizes such explanations as obscure and inadequate
to the propaedeutic task.
As Wright says:
[...] before the Diagonal Argument [...] can lead us to a conception of
the intended range of the individual variables in set theory which will
allow us to regard any countable set model as a non-standard truncation,
we need to waive the restrictions [to an eective listing of eectively
46 ¿e proof of SMT requires the axiom of Choice; I concede this to Wright for the sake of argument.
47 Wright, ‘Skolem and the skeptic’ p. 134.
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computable innite decimals]. And in order to understand the waiver,
we need to grasp the notion of a non-eectively enumerable denumerably
innite subset of natural numbers.48
Here, Wright pinpoints the key problem in understanding Cantorian set theory:
How are we to make sense of the idea of wholly arbitrary innite sets? And he is
quite correct that the Diagonal Argument does not help us in this task: whatever
countable family A = Ai S i > N of sets of natural numbers we start with, the
diagonal method gives us a new set of natural numbers, not inA: but it is of course
not an arbitrary set: it has a perfectly good nite denition, in terms ofA.
Wright’s mistake is his suggestion that there is a coherent standpoint on which
one can endorse ZF and yet remain a countablist.
Wright focuses his attention on how to interpret, in a countable universe, Cantor’s
Diagonal Argument, as it is formalized in ZF. ¿e proof shows that 2N, the set of
functions from the natural numbers to the set 0, 1, is not equinumerous (cannot
be put into bijective correspondence) with the natural numbers. To be accurate,
Wright actually rst considers the proof of the uncountability of the innite decimal
fractions; but as 2N is obviously equinumerous with the (innite decimal) fractions
between 0 and 1, I’ll concentrate on the simpler case, 2N.
¿e problem for Wright’s approach to the Diagonal Argument is that whatever
countable family of sets of natural numbers we started o believing in, the argument
gives us a new one. For the Diagonal Argument shows, for any countable set Aof
sets of natural numbers, that A is not the powerset of the naturals.
For instance, if we start o as ‘recursivists’, that is, believing only in recursive sets,
then what the Diagonal Argument shows us is that any recursive set Aof recursive
sets of natural numbers is incomplete: there is a recursive set of naturals not in A,
and so A is not the full powerset. If we are committed to the powerset axiom, then
the Diagonal Argument forces us to move beyond recursivism: to accept that the
powerset of the naturals is not a recursive set.
Wright’s countablist standpoint was supposed to be one on which the ZF axioms
and only sets of a limited sort were countenanced. In fact, there is no such stable
conception: the Diagonal Argument genuinely is a principle of extension no matter
what countable range of subsets of the naturals wemay have accepted: that is why the
set of subsets ofN—or equivalently the set of reals — is considered by predicativists
48 Wright, ‘Skolem and the skeptic’ p. 134.
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to be an ‘open-ended’ (indenitely extensible) domain. ¿e alternative is to accept
the Cantorian claim that there is a domain of subsets of N which is closed under the
diagonalization: and then the Diagonal Argument goes to show that this domain
must be uncountable.
If we assume, for the sake of argument, the existence of an uncountable standard
model of the axioms, and enough Choice to prove SMT, then SMT tells us that
there will be a countableM which satises the axioms (when the quantiers in
the axioms are restricted to the domain SMS). Let’s also suppose that a trainee set
theorist somehow gets hold of this model. But this does not give Wright what he
wants: inM, the set, call it α, which is the referent of ‘P(N)’ satises (the formal
version of) the predicate ‘is uncountable’. So Wright faces a dilemma: either the
novice sees α as really being countable, or she does not.
If she does, the function that counts α (the bijection between α and the natural
numbers) gives rise to a diagonal set of natural numbers which is not itself in α, or
indeed in the modelM. ¿e novice seesM merely as a part of the set-theoretic
universe. ¿e fact thatM satises the ZF axioms does not mean that those axioms
are true.
On the other horn, if she believes that the domain of SMS is the real, full, un-
countable universe of sets, then the standpoint Wright oers is not a countablist one:
the novice will sincerely assert that α is uncountable. Of course, because of the way
in which we set up the example, we see her as being wrong about this; but that is
because we are on the rst horn, so to speak, looking down atM from outside.
¿e part of Cantor’s Diagonal Argument whichWright discusses is the construct-
ively acceptable part: this part of the argument is a principle of extension, which
when applied to a countable collection x0,x1, . . . of sets of naturals, gives us a new
such set of naturals, n S n ¶ xn, which is not in the collection. ¿is part of the
argument is irreproachable, and does not rely on any questionable assumption of
ZF. (¿e corresponding result in second-order arithmetic can in fact be proved in
very weak systems, which have only a quantier-free comprehension axiom.49)
¿e part of Cantor’s argument which the sceptic of uncountability should object
49 ¿e second-order form says that for any enumerationA0,A1, . . . of classes of natural numbers, there
is a class which is notAi for any i > N. A sequence of classes of naturals is implemented in second-order
arithmetic as a class B of pairs `m,ne S m > An. ¿e proof is the usual diagonal construction: the
class n S n ¶ An can be proved to exist, but obviously cannot be in the enumeration. See Feferman,
‘What rests on what?’ pp. 198–199 for discussion.
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to is the other part: the assumption that there is a collection of all of the subsets of
the natural numbers. ¿is is, in eect, the Powerset Axiom: it is this premise that
takes us from the constructive part of Cantor’s argument to the conclusion that there
is a set of all of the subsets of N, which must be an uncountably innite set.
To sum up, Wright has given us good reasons not to be a Cantorian, but he
has not given us what we were promised: a coherent conception on which we can
remain countabilist, and yet accept the axioms of ZF. Rather than leavematters there,
though, it would be nice to nd a diagnosis of what has gone wrong. I suggest that the
root cause is (to borrow Whitehead’s phrase) the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’
for the case of models of set theory
Wright argues that:
if the intuitive concept of set is indeed satisfactorily explicable — and
how else could it be communicable? — the explanation has to be, at least
in large part, informal; and it will not suce informally to explain the
set membership relation and then to stipulate e.g. that the ZF-axioms
are a correct digest of the principles of set existence. If the Cantorian
wishes it to follow from his explanation that there are all of the sets
which, intuitively, he believes that there are, he has to do something
more. What?
He has to say something which entails that there are uncountably many
sets. And that is not the same thing as stipulating an axiomatic frame-
work in which Cantor’s theorem may be proved, since the diculty is
exactly that if his preferred set theory can take its intended interpreta-
tion at all, it can take a set-theoretic interpretation under which Cantor’s
theorem cannot be interpreted as a result about uncountability.50
¿e problem here is precisely the one considered in §4.3.3 above. ¿e countable
models which the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem gives us are innite mathematical
objects; their availability to a mathematician depends on what innite objects she
believes exist; these beliefs will in turn depend on what mathematical theories she
accepts. It is absurd to think of models as if they were concrete: as if a countable
submodel is something which a trainee might somehow get hold of or stumble over,
and then recognize to be correctly described by the axioms she has just been given.
50 Wright, ‘Skolem and the skeptic’ pp. 131–2.
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¿e Cantorian believes ZF to be sound; that is, true of the real, uncountable
universe of sets. So SMT tells her that there exist countable transitive set models of
the axioms. But it is not clear what, if anything, SMT tells the trainee. ¿e trainee
might well doubt whether the axioms are true of anything at all, or even whether
they are consistent; and in that case the theorem tells her nothing.
It is, I suppose possible that a trainee could somehow get hold of an autonomous
description of the contents and structure of a countable transitive set model of
ZF. (‘Autonomous’ here means a description which is not parasitic on one of the
Cantorian’s intended models; if it is parasitic in this way, then such a structure is
accessible to a trainee only if she rst accepts that there is an uncountable universe of
sets — that is, only if she rst becomes a Cantorian.) ¿is would not be a vindication
of Wright’s claim: the dilemma mentioned above still stands. But such a description
would also constitute a consistency proof of ZF. ¿e prospects for such a thing seem
dim, to say the least: the second Incompleteness ¿eorem tells us that such a proof
could not be given in any theory mutually interpretable with ZF; or of course in any
weaker system.
One route to such a proof would be arithmetical insight. Indeed, in a sense, this
is the only route: any countable model is, modulo coding, a model in the natural
numbers. On such a model, the axioms of ZF would be seen to be (not merely
consistent, but also) true of the natural numbers under this interpretation. All of
this, we are supposing, is for reasons which are accessible to the novice purely on the
basis of reection on the natural numbers. ¿is seems a tall order, to put it mildly.51
4.4 Intuitively based classicism
4.4.1 Cantor again
As Lavine argues at length, and as has been mentioned in Ch. 2.2 above, it seems
that the early views of Cantor are in some respects importantly dierent from those
51 Harvey Friedman, building on the famous Paris–Harrington result, has tried to give arithmetical
reasons for believing in higher set theory: he has presented various example of combinatorial principles
about the natural numbers, but which can be proved only in strong systems of set theory. As I
understand it, though, the principles are consequences of the theories, but not conversely: that is, the
evidence provided for the consistency of ZF is merely ‘regressive’ in character. It is of course highly
questionable whether the combinatorial principles can be recognized as true by means other than the
set theory used to prove them.
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views of modern set theorists which I have been discussing under the name of
‘Cantorianism.’52
In his pre-1891 writings on set theory, Cantor seems to have simply assumed
that the continuum of real numbers was a set.53 In 1891 came an important change
in Cantor’s thinking,54 marked by the invention of the Diagonal Argument, which
depends on the idea of characteristic functions and of power sets. ¿e assumption
changed from the (unjustied) postulation of a set of real numbers to the assertion
of a new axiom— eectively, the powerset axiom: for every set, there is a set of all
of its subsets.55
¿e previous section, §4.3, has discussed and criticised the attempt to justify a
classical conception of the continuum on the basis of a set theory with a powerset
axiom; it remains to assess Cantor’s rst thought, and to consider the possibility of
taking the classical continuum as primitively given to us in intuition.
4.4.2 Postulating or intuiting the classical continuum
Why did Cantor think that it was legitimate to postulate the continuum as a set?
Lavine attributes this to a fundamental (though very vague) general belief, the
Domain Principle: this states that every domain of a mathematical variable is a set.56
¿e obvious point is that the real numbers, and real-valued functions, were
the stock-in-trade of nineteenth-century mathematicians. Cantor was well aware
that not all domains could consistently be seen as sets: those which could not, he
called the Absolutely Innite (and he associated them with the unknowability of the
divine in his theological reections). But it seems to have been almost unthinkable
to Cantor that the real numbers could be such.
Cantor was not alone, of course. Poincaré famously viewed transnite set theory
as a disease, and rejected impredicative set denitions; but he endorsed the least
upper bound principle for real numbers, on the grounds that the reals were an
unproblematic pre-existent mathematical object. Poincaré viewed most innite
52 Lavine,Understanding the Innite. 53 At one point, Cantor did in fact worry that perhaps the reals
could not be well-ordered: see Hallett, Cantorian set theory pp. 42, 73, 76–77. 54 Cantor, ‘Über eine
elementare Frage’. See Lavine, Understanding the Innite pp. 93–98 for discussion. 55 ‘Eectively’
because, to be precise, Cantor considered not subsets of a given set, but the set of functions from
a set to a pair of arbitrarily chosen items. See Cantor, ‘Über eine elementare Frage’. 56 Lavine,
Understanding the Innite p. 90; Hallett, Cantorian set theory attributes to Cantor a similar Domain
Principle, and for similar reasons.
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sets as potential, as being constructed, and it is this that makes impredicative set
specication illegitimate: to construct a set which has been specied impredicatively
is a viciously circular task, which requires us to have nished before we can begin.
But the real numbers, on Poincaré’s view, are there to begin with, given to us by
means of intuition. As such, specifying a real as the least upper bound of some others
is as harmless as pointing out the tallest man in the room.
Clark takes a dim view of Poincaré’s postulation of a set of the reals:
Poincaré is trying to have his cake and eat it. He is prepared to recognize
the real line and the plane as sets or collections, at least as entirely
legitimate mathematical objects, but he is not prepared to think of those
collections as obtained from the natural numbers in any way. ¿us he
regards the plane and line as independent mathematical objects and
our knowledge of them as given synthetic a priori independently of any
knowledge of the natural numbers. [...] it is certainly worth noting that
this sort of semi-intuitionism as it has come to be called does leave the
impression of the over honest toil.57
What is unclear is whether there is honest toil which can be done to justify the
classical view of the continuum; in this chapter I have attempted to show that there
is not.
Insofar as the Domain Principle is compelling, it is so because of its conservatism:
it licenses us to take as a set any domain which mathematicians have traditionally
been happy to deal with by considering functions over. Traditional (early nineteenth-
century) analysis deals with functions on the real numbers; so the Domain Principle
tells us that the real numbers are a set. But what this glosses over is the question of
just what real numbers there are. As we saw above, discussing Weston’s assimilation
of Bishop’s continuum to the classicist’s, the fact that everyone agrees that every
Cauchy sequence of rationals has a limit in the reals (or that every lower Dedekind
cut of the rationals has a least upper bound in the reals) does not show that everyone’s
continuum is the same. ¿at would only follow if everyone agreed on what Cauchy
sequences or sets of rationals there are. But that is more or less precisely the question
at issue: modulo coding, it comes down to the question: What sets of natural numbers
are there? And that is of course the same as the question: How big is the continuum?
57 Clark, ‘Logicism, the continuum and anti-realism’ pp. 131–2.
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¿e argument from tradition for the deniteness (and hence sethood) of the
continuum overlooks the fact that traditional mathematics is actually countable, in a
certain extended sense. As Simpson puts it:
¿e distinction between set-theoretic and ordinary mathematics cor-
responds roughly to the distinction between ‘uncountable mathematics’
and ‘countable mathematics’. ¿is formulation is valid if we stipulate
that ‘countable mathematics’ includes the study of possibly uncount-
able complete separable metric spaces. (A metric space is said to be
separable if it has a countable dense subset.) ¿us for instance the study
of continuous functions of a real variable is certainly part of ordinary
mathematics, even though it involves an uncountable algebraic struc-
ture, namely the real number system. ¿e point is that in ordinary
mathematics, the real line partakes of countability since it is always
viewed as a separable metric space, never as being endowed with the
discrete topology.58
As Simpson’s remarks suggest, and as I argued in Ch. 2, the modern conception
of the continuum is a recent one: it is not older than set theory. (My choice of the
word ‘classicism’ for it is perhaps somewhat unfortunate.) While it certainly has
been accepted as a natural development, and indeed as the rational reconstruction
or explication of the earlier conceptions of the continuum, it has not gone wholly
unchallenged. And of course those mathematicians who challenged it tended to be
just those mathematicians who were also unhappy with Cantorian set theory as a
justicatory basis for the continuum. It follows that the intuitive route to the classical
continuum that I am discussing here was taken by hardly anyone: the earlier Cantor
is the only clear example I am aware of.
Intuition is of course an extremely popular justication for non-classical accounts
of the continuum: the obvious examples are the Brouwerian intuitionists, but the
semi-intuitionists should also be counted, and perhaps also other constructivists of
various stripes. In the case of Poincaré, his commitment to the least upper bound
principle does not suce to make his conception of the continuum classical, unless
he also accepts all of the sets of real numbers that the classicist does: but Poincaré
did not accept all of those sets — he rejected impredicatively dened sets.
58 Simpson, Subsystems of Second Order Arithmetic pp. 1–2.
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And intuition was also the obvious justication for those who considered the
continuum before the development of set theory. Here matters become dicult:
it would be very dicult to substantiate the claim that Kant (to take an obvious
example) had a view of geometrical intuition which has as its best rational recon-
struction what I have called classicism about the continuum. I suspect that in fact
Kant’s views are better represented as being anti-classicist, but this would not be
much easier to substantiate.
4.4.3 Arithmetic and geometric continua
I have taken the assumption that sentences of second-order arithmetic all have
determinate truth-values to be constitutive of classicism about the continuum. So we
need to examine how this arithmetical conception relates to the assumption of the
deniteness of the (classical) continuum based on analytic or geometrical intuitions.
Classical analysis can be formulated in second-order arithmetic, as has been long
been familiar from the work of Hilbert and Bernays.59 One careful recent develop-
ment of classical analysis in the language L2A is Simpson’s:60 Simpson represents real
numbers as sets of naturals, using several steps of coding. 61 ¿e equivalence between
analysis and second-order arithmetic is therefore a well-established mathematical
result. In order to assess the claim that our analytic (or geometrical) intuitions can
justify classicism about the reals, what needs closer inspection is those intuitions.
¿e crucial intuition of the continuum is gaplessness, and this is made precise
in the notion of the completeness of the eld of real numbers, i.e. its obeying the
least upper bound principle. To take an example from a textbook:
¿e real numbers are complete in the sense that there are no ‘holes’ in
the real line. Informally, if there were a hole in the real line (see Figure
5.1), the set of numbers to the le of the hole would have no least upper
59 Hilbert and Bernays, Grundlagen. 60 Simpson, Subsystems of Second Order Arithmetic. 61 ¿e
details of the coding may seem rather arbitrary, but some of them turn out to be of importance to
the Reverse Mathematics project being pursued. ¿e natural way to develop analysis in ACA0 (as
presented, ibid, § I.4) is dierent from his ocial account (ibid, § I.8) which is less logically complex,
and is therefore suitable for use in the weaker system RCA0 (ibid, § I.8). For example, while in ACA0
real numbers would most naturally be represented as Cauchy sequences of rationals, in RCA0 the reals
need to be represented by sequences of rationals which satisfy a more restrictive convergence criterion.
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bound.62
So our attention turns to the least upper bound principle, which asserts that
every non-empty set of real numbers which is bounded above has a least upper
bound. So to characterize the real numbers, we need to know just what sets of real
numbers there are.
A typical modern approach63 is simply to dene the real numbers to be some
appropriate structure (standardly `A,0A, 1A,+A, ċA,BAe, with A as the domain, the
real numbers, and the other items corresponding to the non-logical vocabulary of
the language of analysis) which satises (the rst-order axioms for an ordered eld
and) the least upper bound principle. ¿en we stand in need of assurance that such
a structure exists. Standard set theory of course gives that assurance; but to appeal to
set theory here is simply Cantorianism. ¿e intuitivist proposal we are considering
now is that we have geometric intuition of one such structure. However, the crucial
point is that for this approach to be an alternative to Cantorianism, we need to
formulate the least upper bound principle without smuggling in the Cantorian
notion of set.
We could take it as a second-order sentence of the language of analysis (with
rst-order variables ranging over the reals, and second-order variables ranging over
sets of reals),
∀X§x∀y(Xy  y B x)  §x [∀y(Xy  y B x)& ∀z(∀y(Xy  y B z)  x B z)];
or as a rst-order schema,
§x∀y(A(y)  y B x)  §x [∀y(A(y)  y B x)& ∀z(∀y(A(y)  y B z)  x B z)] .
¿e second route can quickly be ruled out as giving what the classicist wants: the
resulting theory is in fact rather trivial: it is a complete theory, as Tarski showed;
and its most natural countable model is the set of algebraic numbers (with the usual
operations and relations on them). But the rst alternative seems to throw us back
either on Cantorianism (if we try to explain the set quantication in terms of some
62 Johnsonbaugh and Pfaenberger, Foundations of Mathematical Analysis p. 16. Figure 5.1 helpfully
shows the reader a line with a hole in it. 63 And the one followed by Johnsonbaugh and Pfaenberger.
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general theory of sets), or on second-orderism (if we refuse to, and instead say that
it is a logical matter).
¿ere is, though, another way to understand the least upper bound principle for
sets. Rather than directly appealing to a theory to tell us what sets there are for the
principle to apply to, we might instead be prepared, on intuitive grounds, to endorse
the principle in an open-ended fashion, as applying to whatever sets of points we
come to recognize. (Compare induction over the natural numbers.) ‘I don’t know
just what reals there are, and I don’t know just what sets of reals there are,’ one might
say, ‘but I do know that any set of reals which is bounded above has a least upper
bound.’ (¿is seems to have been more or less Poincaré’s view of the matter.) Does
this give us classicism about the continuum? No!
¿e simplest way to see this to consider forming a completionQ of the rationals
which satises the least upper bound principle, in the sense that any bounded set
X ⊂ Q has a least upper bound. To avoid appealing to Cantorianism, we cannot
assume that we have any general idea of what subsets of Q there are; but we can of
course consider those sets that we can dene. ¿ese will be either explicitly countable
sets (the range of a denable sequence of elements inQ) or intervals with endpoints
in Q. But this is not enough to give us a classical continuum: as we shall see in
Ch. 7, the arithmetical reals — those given by predicative sets of natural numbers —
satisfy sequential completeness, and also interval completeness.
It is interesting to note that in the classical context, the completeness principle for
bounded intervals is enough — it is equivalent to the full completeness principle.64
Onemight at rst have thought that the problemwith the least upper bound principle
comes with its application to ‘nasty’ sets of reals — those with complex structure,
such as fractals or non-measurable sets; but the equivalence between the principle
restricted to intervals and the principle in full generality shows that this is not the
case. However, this does not change the main point, as the classical context in
which the equivalence holds is one where all of the real numbers (which can serve
as end-points to specify the intervals) are already present.
What I suggest is that it is extremely dicult to defend the view that our intuition
of the continuum is rich enough to ground what I have been calling classicism about
it: while the least upper bound principle is extremely compelling for those collections
64 Proof sketch: Given a bounded set of reals X, consider the set Y = x S §y, z > X.(y B x B z).
¿e set of upper bounds for Y is clearly the same as the set of upper bounds for X, so Y will have a
l.u.b. just in case X has.
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of real numbers that we can envisage or intuit, it is simply question-begging for the
classicist to claim that we can intuit all of the sets of real numbers, and on that basis
see the truth of the least upper bound principle in its full classical generality.65 (I
will return to the subject of completeness principles in the discussion of what the
predicative continuum is like, in chapter 7.1.9 below.)
More generally, I suggest that we have not been given a compelling argument
to seriously endorse uncountable mathematics by any of the routes considered
— second-orderism, Cantorianism and intuitivism. And those routes are general
enough that it is hard to know where else the classicist could turn. Of course, none
of this suggests that the classicist conception is actually inconsistent or even just
incoherent. All I have been trying to show is that there is no particular reason to
think classicism true.
65 It is an interesting question just how far such geometric intuition can take us in the development of
the real line. However, that is a question which I cannot attempt to answer here.
Chapter 5
¿e stability of the predicativist
position
¿e purpose of this chapter is to address concerns that one might have about the
internal stability of predicativism as a philosophical position. Is it in danger of
collapsing into some more radically revisionary philosophy of mathematics, such
as intuitionism or nitism? Do the concerns with classical mathematics that were
raised in Ch. 4 cut so deeply as to warrant the rejection of predicativist mathematics
too? I shall argue not.
Intuitionism can claim to be the most inuential and popular of anti-classical
approaches to mathematics. It is particularly important for my defence of predic-
ativism to distinguish it clearly from intuitionism, as Weyl himself renounced his
predicativist project a er falling under Brouwer’s spell;1 as a result, there has been a
persistent suspicion of a slippery slope from predicativism to intuitionism.
As originally presented by Brouwer, intuitionism was motivated by a strongly
anti-platonist view ofmathematical reality, according towhich the objects ofmathem-
atical study are mental constructions. ¿e intuitionistic mathematics that Brouwer
developed is constructive, in the sense that to be intuitionistically acceptable, a proof
of an existential statement §xFx must be direct, by actually constructing (or at least
by showing how to construct) an instance, and not just by refuting ∀x Fx. ¿is
constructivity requirement on proofs led Brouwer and his followers to reject certain
logical principles, and so to adopt instead a non-classical logical calculus, which no-
1 In fact, it is arguable that Weyl’s later position is better seen as a form as a form of nitism. See
especially Majer, ‘Dierenz zwischen Brouwer und Weyl’.
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toriously does not validate the classical Law of the Excluded Middle. Later advocates
of intuitionism, most notably Michael Dummett, have also argued for non-classical
logic, but have not always based their arguments on Brouwerian metaphysics.
In their criticism of classical mathematics, predicativism and intuitionism share a
number of philosophical concerns, but the two schools have developed very dierent
bodies of mathematics. ¿e fundamental dierences between predicativism and
intuitionism lie in their divergent attitudes towards the natural numbers and towards
the continuum. With respect to the natural numbers, predicativists take the view that
the number sequence is fully determinate, and so their mathematics is fully classical
with respect to rst-order arithmetic; intuitionistic arithmetic, by contrast, does not
validate LEM even for quantication over the natural numbers. With respect to the
continuum, the dierence is even more fundamental, in that while predicativistic
analysis diers from classical analysis only in terms of which denitions for real
numbers (or sets of natural numbers) are permissible, intuitionistic analysis is based
on a very dierent idea of the real numbers— that they are given by choice sequences.
¿e structure of this chapter is as follows. First, in §5.1 I consider two arguments
for intuitionism: one based on the Brouwerian premise that the objects of mathem-
atics are mental constructions; and one based on Dummett’s doctrine that certain
mathematical domains are indenitely extensible. I nd the rst to be inconclusive,
but the second to be highly suggestive of a problem with classical mathematics. I
then examine what the upshot of that argument is in the two cases which are crucial
to the predicativist programme. In §5.2 I examine whether the natural numbers
exhibit the phenomenon of indenite extensibility. I argue that they do not. And in
§5.3, I argue that the real numbers are indenitely extensible, and I investigate how
this can be accommodated mathematically. I argue that the predicative approach
here compares favourably with intuitionistic analysis, and that in both arithmetic
and analysis, the Law of the Excluded Middle turns out to be both less problematic
and less important than has o en been thought.
5.1 Arguments for intuitionism
5.1.1 Brouwer: Mathematical objects as mental constructions
On Brouwer’s view, mathematics was a mental activity based on pure intuition.
Brouwer was determined to avoid both platonism, which hypostasized the objects
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of that intuition into quasi-concrete mind-independent inhabitants of some ab-
stract realm, and naive formalism, which denied that intuition, and so reduced
mathematics to the manipulation of empty symbols.
As such, Brouwer came to think of mathematical truth as being a wholly mental
and experiential matter: as he put it, ‘there are no non-experienced truths.’2 And of
course this leads immediately to a rejection of bivalence, and of the corresponding
logical Law of the Excluded Middle: for any open mathematical problem, there is
currently no proof that can lead the mathematician to experience its truth, nor a
refutation that can lead her to experience its falsity. If all there is to the truth or
falsehood of a mathematical proposition is our experiencing it as such, then we are
not currently warranted in saying that an open proposition is either true or false.
It is interesting to note that Weyl seems to have been attracted to some form of
idealism throughout his career, as is suggested by his approving mention of Fichte
in Das Kontinuum, and his later comment that:
the numbers are to a far greater measure than the objects and relations
of space a free product of the mind and therefore transparent to the
mind.3
It may well have been the idealistic metaphysics of Brouwer’s intuitionism that rst
attracted him to the position.
Brouwer suggested that the laws of classical logic had their origins in our reas-
oning about nite collections, and that the naive extension of those laws to innite
domains by the classicist went beyond the range in which those laws were valid. As
the later Weyl put it (with the zeal of a convert):
According to his [Brouwer’s] view and reading of history, classical logic
was abstracted from the mathematics of nite sets and their subsets.
[. . . .] Forgetful of this limited origin, one a erwards mistook that logic
for something above and prior to all mathematics and nally applied
it, without justication, to the mathematics of innite sets. ¿is is the
Fall and original sin of set-theory, for which it is justly punished by the
antinomies.4
It is not obviously the case, however, that viewing mathematical objects as mind-
dependent necessarily threatens either the bivalence or the objectivity of the truth
2 Brouwer,CollectedWorks 1 p. 488. 3 Weyl, Philosophy of mathematics p. 22. 4 Weyl, ‘Mathematics
and logic’ p. 276.
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values of the mathematical propositions about those objects. Feferman is an example
of someone who combines the two views:
[Hellman] points out that I am even an anti-platonist regarding the
natural numbers but that I accept classical logic concerning arithmetical
statements on the basis of the objectivity of truth values for them. My
reason for doing so is that I regard the mind-dependent conception
of the natural number sequence as intersubjectively robust, just like
various other human conceptions. . . 5
Even if we grant the constructivist the ontological premise that the natural
numbers are our mental creations, it does not seem to follow that the only facts
about them are those that are immediately available to us. Presumably the mental
creation of mathematical objects is by some sort of stipulation: but our stipulations
may very well have consequences which we did not foresee.
Brouwer’s remark quoted above, that there are no non-experienced truths, is a
very strong one. If taken seriously, it seems to lead to an extreme ‘decisionist’ view,
such as that associated with (a certain reading of) the later Wittgenstein, on which a
stipulation made in the past has no power to bind us now to go on one way rather
than the other; at every point, a fresh decision is required.
But this is not the way that intuitionism has gone. ¿is is most apparent in its
attitude to innity. However we spell out ‘experience’, it seems that there are only
nitely many of the natural numbers which we have experienced in the past, or will
experience in the future. We are, a er all, nite creatures. But intuitionism is not
the same as strict nitism: crucially, intuitionists accept that the natural number
sequence is potentially innite, and therefore that there is something in our grasp
of the sequence that serves as ‘rails to innity’. When the natural number sequence
was created, we determined how things would go all of the way down the line. So
intuitionists are willing to idealize away from some of our limitations, and therefore
to open themselves to the phenomenon that stipulations or constructions we have
performed in the past in some sense already contain consequences which we are yet
to unpack.
¿e question then becomes: how far (and in what directions) should we idealize?
Intuitionists go as far as endorsing bivalence for the case of decidable predicates
applied to natural numbers. For every individual number, there is a fact of the matter
5 Feferman, ‘Comments on Hellman’ p. 317.
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as to whether it has the Goldbach property (being either odd or the sum of two
primes). It is in principle decidable by a mere computation, and that is enough for
the determinacy of its truth value, even if that computation would be too long and
too large to be physically carried out in our universe. But the intuitionist is not
prepared to endorse bivalence for the universal generalization, that is, for Goldbach’s
Conjecture that every number has the property. ¿at, it seems, is an idealization too
far. But why?
What makes arithmetical sentences true or false is the way the numbers are: this,
the mentalist insists, is transparent to reason, as the numbers are products of reason.
But it is the elementary (quantier-free) arithmetical facts which are transparent to
reason; they are decidable by mere calculation. And on the classical view, it is the
innity of those instances which make quantied arithmetical statements true or
false.
¿e intuitionist thought seems to be precisely a rejection of this last move: a
universal generalization is of course false if it has a counterexample, and true if
it has a proof, but these sorts of nite reasons are not obviously exhaustive of the
possibilities. ¿e real force of Brouwer’s remark that there are no non-experienced
truths seems to be to insist that such nite reasons — reasons that we can experience
— for the truth or falsity of mathematical statements are the only reasons that there
are; and so in the absence of such a nite reason, we have no warrant for thinking
that a statement must be either true or false. But it is the innity of the natural
numbers, and not their status as mind-dependent objects, that makes the dierence
here — that gives us reason to worry about the bivalence of statements quantifying
over them.
It seems that while a belief in themind-dependent nature ofmathematical objects
may suggest a rejection of bivalence for the propositions of mathematics, there is
no immediately compelling argument from the rst to the second. If we want a
reason to be intuitionists, we need to look harder at the problems associated with
the innite.
5.1.2 Dummett: Indenite extensibility
Michael Dummett has inuentially looked for such a reason in general consider-
ations about meaning. He draws on the striking dierence between the standard
semantics for the intuitionistic logical connectives— the so-called Brouwer–Heyting–
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Kolmogorov semantics, which are in terms of abilities and operations on proofs —
and the semantics for the classical connectives, which are of course truth-conditional.
¿e thought is that this classical semantics asks more of us than we can deliver.
Dummett has suggested two requirements that an adequate theory of the mean-
ing of language must meet: the implicit knowledge of meaning that it credits us
with must be knowledge which can be both acquired andmanifested through actual
language use. ¿e basic thought is that the assertion conditions for a sentence should
be such that we can always know, in principle, when they obtain, that they obtain.
And the meaning of the intuitionistic connectives is supposed to be given by the
BHK clauses, which give assertion conditions for sentences where those connectives
appear in the main position, in terms of the assertion conditions for the principal
subformulae. In contrast, the classical logical connectives have a meaning which
is explained in terms of their truth conditions — the truth-function that takes the
truth-values of the principal subformulae, and gives the truth-value of the whole
formula; and the classical quantiers are explained in terms of the truth values of
the bound formula when it is instantiated by every element of the domain. And in
contrast with assertion conditions, it is obviously not the case that we are always in
a position to know that such truth conditions obtain when they do.
Consider again Goldbach’s Conjecture: a universal quantication of unknown
truth value. It seems clear that we know what it means; but if the quantier is a clas-
sical one, then grasp of that meaning is something that we cannot plausibly acquire
or manifest through behaviour, because it is only through a general proof — which
in this case we don’t have — that we could come to acquire or to manifest the belief
that all of the instances obtain. On the other hand, an intuitionistic understanding of
the quantier makes its meaning a matter of our abilities to recognize and (in some
cases) produce proofs of, or counter-examples to such universal claims: and these
are abilities which clearly are acquired and manifested in the education and practice
of mathematicians. ¿e suggestion is that intuitionistic logic therefore meets the
acquisition and manifestation challenges, whereas classical logic does not.
Dummett’s meaning-theoretic argument has spawned a vast literature, but it has
certainly not met with universal acceptance.6 ¿e reasonableness of the acquisition
and manifestation challenges has been questioned (might not an appeal to shared
human nature obviate the need for absolute publicity of our meaning?), as has the
6 See, for instance, McDowell, ‘Truth conditions’.
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claim that a classical, truth-conditional account of meaning cannot meet those
challenges, when they are properly construed. I cannot begin to do justice here to
the depth of the argumentation on both sides. Stepping back from the argument,
though, we might worry that an area of philosophy as contentious as the theory of
meaning is not currently a promising source for a genuinely suasive argument for a
revisionary project in mathematics such as intuitionism.
I will therefore focus instead on Dummett’s other, specically mathematical,
argument for intuitionism: the argument from indenite extensibility. ¿is line of
argument does not rely, as the Brouwerian case for intuitionism does, on imagery of
our creation of mathematical reality. And while it is meaning-theoretic, it is much
more localized in its ambition than the general meaning-theoretic argument just
considered. It turns on the specic issue of what is needed for quantication over a
domain to be meaningful. We rst met the argument in Ch. 3.2.2 above.
For a domain which we are happy to view realistically — the domain of Fs, say,
there is no general requirement to characterize the extent of the domain in order
to meaningfully quantify over it. To ensure that a sentence which quanties over
the Fs has determinate truth-conditions, we need of course to have sharp criteria
of application and of identity for the predicate ‘F’; to know, that is, of any given
item, what it takes for it to be one of the Fs, and to know of any two given Fs what
it takes for them to be the same F. (If we do not have sharp criteria of application
and identity, then we are unable to give any substance to the standard explanation of
the quantiers as innite truth-functions: there is no question of ‘mentally running
through’ all of the Fs if we are unsure of what counts as an F or whether we have
checked them all.) But there is no further work that needs to be done in the way of
saying what Fs there actually are: the realist thought is that reality will take care of
that. As Dummett writes,
In order to confer upon a general term applying to concrete objects —
the term ‘star’, for example — a sense adequate for its use in existential
statements and universal generalizations, we consider it enough that
we have [...]: a criterion of application and a criterion of identity. ¿e
same indeed holds true for a term, like ‘prime number’, applying to
mathematical objects, but regarded as dened over an already given
domain.
¿e last clause, the requirement that the domain is already given, is crucial, though;
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for Dummett continues:
It is otherwise, however, for such a mathematical term as ‘natural num-
ber’ or ‘real number’ which determines a domain of quantication. For
a term of this sort, we make a further demand: namely that we should
‘grasp’ the domain, that is, the totality of objects to which the term ap-
plies, in the sense of being able to circumscribe it by saying what objects,
in general, it comprises — what natural numbers, or what real numbers,
there are.7
Why do we — or why should we —make this further demand? Why is it that in
the case of mathematical object, unlike concrete objects, ‘reality cannot be le to
blow all haziness away’?8
Dummett’s answer seems to be that the need to make this demand is the lesson
of the set-theoretic paradoxes. ¿e paradoxes revealed that some mathematical
concepts are ‘self-reproductive’ or ‘indenitely extensible’. ¿e simplest example
is the concept of ‘non-self-membered set’. Consider a setW of objects which fall
under the concept;W will itself fall under the concept, and so naturally gives rise to
another set, (W 8 W), of objects all of which fall under the concept, and which is
more extensive than the original set.
Dummett endorses Russell’s analysis of the paradoxes: that they all involve
quantication over an ‘illegitimate totality’ (i.e. domain) — that is, a domain which
contains all of the objects falling under a self-reproductive concept:
it is impossible coherently to understand individual variables as ranging
over all objects, or even over all sets, all ordinal numbers. [...] What is
meant [...] is that it is not possible to suppose that, by specifying the
range of some style of individual variables as being over ‘all objects’, or
‘all sets’, or ‘all ordinals’, we have thereby conferred a determinate truth-
value on all statements containing quantiers binding such variables
(even given that the other symbols occurring in these statements have
been assigned a determinate sense). Any attempt to stipulate senses
for the predicates, relational expressions and functional operators that
we shall want to use relative to such a domain will either lead to con-
tradiction or will prompt us to concede that we are not, a er all, using
7 Dummett, ‘What?’ p. 438. (My emphasis.) Cf. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics pp. 314–5.
8 Ibid. p. 315.
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the bound variables to range over absolutely everything that we could
intuitively acknowledge as being an object, a set, or an ordinal number.9
Dummett’s denition of indenite extensibility draws on this:
[IE] An indenitely extensible concept is one such that, if we can form a
denite conception of a totality all of whose members fall under that
concept, we can, by reference to that totality, characterize a larger totality
all of whose members fall under it.10
¿emoral we are to draw from all this is the central thesis of the argument from
indenite extensibility:
(*) Classical quanticational logic is legitimate only over mathematical domains
whose extent can be given a denite characterization.
So far, so Russellian. But Russell’s response to this was to impose a predicativity
constraint on mathematics, and avoid quantication over the domains which caused
the trouble. Dummett, however, thinks that we need not give up on such quantic-
ation altogether; we only need to make sure it is not classical quantication. And
what makes Dummett’s argument from indenite extensibility into an argument for
mathematical intuitionism is that Dummett also accepts the additional thesis:
(**) Intuitionistic logic is legitimate for quantication over any domain (including
indenitely extensible domains).
¿e thought behind this second thesis is one that we saw at the heart of the
general meaning-theoretic argument considered above: very roughly, it is that clas-
sical quantication is explained truth-conditionally, and so in a way that makes
essential reference to the domain of discourse, whereas the meaning of intuitionistic
quantication is explained in terms of our abilities — in the mathematical case, our
abilities to give and understand proofs. Of course, the meaning of the quantied
statement in both cases depends on the domain; but in the intuitionistic case, that
dependence is fully captured by the axioms drawn on, and the methods used in the
proofs themselves— by things which are graspable by us. In contrast, the meaning of
a classical quantication is an innitary truth-function over the domain itself, and so
9 Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language p. 568–9 (cf. pp. 476, 530). 10 Dummett, ‘What?’ p. 441.
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the ungraspability of the extent of the domain renders the meaning of quantication
over it hazy or mysterious: such statements may lack determinate truth conditions.11
Now Dummett recognizes that intuitionistic logic is not a panacea: a er all, the
derivation of Russell’s paradox does not rely on LEM. As Dummett notes,
Abandoning classical logic is not, indeed, sucient by itself to preserve
us from contradiction if we maintain the same assumptions as before;
but, when we do not conceive ourselves to be quantifying over a fully
determinate totality, we shall have no motive to do so.12
¿e fundamental mistake in Frege’s set theory was to suppose that we could be given
a once-and-for-all recipe for forming the sets. We see that this is impossible when
we realize that the domain of sets is indenitely extensible, with the sets stretching
o into the hazy distance. Dummett’s claim is that intuitionistic quantication over
all of the sets can be understood, because our concept set is xed, even as we see its
extension expand; but he admits that our specically set-theoretic assumptions also
need to be changed in the light of the concept of indenite extensibility. (Changed,
that is, from the assumption of naive set comprehension.) And this raises a question:
if we make appropriate changes, could classical logic perhaps be legitimately applied
a er all?
Our discussion so far has focused on the set-theoretic paradoxes, and one might
be tempted to think indenite extensibility is restricted to set-theoretic concepts,
and so that the argument from indenite extensibility applies only to set theory. But
Dummett has claimed that the concepts ‘natural number’ and ‘real number’ are also
indenitely extensible (or at least can be seen or argued to be so). And it is these
cases, of course, which are the important ones for the project of this thesis.
¿e argument in these cases is necessarily somewhat dierent from the case
for set theory, because it seems clear that no paradox results from assuming either
that the naturals are a denite domain, or that the reals are. (In fact, no paradox
results merely from the assumption that there is a universal set. Other set-theoretic
principles are needed to derive a contradiction, and indeed there are various more
or less well-motivated set theories which drop those principles, and suppose that
there is a universal set. ¿e same goes for a set of all ordinals.13 ¿e concept at the
11 Dummett, ‘What?’ pp. 438–442. 12 Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics p. 316. Cf.
Dummett, ‘What?’ pp. 441–2. 13 See for example Forster, Set ¿eory with a Universal Set, Church,
‘Set theory with a universal set’.
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root of Russell’s paradox, however, ‘non-self-membered set’, cannot have a set as its
extension, as a matter of pure logic.) It has been suggested by both Clark and Oliver,
for instance, that the case for the indenite extensibility of the real numbers and of
the natural numbers is weaker than for the sets.14
In §5.2, I argue that the natural numbers are not indenitely extensible, and
therefore that arithmetical classicism (the application of classical logic to arithmetic)
is not vulnerable to a Dummettian argument from indenite extensibility. While
it may not be possible to give a characterization of the natural numbers which will
satisfy the most resolute of sceptics, such resolute sceptics are not entitled to as much
as intuitionistic arithmetic: they should be strict nitists.
In §5.3, I discuss the continuum. I argue that here we do have an indenitely
extensible domain, and I explore the notion of indenite extensibility, and some
criticisms of it, and explain why it is that, in my view, it enters the story where it does:
with the real numbers, but not with the naturals. Further, I argue that despite this
indenite extensibility, classical logic can legitimately be used in quantifying over
the continuum, as long as we respect the predicativity requirements which indenite
extensibility motivates.
5.2 Are the natural numbers indenitely extensible?
5.2.1 Characterizing the natural numbers
In ‘¿e philosophical signicance of Gödel’s theorem’, rst published in 1963, Dum-
mett argues that we can give a denite characterization of the concept natural number,
but not of the domain of the properties of the natural numbers. As we will shortly see,
in later writing, such as ‘What is mathematics about?’, Dummett changes his position,
and suggests that the natural numbers themselves are indenitely extensible.
A denite characterization of the natural numbers can be given in terms of zero
and the successor function: zero is a natural number and is not a successor; every
natural number has a unique successor, which is another natural number; and there
is no natural number which cannot be reached from zero by means of the successor
function. In other words, a natural number is the result of nitely many applications
of the successor function to zero.
14 Clark, ‘Dummett’s argument’, Oliver, ‘Dummett and Frege’.
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¿is characterization is of course somewhat circular, in that it uses the concept
‘nite’. But for whom is that a problem?
¿is circularity is a problem for the strict nitist — by which I mean someone
who believes that there is a greatest natural number. (Of course, strict nitists tend
to say that we don’t know — and can’t — which that greatest natural number is.)
It seems, though, that everyone else actually subscribes to this characterization
of the natural number concept. In particular, the nitist does. By nitism, I mean
the view championed by Hilbert that meaningful mathematics is concerned solely
with singular statements about nite objects, and that full-blown quantication over
the natural numbers is therefore not meaningful. Such nitists do allow schematic
reasoning, however, to establish conclusions about an arbitrary natural number; and
it is just this concept which is at issue. Although the nitist is unwilling or unable to
reect on the concept of natural number, she knows one when she sees it, and unlike
the strict nitist, she does not think that they give out somewhere further down the
line. Certainly the concept is one which the intuitionist accepts.
As Dummett points out (and as we noted in §4.3.3 above), a non-standard model
of the elementary Peano axioms (by which I mean just the axioms concerning zero
and the successor function: we need not worry about induction at this stage) is a
possible way of (mis)interpreting the vocabulary in the axioms, but it is not a possible
way of misunderstanding the characterization they give. A non-standard model is
an innite mathematical object, and as such it can only be given as a description.
And such a description will necessarily be in terms which presuppose a grasp of
the (standard) natural numbers.15 It is not merely that a non-standard model of
the basic arithmetical axioms is a perverse interpretation; it is that such perverse
interpretations are only available to those who have already helped themselves to
the notion of the natural number sequence.
¿e early Dummett does say that there is some sort of indenite extensibility
connected with the concept natural number: the means of proof of arithmetical
statements that we nd acceptable are always incomplete: that, Dummett suggests,
is the philosophical signicance of Gödel’s theorem. But in 1963, Dummett was
quite clear (and, I would add, quite right) that ‘there is really no vagueness as to the
15 Dummett, ‘Gödel’s theorem’; cf. also Putnam, ‘Models’ on the ‘vericationist’ (or perhaps better:
internalist) understanding of model theory. A formal version of this point is given by Tennenbaum’s
theorem: any recursive model of Peano Arithmetic is isomorphic to the standard one. See Odifreddi,
Classical Recursion ¿eory p. 24.
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extension of “natural number”.’16
At some point a er this, however, Dummett changed his mind, and began to talk
of the domain of the natural numbers as indenitely extensible. ¿e later Dummett
draws an analogy between the concept ‘natural number’ (where the ‘principle of
extensibility’ is the successor function) and the concept ‘property of natural numbers’
(where it is diagonalization). Just as the predicativist refuses to accept a denite
domain of properties or sets of natural numbers which is closed under diagonaliza-
tion, the nitist nds it absurd to suppose that there is a denite domain of natural
numbers closed under the successor function. And there seems to be no non-circular
way of getting a rational being to make the leap to accepting the totality in either
case. Dummett oers this reection on the situation:
A natural response is to claim that the question has been begged. In
classing real number as an indenitely extensible concept, we have
assumed that any totality of which we can have a denite conception
is at most denumerable; in classing natural number as one, we have
assumed that such a totality will be nite. Burden of proof controversies
are always dicult to resolve; but in this instance, it is surely clear that
it is the other side that has begged the question.17
But the concept natural number only ts Dummett’s ocial account of indenite
extensibility (see the quotation (IE) on p. 115 above) when it is explained as Frege does,
dening each natural number to be the cardinality of its predecessors. ¿e principle
of extension here takes us from a (nite) domain (for Frege, strictly: concept) of
natural numbers to the cardinality of that domain; when the domain is an initial
segment of the naturals, the resulting cardinal will be a natural not in that segment.
But the more obvious principle of extension is simply the successor operation, and
here we do not have the same move from a nite domain of naturals to a more
extensive nite domain; we just have a natural number, and then a bigger natural
number.
¿ere is indeed a ‘striking resemblance’, as Dummett puts it, between Frege’s
reasoning for the innity of the naturals, and the indenite extensibility of the set
concept — in short, their impredicativity. But this impredicativity is not an essential
feature of the concept natural number, whereas it does seem to be essential to the
16 Dummett, ‘Gödel’s theorem’ p. 196. Emphasis in original. 17 Dummett, ‘What?’ p. 443. Emphasis
Dummett’s.
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concept set. If we do not share Frege’s determination that the innity of the natural
numbers should be a logical truth, then we can instead appeal, for example, to a
Hilbertian symbolic intuition of stroke strings to deliver the basic truths of arithmetic:
that every stroke string has a unique successor (formed by the concatenation of
another stroke), that no two distinct stroke strings have the same successor, and
that such concatenation will never take us back to the single stroke with which we
started.
Dummett’s paradigm example of indenite extensibility is the concept of non-self-
membered set. In contrast to Lear, for example, who argued that the open-endedness
of the sets arises from some underdetermination of the set concept,18 Dummett is
surely correct in diagnosing indenite extensibility, not in any equivocation, but
rather in our coming to recognize more and more instances of the same concept, by
reecting on that concept. But it seems that while this analysis is correct for sets
of natural numbers, and for sets in general, it is grossly inappropriate for the case
of the natural numbers. If someone has any concept of natural number worth the
name, she must recognize that the sequence of numbers goes on indenitely; that
we can keep on counting and so keep on getting new numbers. But this is not the
result of reection on the concept natural number: it is merely the straightforward
application of it.
5.2.2 ¿e alleged impredicativity of the natural numbers
At this point, it is as well to return to an issue raised in Ch. 3.4.1 above: the argument
that in fact there is an essential impredicativity of the natural number concept, which
is shown in the induction principle.19
¿is issue seems to be intertwined, at least in Dummett’s work, with concerns
about the indenite extensibility of the natural numbers. But the induction principle
is of course unrelated to any principle of extension, and therefore to any possibility
that the natural numbersmight be indenitely extensible: if anything, its contribution
to the concept is quite the opposite, ruling out non-standard elements. What is
indenitely extensible, as Dummett argued in ‘¿e philosophical signicance of
Gödel’s theorem’, is the collection of epistemically legitimate axioms (or methods of
proof) for arithmetic.
18 See Lear, ‘Sets and semantics’. 19 ¿e argument has been put forward by Parsons, Nelson, and
Dummett himself. ¿e most recent version is given in Parsons,Mathematical ¿ought and its Objects
§50.
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¿e alleged impredicativity of the concept ‘natural number’ consists in the fact
that the validity of induction, with respect to all well-dened properties, is supposedly
an integral part of the concept. And among these properties are those which quantify
over the natural numbers.
Recall that according to the Vicious Circle Principle, a set specication is im-
predicative if it involves quantication over a domain which contains the set being
specied. First-order instances of the induction principle however, taken as part of
an implicit characterization of the concept ‘natural number’, do not involve quanti-
cation over any domain which contains the set of natural numbers (or the property
of being a natural number); at worst, they quantify over a domain which includes
the natural numbers. In this respect, instances of induction seem to be in the same
boat as the axiom that every number has a successor. Such quantication does not
t our ocial denition of impredicativity. Indeed, as Alexander George has noted,
there are adequate specications of the set of natural numbers which quantify only
over nite sets.20
It should come as no surprise that, in contrast to PA (by which I mean, as
always, rst-order Peano arithmetic), full second-order Peano arithmetic, which
contains the second-order induction axiom, is ocially impredicative when taken
as a characterization of the natural numbers. When the axioms are framed so as to
introduce a natural number predicate N, then the extension of that predicate is in
the range of the second-order quantier which features in the induction axiom.
¿e situation seems to be this. A basic understanding of the natural numbers
is that they are zero and its successors and nothing else. ¿e extremal clause, ‘and
nothing else’, can be read in various ways; it certainly need not be read as presup-
posing the full second-order induction axiom. As we noted in Ch. 4.2.5 above, full
second-order logic is more than is needed to pin the natural numbers down (up
to isomorphism); there are weaker logics, such as logic with a built-in ancestral
operator, that will do the job. But it is not clear quite what purpose is served by
such non-formal formalizations, and I suggest we leave this characterization as it
is, a sentence of informal language. What this basic understanding of the natural
numbers entails, though, is that induction is valid for any meaningful, well-dened
20 George, ‘Imprecision’. ¿e fullest and most modern version of this idea has been carried out by
Feferman and Hellman, ‘Predicative foundations of arithmetic’.
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predicate of the naturals.21 But this basic understanding of the naturals leaves entirely
open a crucial question: Which predicates of the natural numbers aremeaningful?
A conservative answer to this is given by Hilbert-style nitism, which denies the
meaningfulness of predicates which contain quantication over the natural numbers.
Hilbert motivated this view by stressing the role of symbolic intuition as the only
real basis for meaning in mathematics. Such intuition could only present individual
nite objects: so statements about all of the natural numbers, or predicates involving
such quantication, could not be given nitary meaning. ¿e nitist will therefore
not be willing to endorse induction for predicates featuring such quantication. On
the other hand, the nitist does allow that sentences of arithmetic with free variables
are meaningful, because they can be understood schematically; so induction for
such predicates is legitimate. ¿e systems PRA and I∆0 are formalizations of this
sort of view of arithmetic.
A more generous answer would correspond to a more full-bloodedly realist
view of the natural numbers as a completed innite domain. On such a view, a
predicate featuring quantication over the naturals is taken to be meaningful and
to give rise to a statement with a determinate truth value when it is predicated
of any natural. And so induction is valid for complex predicates containing such
quantication. Such embedded quantication over the natural numbers (unlike the
intitial universal quantication which features in the elementary Peano axioms and
which is acceptable to the nitist) cannot be understood as schematic quantication.
To meaningfully embed quantiers in this way, we need to take the natural numbers
as already given.
¿e sort of circularity that is described as the ‘impredicativity’ of induction is
that these instances of the induction scheme with embedded quantiers feature
in axiomatizations (most notably PA) which are also sometimes presented as char-
acterizations of the natural number structure. And here we might object: if we
don’t already assume that we know what the natural numbers are — if that is, the
characterization is supposed to be an adequate introduction to the concept — then
how could we make sense of these problematic instances?
¿is problem is a real one. It is a real conceptual leap to go from the sort
21 Indeed, perhaps the best way to semi-formally express the basic understanding of the naturals is
through natural deduction inference rules for the introduction and elimination of a natural number
predicate, where the induction principle is an elimination rule. See Parsons,Mathematical ¿ought
and its Objects §31, §47 for presentation and discussion of this.
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of nitistic understanding of the natural numbers embodied in PRA, say, to that
embodied in PA. Finitism is a conceptually stable position.
However, the problem is not one of impredicativity; at least, not in the ocial
sense that is at work in the Vicious Circle Principle, and that is my concern in this
thesis. (It may well be that there is some broader concept — perhaps a necessarily
imprecise, family-resemblance concept — of impredicativity that might encompass
both formal arithmetic and impredicative set comprehension.22 But again, such
a concept is not my present concern.) As we have noted, the sort of embedded
quantication that features in the instances of induction of PA is quantication
over the natural numbers themselves, and not over any domain of objects which
includes the set of natural numbers, or over a domain of properties which includes
the property of being a natural number. So the axioms of PA are not formally
impredicative.
And the sort of circularity that we diagnosed occurs only if the axioms of PA
are taken all at once as an introductory characterization of the natural numbers. If
instead we give rst the elementary Peano axioms as a characterization of the basic
grasp of the natural numbers — that the natural numbers are zero and its successors
— then the instances of the induction principle can be presented subsequently, as
further facts about the already understood structure. As we have noted, the stubborn
nitist will reject these (purported) further facts as being ungrounded. And I do not
propose here to try to persuade her otherwise. What is important for my purposes
here is that those of us who have taken the leap and endorsed PA are not vulnerable
to an argument, based on impredicativity, to the conclusion that we should not have
made that leap.
5.2.3 ¿e negative translation
It’s here worth returning to the comparison between intuitionism and nitism. While
nitism genuinely is amoremodest position to take on arithmetic than predicativism
(given that predicativists accepts PA), it seems that intuitionism is not. And it quite
is clear that neither the Dummettian, nor the orthodox Brouwerian intuitionist is
any longer in a position to doubt the consistency of PA.
¿e reason is as follows. ¿e standard formalization of intuitionistic number
theory is Heyting Arithmetic (HA). As the rst-order Peano axioms are obviously
22 George, ‘Imprecision’ makes more or less this suggestion.
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true of the natural numbers from an intuitionistic perspective just as much as on a
classical perspective, the only dierence between PA and HA is in the background
logic. However, Gödel’s ‘negative translation’ gives a uniform mapping of sentences
of arithmetic which carries PA-proofs into HA-proofs, and which leaves numer-
ical equations unchanged. An inconsistency in PA would allow us to construct a
PA-proof of ‘0 = 1’; but this could then be converted by the negative translation
into an HA-proof of the same result, and would therefore mean that HA was also
inconsistent.23
Formal systems for predicativism which are conservative over PA, such asACA0,
are therefore guaranteed by intuitionistically acceptable means to be consistent; and
so an intuitionist should have no scruples about making use of such a system in an
instrumental spirit, as an ‘ideal’ mathematical theory (in Hilbert’s sense).24
¿e intuitionist objection to LEM (and to classical logic in general) in the context
of arithmetic cannot be that the assumptions lead to a contradiction; it must instead
be about meaning. ¿e charge must be that the classicist has inadvertently lapsed
into nonsense; or that the explanations (implicit as well as explicit) of the meaning
of mathematical sentences which the classicist can give are incoherent, or do not
meet certain a priori requirements. (¿e obvious example of such requirements are
Dummett’s acquisition and manifestation challenges that we discussed earlier.)
But as Potter has argued,25 even this moremodest attack is called into question by
the negative translation: if we look at the matter from above, as it were, it seems that
the intuitionist will struggle to demonstrate an internal incoherence in the pattern
of language use in classical mathematics, given that just those patterns are wholly
replicated within intuitionistic mathematics. HA is a proper subtheory of PA, and so,
on the face of the matter, intuitionist arithmetic is a part of classical arithmetic. ¿e
intuitionist might argue that HA is a privileged part — fully meaningful or justied
in a way that classical arithmetic as a whole is not, or (more modestly) maintaining
distinctions (such as that between a statement and its double-negation) that PA
collapses. But what the negative translation gives is an injection of PA intoHA that is
not a surjection; hence the title of Potter’s paper. And this seems to entirely undercut
the claim that there is any merit particular to HA.
23 See Gödel, ‘Intuitionistischen Arithmetik [1933e]’. 24 ¿e conservativity must of course be proved
in PA for this to hold. In fact, Shoeneld’s proof of the conservativeness of ACA0 over PA is eectively
in PRA: see Shoeneld, ‘Relative consistency proof ’. 25 Potter, ‘Classical arithmetic is part of
intuitionist arithmetic’.
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If the intuitionist wants to resist this line of argument, it seems that she is forced
to say that the logical constants are not up for reinterpretation in this way: that they
have some special meaning which goes beyond what can be cashed out by describing
patterns of legitimate inference. Such a desperate resort to incommunicable mean-
ings seems to drive the intuitionists back into the Brouwerian solipsism fromwhence
they came. ¿is position is perhaps invulnerable, but also profoundly unappealing;
and it is completely powerless to explain one of the most distinctive phenomena of
mathematics, its objectivity.
Of course, the logical constants are used throughout language, not just in arith-
metic. So the Dummettian, who defends intuitionistic logic for arithmetic but also
insists on the publicity of meaning, can claim that it is the patterns of legitimate in-
ference throughout language as a whole that pin down the meaning of the constants,
and that intuitionistic logic is then applied to the subject of arithmetic to give us HA.
But the problem with this tack, as Potter argues, is that the negative translation can
be re-packaged as an intuitionistically acceptable, step-by-step introduction of the
classical logical constants as used in arithmetic. So for there to be any real dierence
between HA and PA, it needs to reside in a dierence in the understanding of the
constants as used in arithmetic. And here we should note that HA and PA agree, not
only on the atomic sentences, but also on the Π1, Σ1, and even Π2 sentences. So
the intuitionist will need to point to more complex sentences of arithmetic to nd
any special virtue in HA. If we had a rm pre-formal understanding of hypothetical
conditionals, then that could serve as a point of a dierence: §xFx classically entails
that one of F0,F1, . . . will be true, whereas if the premise is understood via the
negative translation as ∀x Fx, no such implication holds intuitionistically. But
an understanding of hypothetical conditionals with an innite consequent is surely
unavailable unless we have already settled the meaning of quantication over the
numbers, which is precisely the point at issue: so an appeal to this as the value of
intuitionistic logic would seem to be circular.
In the paper in which he announced the result of the negative translation, Gödel
interpreted the situation thus:
the system of intuitionistic arithmetic and number theory is only ap-
parently narrower than the classical one, and in truth contains it [. . . ].
Intuitionism appears to introduce genuine restrictions only for analysis
and set theory; these restrictions, however, are due to the rejection, not
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of the principle of the excluded middle, but of notions introduced by
impredicative denitions.26
¿e challenge which the predicativist faces from the intuitionist (Brouwerian or
Dummettian) — to justify the Law of Excluded Middle for sentences featuring
quantication over the natural numbers — seems to be adequately met. Unlike with
nitism, it is very hard to nd a compelling philosophical position which could
motivate arithmetical intuitionism.
5.3 ¿e indenite extensibility of the continuum
So far, I have argued that if we set aside nitist scruples, we can credit ourselves
with a determinate conception of the natural numbers. ¿is means that we can
be Dummettian realists about arithmetic, committed to bivalence for arithmetical
statements, and can straightforwardly endorse classical Peano arithmetic as true.
What about analysis and the continuum? ¿e predicativist agrees with the
Dummettian intuitionist that the continuum is indenitely extensible; but unlike
the Dummettian, she attributes this to an important disanalogy between the natural
numbers (which, contra the later Dummett, are a denite domain), and the real
numbers. For the predicativist, then, the indenite extensibility of a concept cannot
be an immediate consequence of the innity of its instances, or even of its ‘intrinsic
innity’. (¿is is Dummett’s term for a domain’s being innite by virtue of the concept
which gives rise to the domain: so ‘natural number’ is intrinsically innite, whereas
‘star’ would not be, even if there happened to be an innite number of stars.)27 To
draw this disanalogy between the case of the natural numbers and the case of the
reals, we need rst to get clearer on what indenite extensibility is.
5.3.1 Indenitely extensibility again
As I am committing myself to the predicativist position that the continuum is indef-
initely extensible, that is, that it is indeterminate just what real numbers exist, I will
pause here to consider some objections to the coherence of this idea, and to make
clearer why it is that I think that indenite extensibility arises with the real numbers,
but not with the naturals.
26 Gödel, ‘IntuitionistischenArithmetik [1933e]’ p. 37. 27 Dummett, Frege: Philosophy ofMathematics
p. 318.
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Clark and Oliver both complain of the obscurity in Dummett’s use of the idea of
indenite extensibility.28 Oliver says that
the failure to lay down precisely which objects fall under an indenitely
extensible concept must, for Dummett, be reected in an indeterminacy
in the existence of those objects.29
He then protests that this is tantamount to vague existence, ‘an idea one cannot
understand.’
Similarly, while Clark seems to accept that set is an indenitely extensible concept,
he objects to the inference he nds in his reconstruction of Dummett’s argument
that ‘just because we have admitted that the concept of set is indenitely extensible it
is indeterminate as to what sets there are.’30 Clark suggests that unless we are already
(metaphysical) constructivists, or at least have some quasi-constructive idea of the
sets evolving through time, then this inference is unwarranted. Further, Clark seems
to suggest that there is an appeal here to Dummett’s general meaning-theoretic
argument: ‘the argument for that claim is one which must lie within the theory
of meaning: it must turn on what it is in general to have a “denite conception of
everything falling under a concept”, and why failure to have it could aect the issue
of what objects there are.’31 (Oliver certainly sees an appeal to the meaning-theoretic
argument when the argument from indenite extensibility is applied to concepts
not threatened by set-theoretic paradoxes.)32
¿e clearest proposal for what Dummett could possibly mean is given by Sul-
livan.33 Sullivan presents, as exegesis of Dummett, an argument that I will call a
version of the argument from indenite extensibility, although Sullivan himself
does not use the notion of indenite extensibility as a premise; rather he suggests it
as ‘an importantly illuminating way of formulating the intended conclusion’.34 As
Sullivan presents it, moreover, the argument is wholly independent of Dummett’s
meaning-theoretic considerations.
As Sullivan presents the argument, the key premise is what he calls Dummett’s
‘logicism’; and Sullivan describes this premise as ‘clearly and importantly right.’35 For
the case of arithmetic — though it is explicitly claimed to hold for all mathematical
domains — the premise is that
28 Clark, ‘Dummett’s argument’, Oliver, ‘Hazy totalities’. 29 Ibid. p. 48. 30 Clark, ‘Dummett’s
argument’ p. 61. 31 Ibid. 32 See Oliver, ‘Hazy totalities’ pp. 33-4, Oliver, ‘Dummett and Frege’
pp. 387–8. 33 Sullivan, ‘Dummett’s case’. 34 Ibid. p. 755. 35 Ibid. p. 760.
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It is incoherent to suppose that anything might make for the truth of
any statement of arithmetic save the conception we have of the objects
it concerns. Arithmetical truth, that is, cannot outrun what is settled as
true by our conception of the numbers.36
And of course the same must go for the existence of the numbers.
¿e load-bearing part of the premise is not of course that ‘It is incoherent to
suppose’, but rather that nothing makes for the truth of a statement of arithmetic
save our conception of the numbers. But the forceful support Sullivan gives for the
premise is indeed that the alternative — what Sullivan calls ‘analogical platonism’ —
is incoherent. Analogical platonism is so-called because the most familiar way of
putting the view is to say that the objects of mathematics are real in just the same
way as concrete objects. But as far as the argument goes, what counts as analogical
platonism is just the belief that there is anything other than our conception of the
mathematical objects which makes for the truth of any statement about those objects.
It follows that ‘logicism’ and analogical platonism are collectively exhaustive and
mutually exclusive positions.
Platonism in general is o en cashed out by appeal to a faculty of intellectual
intuition of mathematical objects which is (in some sense) analogous to sense-
perception of physical objects. What the argument for ‘logicism’ (or equivalently,
against analogical platonism) does is to place a limit on how far such an analogy can
be taken.
In the case of concrete objects, a correct characterization of a region of concrete
reality will allow us to draw conclusions about that region by purely deductive
reasoning. But, by the nature of the case, such reasoning is only able to take us
so far: a concrete object has a ‘dark side’, as Sullivan puts it, aspects which are not
transparent to our reasoning on the basis of our conception of such objects. And
the only way to ll in such gaps in our knowledge is by further empirical enquiry.
¿ere is no analogue to this in the mathematical case.
If the continuum hypothesis, say, is determinately true, that can only be
because it follows from principles not yet formulated by us, but already
inchoately present in our intuitive conception of the intended model of
set theory. If that conception were a kind of blurred perception, on the
36 Sullivan, ‘Dummett’s case’ p. 757.
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other hand, it might be that it could be lled out, with equal faithfulness
to our present grasp of it, however implicit, both so as to verify and
to falsify the continuum hypothesis, which nevertheless possessed a
determinate truth-value according to the way things happened to be
[. . . ]. ¿is supposition is manifestly absurd [. . . ].37
¿e absurdity with analogical platonism is the thought that beyond faithfulness to
our conception of mathematical objects, there is any further question of faithfulness
to the objects themselves. In the case of the Continuum Hypothesis, either our
conception of the sets is determinate enough already to settle its truth value (and it
is just that we have not yet succeeded in expressing enough of that conception in set
theoretic axioms); or nothing settles its truth value (and perhaps we will come to
recognize that our present conception of the sets is really two distinct conceptions
of sets blurrily superimposed; or perhaps even that it is really no conception at all).
¿ere is no third possibility, of the sets settling the truth value of CH behind our
backs, as it were, by being arranged thus-and-so, despite the fact that their being so
arranged is in no sense a consequence of our conception of them.
As Dummett writes,
if the analogy between physical and ideal objects were sound, our uncer-
tainty about the continuum hypothesis need show no haziness in our
concept of a set, but only in our knowledge of what sets God has chosen
to create; for presumably ideal objects are as much God’s creation as
physical ones.38
¿e point is that the analogy is clearly not sound, but ‘lame’. If it were up to God’s
creative will what things there are and how they are arranged in mathematical reality,
then proof would not have the special role that it does in mathematics as the unique
source of knowledge. ¿ere would then be an extra-mathematical fact about what
God had actually done that would settle the truth value of CH. Conversely, as proof is
the unique source of mathematical knowledge, it cannot be that mathematical reality
is ultimately answerable to anything other than our conception of mathematical
objects.
To put the matter another way: if the Fs are concrete physical objects, and if our
theory of the Fs doesn’t settle whether or not some statement ϕ holds of the Fs, then
37 Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics p. 310. 38 Ibid. p. 302.
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we need to do some empirical enquiry to nd out, in this respect, how things stand
with the Fs — whether ϕ is true or not. But if the Fs are mathematical objects, and
if our conception of the Fs really doesn’t settle whether or not ϕ holds, then there is
no question of anything else (the Fs themselves) settling the matter. It must be that
our conception of the Fs was not univocal, and that there are in fact two sorts of Fs:
the ϕ-sort and the ϕ-sort. (And this is precisely what is said by those set theorists
who accept ZF but reject the idea that CH is settled by some (as-yet unformalized)
part of our conception of the sets. And it is more or less how things turned out with
Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry.)
Twopoints should be noted here beforewemove on. First, Dummettian ‘logicism’
does not already entail that all mathematical truths are knowable by proof; what it
does entail, rather, is that all knowable mathematical truths are knowable by proof.
In one place, Dummett leaves open the possibility that second-order consequences of
our initial mathematical assumptions might be genuine consequences, even though
‘we may be unable even in principle to see that they follow.’39 Second, Sullivan
overstates the case in saying that if any truth about a subject area is obtainable by
proof, then all obtainable truths must be so obtainable.40
As we discussed in Ch. 3.2.2 above, Sullivan explains the role that empirical
reality plays in settling the meaning of empirical quantication through his striking
metaphor of a checkerboard. When considering a quantied statement such as §xFx
for an empirical concept F,
¿e role of the checkerboard [. . . ] is to provide positions, not only
for objects that might fall under the concept, but at the same time for
other viewpoints that might ground alternative ways of referring to
those same objects. It is because it provides both of these that it is a
framework both for dierentiating and for identifying these objects.41
So to settle the criteria of application and identity of an empirical concept is thereby
39 Dummett, ‘What?’ p. 431. In Ch. 4.2, I argued against the idea that the full second-order consequence
relation really is a consequence relation. Does this mean that I am committed to the view that all
mathematical truths are in principle knowable by proof? I think that it does, and that this is not
unacceptable. As the Incompleteness ¿eorems teach us, however, not all mathematical truths can
be proved from any xed collection of principles. ¿ere is clearly much more to be said; but I cannot
attempt to say it here. 40 See Dummett, ‘Reply to Sullivan’ p. 788 for Dummett’s rejection of Sullivan
on this point. 41 Sullivan, ‘Dummett’s case’ p. 777.
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to x its extension — or rather, to do what is needed to make it that reality xes its
extension. On the other hand,
In the absence of a checkerboard [. . . ] our understanding of what it
is for any given object to be F does not include any circumscription
of the ways in which a candidate for being F might be given. In the
mathematical case, then, knowing how to answer a question, ‘Is so-and-
so an F?’ does not give us even a general grip on which such questions
there are.42
Or, therefore, on which Fs there are; and so we are in the dark about the meaning of
quantications over all of the Fs. But it is not just that we haven’t exactly determined
the range of our variables: it is that nothing has.
¿e naive realist picture, the analogical platonism that we have rejected, is of
all of the objects, among them the mathematical objects, lying about the place in
their respective regions of reality, and, by their existence, their properties and their
arrangement, making our quantied sentences true or false. And were this picture
right, then of course any problems associated with our ignorance of which Fs there
are and how they are arranged, would be just our problems; our sentences would still
be meaningful and have determinate truth values, even though we o en wouldn’t
know what those truth values were, or perhaps even (in one sense) quite what our
quantied sentences meant. But we have argued that analogical platonism is absurd:
there cannot be any facts about what mathematical objects there are which are not
consequences of our conception of those objects.
What this argument for Dummettian ‘logicism’ does is to answer Clark’s chal-
lenge: Dummett’s logicism is a weak form of constructivism on which the indenite
extensibility of a mathematical concept entails not merely our ignorance of, but the
indeterminacy of the meaning, and so perhaps of the truth values of sentences which
quantify over the objects which fall under that concept. Whether this is, as Oliver
suggests, ‘an idea we cannot understand’ is another matter. ¿e Russellian response
to indenite extensibility is indeed to view such sentences as nonsense, and to try
to do without them altogether. Dummett suggests that we can make some sense of
them, and I agree. First, though, is the question of where the continuum ts in.
42 Sullivan, ‘Dummett’s case’ p 778.
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5.3.2 ¿e continuum
In the course of his discussion, Sullivan asks why it is that there is no analogue of
the checkerboard in the mathematical case. He considers how we might explain the
notion of a real number, and notes that our explanations in no way settle how we
might be presented with an instance: we ‘simply leave any purported specication
to be judged on its merits when it is oered.’43 ¿ere is something intrinsically
open-ended here. However, Sullivan notes that this
turn[s] essentially on the intrinsically innite character of the real num-
bers — of each real number, that is, and not only of the domain of
the real numbers. And that makes it far from clear that any genuinely
parallel source of open-endedness could aict generalization over the
natural numbers.44
I argued above that there is indeed no such open-endedness with the natural
numbers. While the domain of natural numbers is innite, it is built up by a uniform
step-by-step process, and can therefore legitimately be considered to be a denite
domain. ¿e numerals provide a system of canonical notation which is, in Sullivan’s
terms, an adequate checkerboard.
¿e sets of natural numbers are not uniformly generated in this way. Indeed,
there can only be countably many intelligible denitions of sets of naturals, while
Cantor’s¿eorem shows that any countable collection of sets of naturals is incomplete
and can be extended. Moreover, the non-absoluteness of the continuum means that
it is infected by the indenite extensibility of the domain of sets.
¿e argument of Ch. 4 was against the classical conception of the continuum as
a denite domain. And we can now put this together with the notion of indenite
extensibility. With the sets of natural numbers, or the real numbers, there can be
no equivalent of the checkerboard, because in the general case, we need an innite
amount of information to specify each one, and that is of course something that we
can never have. No conception we can have of them can give us a grasp of more than
a countable innity of them. As we have renounced analogical platonism, it is our
conception of the real numbers that determines what real numbers there are. And as
43 Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics p. 319; quoted Sullivan, ‘Dummett’s case’ p. 778.
44 Ibid. p. 779. Do not confuse this ‘intrinsically innite character’ with Dummett’s sense of ‘intrinsic
innity’, mentioned above.
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Cantor taught us that the real numbers cannot be countable, it follows that the real
numbers in themselves are indenitely extensible: that statements which quantify
over the reals have indeterminate meaning, and may have indeterminate truth value.
5.3.3 Predicativist analysis
Because of the indenite extensibility of the continuum, predicativists and intuition-
ists agree that sentences which quantify over the continuum, such as, in particular,
sentences of the language of second-order arithmetic, may lack a truth-value.
¿e intuitionistic approach to analysis is to reject the classical idea of a real num-
ber (which is in a sense a completed innite sequence, and therefore intuitionistically
illegitimate) and instead to base analysis on the idea of real numbers as given by
choice sequences, about which only a nite amount of information is supposed to
be available at any one time. While with arithmetic the intuitionists apply a more
restricted logic to premises that are classically acceptable to give a subtheory of
classical arithmetic, here the wholly original concepts used lead to results which
actually contradict classical theorems of analysis. ¿e predicativist response is much
moremodest; as we shall see in the following chapters, it simply involves a restriction,
relative to classicism, of the principles by which real numbers (or sets of natural
numbers) can be dened. ¿e domain of quantiers which range over the reals is
not denite, and so bivalence is not guaranteed; but as we shall see, (bearing out
Gödel’s remark, quoted above), the assumption of LEM is nevertheless legitimate
and does no harm.
¿e denable sets are a denite sub-collection of the full, indenitely extensible
continuum. ¿ey can be viewed as Weyl advocated, as built up genetically, by means
of operations such as union, complementation, recursion, and so on, applied to a
base-class of singletons; or they can be viewed (as is more common today) as arising
from a comprehension principle applied to open sentences of arithmetic — which,
in view of the way logically complex sentences are built up recursively from atomic
formulae, comes to much the same thing. ¿e important point for the predicativist
position is that the means of dening (rst-level) sets of natural numbers must not
involve any quantication over the sets of natural numbers. (Ramied predicative
systems allow second-level sets which may be dened using quantication over
rst-level sets, and then third-level sets dened by quantifying over those, and so
on. However, the division of the sets (and therefore the real numbers) into levels
134 CHAPTER 5. THE STABILITY OF THE PREDICATIVIST POSITION
makes it much more dicult to give an intuitive interpretation to the theorems of
ramied analysis, and I will not attempt to do so here.)
¿e genetic viewpoint, if taken seriously, provides one justication for this
prohibition: we cannot permit set denitions to quantify over all of the sets because
the sets are still being built (by means of their denitions). Outside the context of
set denitions, quantication over the sets is perfectly legitimate. However, there is
normally no suggestion that the only sets which exist are those which can be dened
by the means permitted in the particular formal system, and this is in accordance
with the intuitive picture: we can always ‘diagonalize out’ to dene a set which
cannot be dened by the means permitted. And so the ‘openness’ of the continuum
is preserved, and the only universal conclusions about the sets which we are able to
establish will be, in a sense, general: they will be claims which are true of any set, for
general reasons, by the nature of the sets.
As Wang wrote, about the analogous case of general set theory:
If we adopt a constructive approach [to set theory] then we do have a
problem in allowing unlimited quantiers to dene other sets. Even
then there remains the possibility of accepting the law of excluded
middle. ¿e diculty is rather in establishing universal conclusions
because we cannot survey all permissible operations.45
To be predicatively acceptable, an axiom system for the continuum needs to be
open-ended: that is, essentially existential. Most naturally, these existential axioms
will correspond to methods of intuitively constructing sets of natural numbers — to
some of Wang’s ‘permissible operations,’ for constructing sets either from natural
numbers themselves, or from other sets of naturals. (Such as the arithmetically
denable sets just mentioned, where the methods are recursion, union, intersection,
complementation, and so on.)46 What are not acceptable are limitative axioms,
which say that only sets of a certain sort exist. Such an axiom may be true of some
determinate part of the continuum (such as the arithmetically denable sets); but it
is clearly not true of the full indenitely extensible continuum. Also unacceptable
are axioms which assert the existence of sets dened by means of quantication over
the continuum: such axioms breach the Vicious Circle Principle.
45 Wang, ‘¿e concept of set’ p. 560. 46 Such axioms will be of ∀§ form: for every set X, there is a
set Y = N − X, and so on.
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For a given axiom system, certain results will be provable about the continuum.
In general, we may say that most of these results will be existential, and only rather
trivial ones will be universal. ¿e predicativist can recognize that the axioms are
true of some delimited and denite part of the continuum, and that therefore the
theorems derivable from the axioms will be true when the quantiers are interpreted
as ranging over thismodel of the continuum; but also that, because they are essentially
existential, the axioms — and so also the theorems — will be true of the continuum
as a whole, which is the intended interpretation.
¿e point of the prohibition on set quantication in set denitions (or set exist-
ence principles) is that the sets corresponding to such denitions will not, in general,
be the same in all acceptable models of the continuum. If we want to dene a set
X as the intersection of all of the members of a class of sets with a certain property
Φ, then this condition may pick out one set XM in the modelM , and a smaller set
XN in the richer modelN . On the classical point of view, of course, there is the
assumption that the continuum is denite, and so that the denition succeeds in
picking out the set X that we want, the intersection of all of the Φ sets that there
really are. But for the predicativist, all that we have are the successively richer models
of the continuum, what we might call approximations from below,M ,N , . . . .
¿e indenite extensibility of the continuum is represented formally by the fact
that formal predicative systems of analysis are not intended to be categorical as re-
gards the range of their set variables. With systems of second-order arithmetic, where
the rst-order variables are intended to range over the natural numbers, and the
second-order variables range over the sets of natural numbers, we considerω-models
as standard, that is, those with a standard rst-order part. ¿ese ω-models dier in
how rich their ‘continuum’ is: how many sets of natural numbers are contained in
the second-order domain of the model. And therefore some statements involving
second-order quantication will receive dierent truth values in the dierent models.
Of course, for any two ω-models,M ,N , ifN contains a set thatM does not, then
M is inadequate — it cannot be the full continuum. But, if it is countable, neither
canN . As the continuum is indenitely extensible, we can always keep extending it
— or rather, revealing more of it. But for the purpose of actually doing mathematics,
we need to choose some axioms to work with; we know in advance that they will
not fully capture the continuum, but if we choose wisely, we can make sure that they
capture enough of it for whatever mathematical purpose we have in mind. As any
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model of the continuum will give determinate truth values to all of the sentences of
the language of second-order arithmetic, there does not seem to be any good reason
to forbid our theories from making the assumption of bivalence, as embodied in the
Law of Excluded Middle.
To make good on this, we need to look more closely at the reasons given by Dum-
mett (and others) as to why LEMmight be problematic for indenitely extensible
domains.
5.3.4 LEM and analysis
Dummett’s position is that statements which quantify over an indenitely extensible
domain do not necessarily have determinate truth-conditions; but that does not
make them meaningless, or indeed rule out warranted assertion of such statements:
if we have a clear grasp of any totality of ordinals, we thereby have a
conception of what is intuitively an ordinal number greater than any
member of that totality. Any denite totality of ordinals must therefore
be so circumscribed as to forswear comprehensiveness, renouncing
any claim to cover all that we might intuitively recognise as being an
ordinal. It does not follow that quantication over the intuitive totality
of all ordinals is unintelligible. A universally quantied statement that
would be true in any denite totality of ordinals must be admitted as
true of all ordinals whatever, and there is a plethora of such statements,
beginning with ‘Every ordinal has a successor’. Equally, any statement
asserting the existence of an ordinal can be understood, without prior
circumscription of the domain of quantication, as vindicated by the
specication of an instance, no matter how large. Yet to suppose all
quantied statements of this kind to have a determinate truth-value
would lead directly to contradiction by the route indicated by Burali-
Fori. [Footnote:] Abandoning classical logic is not, indeed, sucient
by itself to preserve us from contradiction if we maintain the same
assumptions as before; but, when we do not conceive ourselves to be
quantifying over a fully determinate totality, we shall have no motive to
do so.47
47 Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics p. 316.
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As stated, this cannot be quite right. As Oliver notes, the domain of ordinalsα S α B ω is surely a denite domain (if any innite domain is). But Dummett’s
generalization, ‘every ordinal has a successor’ is false in this domain.48 Presumably,
however, such domains do not even reach the starting-line: no-one would have such
a domain as her intuitive model of the ordinals, precisely because it doesn’t satisfy
the obvious closure principle which is Dummett’s example.49
And while Dummett’s footnote concedes that abstaining from the use of classical
logic is not sucient to avoid contradiction, it also seems that it is not necessary.
Whether or not we are led to a contradiction surely depends on the assumptions
that we make about the ordinals, and on the richness of the language we use to talk
about them. As Boolos points out, the (classical) elementary theory of the ordinals
is even decidable: so every statement in that language clearly has a determinate
truth-value.50
Dummett’s thought can naturally be extended, for example to disjunction: a
disjunctive statement which involves quantication over an indenitely extensible
domain should presumably be endorsed if every acceptable model makes true one
disjunct or the other. But then we seem to have opened the way to a vindication of
LEM: second-order instances of the Quantier Law of ExcludedMiddle, ∀XΦ(X)-§XΦ(X), are true in all models. Can we not also admit these as true of all sets of
natural numbers whatsoever?
Peter Clark (considering instead the case of general set theory, and drawing on
Parsons’ suggestion of relativizing the distinction between set and proper-class) has
suggested that we can.51 Dummett elaborates on the suggestion somewhat:
[Clark] disagrees with my opinion that a theory whose variables range
over the objects falling under such a [sc: indenitely extensible] concept
must have an intuitionistic, not a classical logic. His justication is
that we can view such a theory as systematically ambiguous, taking its
variables as ranging over any one of a (necessarily indeterminate) range
of denite sub-totalities. ¿ere will be many sentences of the theory
that are not determinately true or false, because (say) false in some
sub-totalities but true in larger ones; but the law of excluded middle
48 Oliver, ‘Dummett and Frege’ p. 384. 49 ¿e principle ∀α§β.β = α+ is therefore an appropriate
axiom to adopt for partial characterizations of the ordinals. It is essentially existential. 50 Boolos,
‘Whence?’ p. 222. 51 Clark, ‘Basic Law V’ p. 247.
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will hold good in the theory, because every sentence is determinately
true or false in each denite sub-totality.52
As Dummett comments, ‘¿e proposal raises the question when we do have a
denite conception of the objects over which our variables range.’53 My suggestion
— which builds on my earlier claim that we do have a denite conception of the
natural numbers — is that we can count as denite any conception that is given by a
(nitely-based) canonical system of notation for the objects.
For the continuum, then, the suggestion is that the predicativist can legitimately
work with appropriate (formally predicative) unramied systems of second-order
arithmetic, with a classical background logic (that is, assuming LEM throughout).
Examples of such systems are RCA0,WKL0, and ACA0.54 ¿ese three theories are
nested: all of the theorems of RCA0 are theorems ofWKL0, and all of the theorems
ofWKL0 are theorems of ACA0. ¿e natural interpretation of the set quantiers in
all three systems is that they range over the intuitive continuum: all of the sets of
natural numbers. But there are also perfectly determinate sub-domains which can
serve as domains for the second-order variables in the theories. (¿e recursive sets
comprise the smallest ω-model of RCA0, and the arithmetical sets are the smallest
ω-model of ACA0.)
¿e indenite extensibility of the continuum can therefore be reconciled with
the meaningfulness and bivalence of quantication over the continuum. Such quan-
tication is to be understood as systematically ambiguous, with the variables ranging
over any denite collection of sets of natural numbers which is a model (strictly
speaking, the second-order part of a model) of the theory that is being used at the
time.
As with Clark’s interpretation of set theory, there will be many distinct
models for what is said about sets (the theory of sets) by any particular
speaker on any particular occasion, so the range of quantiers employed
in making such statements must be systematically ambiguous. No
systematic elaboration by laying down more and more claims about
sets could serve to eliminate totally this ambiguity from a speaker’s
discourse.55
52 Dummett, ‘Chairman’s address’ p. 250. 53 Ibid. 54 Simpson, ‘Predicativity’. 55 Clark, ‘Basic
Law V’ p. 247.
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Imagine a mathematician who rst adopts RCA0, and proves various theorems
in the language of analysis, and who then comes to recognize the existence of more
sets of natural numbers, and to accept the axioms of ACA0. Formally speaking,
she can recognize that the axioms of RCA0 are simple consequences (actually just
special cases) of her new axioms, and so her old proofs carry over to the new context
verbatim. But this is not merely a formal similarity: there is a clear sense in which
she is talking about the same things as she was before — the continuum, that is, the
sets of natural numbers. She has of course recognized more of its complexity; she
now asserts existential statements which she did not previously. And she can now
see all of the mathematics she did before as true of (true when interpreted in, by
restricting the set quantiers to range over) some denite sub-continuum. Formally,
she can come to grasp the class of recursive sets, and see that that is a model of her
old theory.
What she meant before by a universal second-order claim was that every set is
thus-and-so. ¿is was something of a wave of the hand or a shot in the dark of course,
as it always is when we quantify over an indenitely extensible domain: we will never
know just what sets there are. But it would not be quite right to describe this as
equivocation. Some interpretations of her words were adequate for everything that
she said before, but are no longer adequate. But our words do not have meaning in
virtue of formal interpretations. What she meant by ‘all sets’ is what she still means
by ‘all sets’; it is just that now she knows about more of them.
5.3.5 Conclusion
Intuitionistic analysis stands in contrast to the predicativist approach to the indef-
inite extensibility of the continuum that I have just sketched. To put the matter
impressionistically, the intuitionist agrees with the predicativist that the continuum
is open-ended; but unlike the predicativist, the intuitionist tries to build that open-
endedness into her mathematics once and for all. ¿e way that this is done is to
consider real numbers as given by choice sequences, either lawlike (given by a rule),
or free (supposed to be given by a succession of arbitrary choices). ¿e intuitionist
rejection of completed innite totalities is accommodated by assuming that at any
point in time, the real number has only been determined by a nite number of
choices, and so can only be said to lie within a nite (rational) interval.
¿e Brouwerian approach to analysis has been considered somewhat bizarre by
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many, and has attracted the scorn even of a constructivist such as Bishop:
In Brouwer’s case there seems to have been a nagging suspicion that
unless he personally intervened to prevent it the continuum would turn
out to be discrete.56
I cannot give an assessment of the intuitionistic approach to analysis here. Intu-
itionistic analysis is based on fundamentally dierent ideas from classical analysis,
and this is why, unlike both Bishop’s constructive analysis, and predicativistic analysis,
intuitionistic analysis produces results which, at least when read naively, actually
contradict theorems of classical analysis. ¿e most famous is of course Brouwer’s
theorem that every total real-valued function is continuous.
What I have tried to show, however, is that we are by no means forced to adopt
such an approach, even if we agree with Dummet that the continuum is indenitely
extensible. Predicativism accommodates that insight, but does not require us to
abandon either the classical notion of what a real number is, or classical logic. Nor
is intuitionistic logic a relevant alternative for arithmetic. In short: Gödel was right.
56 Bishop, Foundations of Constructive Analysis p. 6.
Chapter 6
¿emetaphysics behind
predicativism
In this chapter, I argue that the view of mathematical ontology which motivates
predicativism is an intensional one. ¿ere are extensional mathematical objects,
such as sets and functions-in-extension (which are standardly represented as sets of
ordered argument–value pairs); but these are not primitive — they are derived from
intensional objects, namely properties and functions-in-intension.
Functions are to be understood as idealized procedures for producing an output
from an input; and properties can be understood as Frege suggested, as functions
which take objects as arguments and give True or False as values. Both properties
and functions are on the sense side of Frege’s distinction between sense and reference,
and it is the idea that senses come rst which motivates the Vicious Circle Principle.
In brief, an impredicative function-denition is illegitimate because it fails to give
the function-symbol a sense; it gives a ‘rule’ which cannot be followed, because it
includes itself.
Predicativism has traditionally given a privileged role to the natural numbers.
Poincaré andWeyl were both hostile to reductionist accounts of the natural numbers,
whether set-theoretic (such as that initiated by Dedekind), or logicist (such as the
failed attempts of Frege and Russell). Instead, they suggested that the natural num-
bers are the fundamental objects of mathematics, and that these are given to us by the
intuition of iteration. ¿is is not to say that a position which combined predicativism
with set-theoretic reductionism about numbers would be incoherent: but such a
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position would lack some of the appeal of the more usual form of predicativism; it
would also be further removed from the well-developed and technically convenient
systems of higher-order arithmetic which have been the basis of foundational studies
since Hilbert.
¿e natural numbers are the appropriate foundation of mathematics: they are
the bedrock beneath which we will not succeed in digging. ¿e natural numbers are
understood in what is, in Dummett’s terms, a robustly realist way, in that statements
concerning them have a fully determinate truth-value. ¿is does not necessarily
commit the predicativist to ontological platonism, however: Feferman defends just
this combination of anti-platonism with a belief in the determinacy of truth values
for arithmetical statements.1
¿emost important feature of the natural numbers is that they obey the principle
of mathematical induction with respect to every well-dened property. (To take this
as a denition of natural number, as the logicists did, is to go too far, according to
Poincaré and Weyl; but the applicability of induction is certainly an essential feature
of the natural numbers, which follows from their origin in iteration.) ¿e dicult
ontological question is therefore: What are the well-dened properties of natural
numbers?
It is common to re-frame that question so as to ask instead what sets of natural
numbers exist. ¿at is, for example, how Simpson phrases the question driving his
research into the existential requirements of mathematics.2 As well as making the
technical case that the predicatively speciable sets are all of the sets which we need,
the predicativist should also, if possible, explain why it is that those are all of the sets
which there are. ¿e answer which both Russell and Weyl gave to this is that sets are
not ontologically basic. ¿ey owe what existence they have to the properties from
which they are abstracted. Abstraction, here, is not some mysterious mental faculty;
it is simply that co-extensionality is taken as deciding identity claims about sets. ¿e
ontological issues around sets therefore devolve onto those around properties.
In this chapter, I will explore the ontological issues around properties and sets,
with particular attention to Weyl (in his predicativist phase) and Russell (in the
period around the time of the rst edition of Principia). Russell andWeyl agreed that
properties are ontologically basic to mathematics, and are subject to a Vicious Circle
1 See the quotation on p. 110 above. 2 ‘We are especially interested in the question of which set
existence axioms are needed to prove the known theorems of mathematics.’ Simpson, Subsystems of
Second Order Arithmetic p. 1.
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Principle. Russell was unable to accept the consequence of this, that a predicativity
constraint applies to the whole of mathematics, as this would dash his hopes for a
logicist justication of classical mathematics, by preventing both the derivation of
arithmetic from logic, and the derivation of classical analysis from arithmetic. Russell
therefore postulated the Axiom of Reducibility, which has the eect of side-stepping
the predicativity requirement in extensional contexts such as mathematics.
In the rst two sections of this chapter, I discuss Russell, and the criticisms
of ramication and of the Axiom of Reducibility. I then turn to Weyl’s views on
properties, and on sets. §6.5 draws on some of the ideas of Ch. 5 in discussing the
impact of this on quantication; and §6.6 explores the idea that sets are dependent
on their dening properties.
6.1 Russell and ramication
Weyl’s predicativism is in many ways very close to that of Russell in the Principia.
Das Kontinuum can be seen as a successful attempt to carry out honestly a modest
part of the ambitious programme which Principia had set itself and had managed to
full only by the most unsatisfactory means. Weyl regarded the central part of the
logicist programme, the attempt to give a purely logical foundation to arithmetic, as
unnecessary and unworkable, and so he took the natural numbers as given; he saw
Russell’s vindication of classical analysis to be vitiated by the unjustied Axiom of
Reducibility, and so he set out to see how much of analysis could be won by honest
toil.
¿e fundamental similarity is that Russell and Weyl are both intensionalists, in
that they take items which are intrinsically meaningful to be primary. ¿e basic
ontology of both consists, rst, of a domain of non-logical individuals, which are
wholly objective (and, presumably, not meaning-bearing items); and then of proper-
ties of and relations between those individuals; and then of higher-order properties
and relations. Properties and relations are called ‘propositional functions’ by Russell,
‘judgement schemes’ by Weyl. ¿ey are unlike Frege’s ‘concepts’ in that what might
be called their sense — the condition which an object (or sequence of objects) must
satisfy, in order for the property (or relation) to be true of it (or them) — is internal
144 CHAPTER 6. THE METAPHYSICS BEHIND PREDICATIVISM
to them.3 ¿ey are therefore not extensional, as dierent properties may happen
to apply to just the same objects; and they are not all logically simple, as some will
involve specic objects or (other) properties, and some will involve quantication
over objects or properties of some order. ¿is ‘involvement’ will necessarily be well-
founded. ¿e meaning of a property which involves quantication is dependent on
the range of the quantier, and from this follows immediately the fact that properties
obey the Vicious Circle Principle. ¿e VCP is a requirement of sense.
Goldfarb argues that this is what motivates Russell’s acceptance of the VCP, and
what unies his apparently distinct phrasings of it:
One formulation [of VCP] is ‘no totality may contain members that
are denable only in terms of that totality’; the others use ‘presuppose’
and ‘involve’ instead of ‘are denable only in terms of ’. Gödel points out
that, prima facie, these are three distinct principles, and he claims that
only the rst yields ramication, whereas only the second and third are
plausible without recourse to constructivism [...]. But if denitions are
not external to the entities under consideration, as they are to classes
but are not [...] to propositions and propositional functions, then the
distinction among these formulations seems to collapse.4
Gödel was of course aware that Russell’s project was about intensional entities;
but the views Gödel expresses about such properties are robustly realist, and he
explicitly rejects the idea that denitions are internal to them: ‘concepts may [...]
be conceived as real objects [...] as the properties and relations of things existing
independently of our denitions and constructions.’5
Gödel explicitly adopts the word ‘concept’ for properties understood in this
strongly realist way, and uses the word ‘notion’ for other purposes, particularly for
Russell’s ‘constructivist’ conception of property. It should also be mentioned that
Gödel’s use of terms such as ‘construction’ and ‘constructivism’ can mislead: in the
note added to reprints of his paper in 1964 and (more fully) in 1972, Gödel sought to
clarify that he attributes to Russell ‘a strictly nominalistic kind of constructivism [....]
(which might better be called ctionalism)’, and which is quite distinct ‘from both
3 ¿e ‘value’ of a propositional function is for Russell a proposition, rather than a truth-value; and
propositions are an independent part of Russell’s ontology; however, this will not be of importance for
my purposes. 4 Goldfarb, ‘Russell’s reasons for ramication’ pp. 32–33. ¿e article Goldfarb refers to
is Gödel, ‘Russell’s mathematical logic [1944]’. 5 Ibid. p. 128.
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‘intuitionistically admissible’ and ‘constructive’ in the sense of the Hilbert school.’6
Goldfarb therefore misrepresents Gödel in writing that Gödel ‘make[s] Russell out
to have a general vision of what the existence of abstract entities comes to, and thus
to be adopting constructivism as a fundamental stance toward ontology. ¿at does
not seem accurate to Russell.’7 Gödel is well aware that Russell had (as Goldfarb
puts it) only one, ‘full-blooded’ conception of existence. ¿e issue is Russell’s desire
for nominalistic reductions, which would limit the class of entities for which full-
blooded existence must be assumed.
Gödel seems to suggest that Russell’s position in Principia was nominalistic, not
only about classes, but also about properties. Gödel makes it clear that his strongly
realist notion of ‘concept’, in contrast to Russell’s propositional functions, permits
impredicative specications:
Since concepts are supposed to exist objectively, there seems to be
objection neither to speaking of all of them [...] nor to describing some
of them by reference to all (or at least all of a given type). But, one may
ask, isn’t this view refutable also for concepts because it leads to the
‘absurdity’ that there will exist properties ϕ such that ϕ(a) consists in
a certain state of aairs involving all properties (including ϕ itself and
properties dened in terms of ϕ), which would mean that the vicious
circle principle does not hold even in its second form for concepts
or propositions? ¿ere is no doubt that the totality of all properties
[...] does lead to situations of this kind, but I don’t think they contain
any absurdity. [fn omitted] It is true that such properties ϕ [...] will
have to contain themselves as constituents of their content (or of their
meaning) [...]; but this only makes it impossible to construct their
meaning (i.e. explain it as an assertion about sense perceptions or any
other non-conceptual entities), which is no objection for one who takes
the realistic standpoint.8
A comparison suggests itself here with Ramsey’s endorsement of propositional
functions understood extensionally, as possibly innite truth-functions. Ramsey
6 Gödel, Collected Works II, p. 119. 7 Goldfarb, ‘Russell’s reasons for ramication’ p. 26. 8 Gödel,
‘Russell’s mathematical logic [1944]’ p. 139.
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compared such self-containing propositional functions with a conjunction such as:
p,q, p& q, p- q
which can be seen to evaluate harmlessly to one of its constituents, the third conjunct
p& q.9 But of course the crucial word here is ‘evaluate’: Ramsey is urging us to look
at functions (truth-functions and propositional functions) extensionally. In that case,
it is not that the function contains itself, it is merely our expression for it which does
so; or rather, one of our expressions for the function contains another expression
for the function. Gödel’s suggestion seems to be instead that a concept, as an item
of objective reality, may contain itself, which seems to prevent our explaining its
meaning in any non-circular terms.
While it is clear that Russell’s outlook was not extensional, Principia is unforth-
coming about just what propositional functions are supposed to be. BecausePrincipia
is an attempt to show that there is nothing more to mathematics than logic, it is not
seen as relevant to the project to tell us what the elementary propositional functions
are: that, presumably, is a task for a more general philosophical enquiry (or Trac-
tarian ‘analysis’), and may well depend on empirical facts about what there happens
to be in the world. Similarly, the individuals at the bottom of Russell’s ramied hier-
archy are the furniture of the real world, whatever that happens to be; though there
had better turn out to be enough of it for Russell’s purposes, a need which prompted
the (quasi-empirical) Axiom of Innity. ¿is is all a far cry fromWeyl’s explicitness
on these matters, as we shall see: on his view, the intuition of iteration gives us
the natural numbers as a domain of objects by means of the primitive relation of
immediate succession, and allows the denition of further relations by recursion.
Non-elementary propositional functions are distinct from elementary functions
in that they involve quantication. But this is not to say that propositional functions
are linguistic items, which may have quantiers as syntactic elements. Indeed,
the Axiom of Reducibility (to which we turn in the next section) would lead to
the heterological paradox if it were further assumed that to every propositional
function there corresponds an individual which names it.10 Moreover, since Russell’s
development of his theory of denite descriptions, he was well aware that surface
syntax may conceal hidden quantiers.
9 Ramsey, ‘Foundations’ p. 204. 10 Chwistek presents just this as a contradiction in the system of
Principia with the Axiom of Reducibility: Ramsey shows the dependence of this argument on the
assumption of nameability, and concludes that this assumption is unwarranted.
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Russell famously thought that the proposition that Mont Blanc is more than 4000
metres high has the mountain itself as a constituent; and Goldfarb suggests that the
requirement of predicativity is to be understood by Russell’s seeing ‘the variable’ as a
real constituent of quantied propositions or propositional functions:
[...] Russell takes a variable to presuppose the full extent of its range.
Now, since the identity of a proposition or propositional function de-
pends on the identity of the variables it contains, and the variables
presuppose their range of variation, even theweakest formof the vicious-
circle principle suces to yield ramication. Indeed, Russell may per-
haps even think of the variables as containing all the entities over which
it ranges; in that case, the only principle needed is that a complex entity
cannot contain itself as a proper part.11
As we saw above, this principle is not one which Gödel saw a need to endorse for his
‘concepts’. But it is very hard to see how the obtaining of states of aairs which were
ill-founded in this way could be knowable (or even entertainable) by nite creatures.
While Gödel’s realism may not be absurd, it is clear that there is a strong motivation
to restrict ourselves rst to the study of that part of the world which can potentially
be grasped by minds like ours. Whether we can intelligibly go further remains in
doubt; but whether we need to go further, in order to obtain a satisfactory system
of mathematics, is something which an investigation of the scope of predicative
mathematics will be able, at least in part, to settle. We will return to this matter in
chapter 7.
6.2 Russell and Reducibility
One dierence to be noted between Principia and Das Kontinuum is that Weyl’s
conception of sets as constructions or abstractions from properties is very dierent
from Russell’s conception of ‘classes.’ Whereas for Weyl, sets were pleonastic, for
Russell, classes — if they existed at all — were full-bloodedly real. ¿e ‘no-class’
position ocially taken in Principia is one of agnosticism as to the existence of
classes rather than a denial of their existence. Symbolism for class abstraction and
membership features prominently in Principia, but this is not to be taken at face-
value: class symbolism is explained away by the doctrine of incomplete symbols, and
11 Goldfarb, ‘Russell’s reasons for ramication’ p. 37, emphasis in original.
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the meaning-in-use they are given is identical with that of Weyl: such symbolism is
an extensional way of talking about intensional objects, the properties.
But Russell maintained that there was a further, substantive question as to
whether classes really existed. ¿is is brought outmost clearly when Russell discusses
the Axiom of Reducibility. ¿e axiom has the eect of undoing, for mathematical
(or other extensional) purposes, the ramied predicativism of the Principia, by as-
serting that every propositional function is extensionally equivalent to a predicative
propositional function (that is, one which does not involve quantication over a
type equal to or higher than its argument). For example — the crucial example for
the logicist programme — the principle of arithmetical induction, when formulated
so as to obey the ramied type restrictions, applies only to the predicative properties;
but if we assume Reducibility, any property is coextensive with some predicative
property, and so induction is a strong enough principle to allow the denition of the
natural numbers as those objects which satisfy it. Russell writes that the hypothesis
of the existence of classes would be a justication of Reducibility:
we must nd, if possible, some method of reducing the order of a
propositional function without aecting the truth or falsehood of its
values. ¿is seems to be what common sense eects by the admission
of classes. Given any propositional function, ϕx, of whatever order,
this is assumed to be equivalent, for all values of x, to a statement of
the form ‘x belongs to the class α’. Now this statement is of the rst
order, since it makes no allusion to ‘all functions of such-and-such a
type’. Indeed its only practical advantage over the original statement
ϕx is that it is of the rst order. ¿ere is no advantage in assuming that
there really are such things as classes, and the contradiction about the
classes which are not members of themselves show that, if there are
classes, they must be something radically dierent fom individuals. I
believe the chief purpose which classes serve, and the chief reasonwhich
makes them linguistically convenient, is that they provide a method of
reducing the order of a propositional function. I shall, therefore, not
assume anything of what may seem be involved in the common-sense
admission of classes, except this: that every propositional function is
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equivalent, for all its values, to some predicative function.12
¿e argument here is that the existence of a class α of the objects satisfying a
propositional function ϕxˆ would entail that there is an elementary propositional
function, namely xˆ > α, which is extensionally equivalent to ϕxˆ. ¿erefore, if there is
a class corresponding to every propositional function, then the Axiom of Reducibility
holds.
But Russell does not argue for Reducibility by claiming that there really are
classes corresponding to every propositional function, and then applying modus
ponens to get the desired conclusion. It seems that the line of thought is something
more like: we have good regressive reason to believe Reducibility to be true; one
explanation of that would be the existence of classes; but it is ontologically more
modest to take Reducibility as an axiom than it is to assume the existence of classes
and derive Reducibility. We seem to have here an example of what might be called
inference to a more modest explanation, rather than to the best; or indeed, sceptics
might suggest, of inference to a non-explanation.
Russell’s position has not been well-received by subsequent writers. Church
sums up the critical consensus thus:
[...] as many have urged, [fn omitted, citing Ramsey, Chwistek and
Carnap] the true choice would seem to be between the simple [i.e. ex-
tensional, impredicative] functional calculi and the ramied functional
calculi without axioms of reducibility. It is hard to think of a point of
view from which the intermediate position represented by the rami-
ed functional calculi with axioms of reducibility would appear to be
signicant.13
¿e point of view which seems to have motivated Russell’s intermediate position
is that propositions and propositional functions are complex, structured entities, the
structure and components of which are tightly bound up with our ability to grasp
or judge them; whereas classes (if there are any) are something like individuals —
ontologically weighty, simple items which may be among the ultimate constituents
of propositions. It is wrong to think that a class which we specify as the extension
12 Russell, ‘¿eory of types’ p. 167. ¿is passage appears almost unchanged in Whitehead and Russell,
Principia Mathematica I, p. 166. 13 Church, Introduction to Mathematical Logic p. 355.
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of an impredicative propositional function somehow contains or hides that logical
complexity within it: as the class is a wholly extensional object, it is a simple fact that
the class has the members it does; or, more precisely, it is an elementary proposition
(an atomic fact) that a given object belongs to the class.
So it would be the , not honest toil, for Russell to postulate the existence of
classes; whereas propositional functions, being ontologically thinner, could be pos-
tulated without undue immodesty. Or so we might at rst think. But of course the
thinness of propositional functions comes from their being complexes of pre-existing
entities. And what Russell needs to justify Reducibility is that there are enough of
such complexes — enough realized combinatorial possibilities. If we think of such
complexes as language-like, even in a broad sense, then they will be nite sequences
of a nite (or at most countably innite) alphabet of objects: in which case there will
not be enough to validate Reducibility. But what else could they be?
¿ere is something curiously half-hearted about Russell’s attitude to classes and
the Axiom of Reducibility: he adopts the axiom, and provides regressive arguments
for it (it has desirable consequences which cannot otherwise be obtained so simply);
he also considers an explanation for the axiom (namely the existence of classes) which
he does not endorse, but the possibility of which is supposed to provide additional
evidence for the axiom. It is hard to see why regressive reasoning, if it is able to take
us as far as the axiom, is unable to take us a little further, to an explanatory basis for it;
except that, as Russell remarks in the passage quoted above, the contradictions show
that developing a theory of real classes is not a wholly straightforward matter. In any
case, it seems that Russell’s primary reasons for adopting the Axiom of Reducibility
are regressive, and so can be fully assessed only when we have considered how much
of classical mathematics — in particular, how much of that part which is applied in
the natural sciences — can be justied by predicatively acceptable means.
¿e ramied hierarchy was Russell’s solution of the paradoxes; and it provides
a unied explanation of what were later seen as two distinct sorts of paradox: the
semantic, and the set-theoretic. Ramsey was prominent in arguing for their distinct
natures:14 he suggested that mathematics was thoroughly extensional in character,
and so that the mathematical (i.e. class-theoretic) paradoxes were best dealt with
in the simplest way, by a simple (unramied) theory of types, which is legitimate
(on Ramsey’s view, as well as Russell’s) if we take it that classes are real objects.
14 Ramsey, ‘Foundations’. Peano had suggested such a distinction earlier.
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¿e semantic paradoxes relied on notions such as ‘truth,’ ‘meaning,’ and ‘denition,’
which were alien to mathematics and should be dealt with by a distinct philosophical
examination of those problematic notions (as in, e.g. Tarski’s subsequent work).
Ramsey’s case was a strong one, because, as mentioned, Russell found it neces-
sary to assume the Axiom of Reducibility in order to allow the denition of natural
number and the derivation of analysis in Principia: as it is ramication which causes
the problems that Reducibility then has to solve, it seems that we are rst splitting
propositional functions into dierent levels, and then lumping them (strictly speak-
ing, their extensional equivalents) all together again in the lowest level. Ramsey
suggested that this is an unnecessary shue which we can avoid by not ramifying in
the rst place.
Now it should be noted that the Axiom of Reducibility, while serving to collapse
the eect of ramication in many contexts, does not vitiate the solution to the
semantic paradoxes. As Russell explains,
¿e essential point is that such results [consequences of the Axiom of
Reducibility] are obtained in all cases where only the truth or falsehood
of values of the functions concerned are relevant, as is invariably the
case in mathematics. [....] It might be thought that the paradoxes for the
sake of which we invented the hierarchy of types would now reappear.
But this is not the case, because, in such paradoxes, either something
beyond the truth or falsehood of values of functions is relevant, or
expressions occur which are unmeaning even a er the introduction of
the axiom of reducibility. For example, such a statement as ‘Epimenides
asserts ψx’ is not equivalent to ‘Epimenides asserts ϕ!x’, even though
ψx and ϕ!x are equivalent.15
But as Ramsey pointed out (and, as the above quotation shows, Russell seems to
have been well aware), themathematical project could be carried out without the
detour, by simply postulating classes. Russell’s procedure is to build up the ramied
hierarchy of propositional functions in accordance with the constraints of meaning,
but also to assume that there are uncountably many predicative propositional func-
tions, with who knows whatmeanings, but with, it just so happens, the extensions of
every one of the functions further out in the hierarchy. ¿e procedure is, as Quine
15 Russell, ‘¿eory of types’ p. 168.
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comments, ‘oddly devious’.
¿e Axiom of Reducibility was undoubtedly forced on Russell: his regressive
argument for it is that its consequences (in the presence of the other axioms of the
Principia), are the theorems of ordinary arithmetic and analysis, which we took to
be true all along, but for which we lacked a satisfactory axiomatic foundation. But of
course for Russell, ‘satisfactory’ here must mean something like: plausibly logically
true (and therefore necessarily containing no non-logical vocabulary). And Russell
is such a strong realist about logic that not only the Axiom of Innity (which asserts
the innitude of the individuals) but also the Axiom of Reducibility (which entails
the existence of all of the uncountably many predicative propositional functions)
can count as logical truths.
Russell later came to recognize, at Wittgenstein’s urging, the need to distinguish
between a logical truth, and a truth which can be expressed in purely logical vocabu-
lary.16 Ramsey advocated Wittgenstein’s conception of tautology as an analysis of
the idea of logical truth, against which the success of the logicist programme could
be judged. A tautology, for Wittgenstein, is a degenerate (constant) truth function of
atomic propositions. ¿e Axiom of Reducibility does not meet this test, as Ramsey
showed by constructing a countermodel.17 Given all this, there seems little reason to
disagree with Church’s assessment.
6.3 Weyl’s account of properties
During the period in which he wrote Das Kontinuum (1918) and Der circulus vitiosus
(1919), Weyl was a predicativist; a constructivist of a sort, but not one with an
objection to classical propositional logic. He believed that mathematical properties
are at root intensional items: that their sense is logically prior to extension. (In this,
he cites Husserl and Fichte as forebears. Frege’s ‘concepts,’ by contrast, are extensional
items; senses of concepts serve only to pick out the concepts themselves.) And he
saw modern analysis as having gone against this, in adopting a wholly extensional
viewpoint which concealed a circularity just as vicious as that in Frege’s set theory.
For a sense to be a sense for us, graspable by nite minds like ours, it must itself be
nite; and that means constructed by a nite process from an intuitive foundation.
16 Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy p. 205. 17 See Potter, Reason’s Nearest Kin
pp. 160–161 for discussion of Wittgenstein’s obscure countermodel, and Ramsey’s clearer example.
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¿at intuitive foundation consists of what Weyl calls primitive relations.
Weyl takes it that there are certain basic categories of objects given to us in
intuition, and certain ‘immediately given’ properties of and relations between these
objects. ¿ese relations are ‘immediately given’ to us in the sense that given such
an n-place relation and n objects, we can tell non-inferentially whether or not the
relation holds between the objects.
Weyl’s main example of such a domain is the category of the natural numbers,
with which is given the single immediately given relation of immediate succession.
(Every branch of mathematics is, he says, concerned with this category.) Worth
noting about the naturals is the fact that they are individuals; they are not homo-
geneous (as, for example, the points in Euclidean space are): each natural number
is distinguishable from the others by means of the primitive relation of immediate
succession. Names for the naturals are therefore eliminable in favour of canonical
descriptions. (Zero is that which is not an immediate successor of anything; one is
the immediate successor of zero; and so on.) ¿ere is nothing more to the natural
numbers than is given by these canonical descriptions. (Weyl suggests that mathem-
atics may be characterized as the branch of science dealing exclusively with general
propositions, i.e. those not involving names.)
¿e ‘primitive relations’ are the immediately given relations, together with iden-
tity. It is interesting both that Weyl thinks that identity between the objects of a basic
category is not (in general) immediately given; and that he thinks that, nonetheless,
it can serve as one of the primitive relations from which mathematics is built up.
Weyl’s classication of identity is presumably motivated by the thought that it is
a logical relation, and that the axioms of identity should count as logical truths,
applicable to every category of objects we might study. (It might be thought that
identity claims for a category of homogeneous objects are problematic; but if we are
‘given’ an object from such a category, then we ought (for a reasonable denition
of ‘given’) to be able to tell if a second given object from that category is distinct. It
would seem reasonable to say, for instance, that if we are to be ‘given’ two points in
Euclidean space, they should be given to us in such a way that it is immediately clear
whether or not they are distinct; and this is so even though there is no geometrical
property to single out either one.)
‘¿e mathematical process’ is the building up of judgement schemes (i.e., judge-
ments, properties and relations) from these primitive properties; and also the forma-
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tion of sets as extensional object-correlates of properties and relations. By building
up, Weyl means what we would now call recursion or induction: he gives a base
class of primitive judgement schemes, and some operations or construction prin-
ciples which turn judgement schemes into (more complex) judgement schemes.
Everything reached from the base class by a nite process of applying these oper-
ations to primitive judgement schemes is a judgement scheme; and nothing else
is.
Weyl’s construction of judgement schemes comes to much the same thing as
the inductive characterization of rst-order formulae that we see in logic textbooks
today, on the basis of atomic formulae. ¿e dierence is that the now-common way
of viewing such an inductive denition as a transitive closure is quite alien to the
predicativist enterprise. Inductive denitions are o en explained today by saying
that the set we want to characterize, the ‘closure’ of the base under the operations, is
the intersection of all sets which contain the base and are closed under the operations.
¿is presupposes a meta-theory, in which the ‘construction’ takes place, which would
already be strong enough to do most of mathematics. To formalize the idea of
taking the intersection of all sets closed under the operations, we need a background
either of set theory with an axiom of innity, or of full (impredicative) second-
order logic. For Weyl, the construction process is based on the primitive intuition
of iteration which underlies our arithmetical knowledge; it certainly does not, in
his view, require operations such as taking the intersection of innite sets. Weyl’s
stance here is supported by the observation that such inductive denitions can be
formalized in systems weaker than full second-order logic, such as ancestral logic.18
Once again, it seems that we can get what we need with less than we might at rst
think.
¿e base for Weyl’s construction consists of the primitive relations. ¿e forma-
tion rules are the standard logical operations (conjunction and disjunction, negation,
the identication of free variables, the substitution of a function-term or the name
of an object for a free variable, and the binding of a free variable with an existen-
tial quantier), together with the ‘principle of iteration’ (i.e. the denition of new
properties from old by means of recursion over the natural numbers).
¿is last is signicant. ¿e inclusion of denition by recursion as one of the
ways of forming new properties shows clearly that, as mentioned above, Weyl’s view
18 See e.g. Shapiro, Foundations, and also Ch. 4.2.5 on the ancestral.
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of arithmetic is at odds with the axiomatic approach introduced by Dedekind: like
Poincaré, Weyl was scornful of the idea that arithmetic could in any meaningful
sense be ‘reduced’ to logic or set theory:
A set-theoretic treatment of the natural numbers such as oered in
Dedekind (1888) may indeed contribute to the systematization of math-
ematics; [fn omitted] but it must not be allowed to obscure the fact
that our grasp of the basic concepts of set theory depends on a prior
intuition of iteration and of the sequence of natural numbers.19
It is interesting in its own right, and I think also helpful in understanding Weyl’s
views on properties to look at a little of the historical context of those views. Weyl
tells us20 that his search for a precise characterization of the concept of a mathem-
atical property, which culminated in the predicativist view of Das Kontinuum, was
initially prompted by a deciency in Zermelo’s 1908 axiomatization of set theory.
Zermelo framed the Separation scheme by saying that for any given set a, and any
‘denite Klassenaussage’ (‘denite property’) we care to consider, there exists a subset
containing just those elements of awhich satisfy that property. Zermelo’s explanation
of what it is for a property to be denit was rather hazy:
A question or assertion E is said to be denite [‘denit’] if the fun-
damental relations of the domain, by means of the axioms and the
universally valid laws of logic, determine without arbitrariness whether
it holds or not. Likewise a ‘propositional function’ [‘Klassenaussage’]
E(x), in which the variable term x ranges over all individuals of a class
K, is said to be denit if it is denit for each single individual x of the
class K. ¿us the question whether a εb or not is always denite, as is
the question whetherM ⊂= N or not.21
While this might be adequate for practical mathematical purposes, it was certainly
not precise enough for the purpose of metamathematical investigations, nor does
19 Weyl,¿eContinuum I.§ 4, p. 24. (References in this and the following sections are to¿eContinuum
unless otherwise stated.) ¿e principle of iteration in the form stated by Weyl, applied to functions
from sets to sets, in fact takes us outside the arithmetic sets of natural numbers: this seems to be a
simple mistake. Allowing the denition of functions on the natural numbers by primitive recursion
suces for Weyl’s purposes. See Feferman, ‘Weyl vindicated’ for technical details. 20 I.§ 8, p. 48
21 Zermelo, ‘Untersuchungen’ p. 201. I use ‘denit’ to avoid any potential confusion with notions
around indenite extensibility.
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it stand much philosophical scrutiny. ¿e problem was, then, to give a satisfactory
explanation of what the requirement that a property be denit amounted to.
Weyl published a paper suggesting an answer to this in 1910.22 He suggested that
a property is denit if it can be constructed from the basic relations of identity and
membership by nitely many applications of basic logical operations; the account is
much the same as that of properties in Das Kontinuum as sketched above. Weyl’s
discussion of this story23 suggests that what he found unsatisfactory about his 1910
proposal was its dependence on the notion of niteness, which would make the
analysis of niteness (and hence arithmetic) in terms of set theory circular. ¿is led
to Weyl’s insight that the natural numbers are fundamental to mathematics, and
cannot be reductively analysed by set theory.
¿e solution which eventually won acceptance in standard modern axiomatic set
theory (ZF and its cousins) was Skolem’s: a property is denit if it can be expressed
by a sentence of the language of set theory (i.e. rst-order predicate calculus with
equality, with the single non-logical relation-symbol >). ¿is is in eect equival-
ent to Weyl’s 1910 proposal, as is the alternative approach of treating properties
axiomatically (as predicative ‘classes’) in the set-class theory NBG.24
But the fact that Weyl explicates the concept of denit property mathematically,
rather than settling it behind the scenes in the logic as Skolem does, is signicant.
Most important for our purposes is that it is the axiom schema of Separation that
is the location of the formal impredicativity of standard axiomatic set theory. It is
Separation that allows us to show, for any hypothesized enumeration f ofP(ω),
the existence of the diagonal set D = n > ω S n ¶ f(n) of natural numbers which
is not in the enumeration. But if we take seriously the idea that the property in
question (the property which separates D from ω) has been built up from other
properties and relations, including f, then we might well wonder whether it is that
we have specied a set of natural numbers in terms of f, which until now we had not
been able to specify; or if instead, by reecting on f, we have been led to a broader
concept ‘set of natural numbers’ than we had before. ¿e rst is the impredicative
22 Weyl, ‘Über die Denitionen’. 23 I.§ 8, p. 48 24 NBG is predicative only in respect of its classes:
it is a conservative extension of (impredicative) ZF. Von Neumann is the originator of this approach
to denit, and his name provides the initial ‘N’. As Gödel (the ‘G’) put it, ‘Classes are what appear in
Zermelo’s formulation as ‘denite Eigenscha en’ [denit properties]. However, in the system Σ [i.e.
NBG] (unlike Zermelo’s) it is stated explicitly by a special group of axioms ... how denite Eigenscha en
are to be constructed.’ Gödel,¿e Consistency of the Axiom of Choice p. 2.
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conception, according to which all of the subsets of the natural numbers, including
D, exist independently of their dening properties, on the same logical level. ¿e
second, the predicative conception, is that because D is dened in terms of f, it must
come later than f (and so later than those subsets of ω which are the values of f)
in the process of building up sets. ¿at is to say, there is no point in the process at
which we have built what the impredicative set theorist would call the full powerset
of the natural numbers.
My suggestion is that taking seriously the idea that denit properties are built up
in a recursive process is what led Weyl from his 1910 position to the predicativism of
Das Kontinuum, according to which there are the sets of natural numbers of level 0,
specied by arithmetic properties; and then sets of naturals of level 1, specied by
properties which may involve arithmetic operations and quantication over the sets
of level 0; and so on; but on which there is no assumption of an overarching domain
of the sets of natural numbers of any level whatsoever. (In fact, in Das Kontinuum
Weyl recommends restricting our attention to the sets of level 0, so as to avoid the
inconvenience of dierent types of real numbers.)
All three analyses of denit property— Skolem’s, vonNeumann’s, andWeyl’s 1910
proposal — are impredicative. Weyl’s 1910 suggestion was in terms of applications of
logical operations to primitive relations; but this cannot be thought of as ‘building
up’ these properties if we also think of the sets as being formed in parallel with the
properties, because among the operations is unbounded quantication over the sets.
In order to ‘construct’ the sets of impredicative set theory we would need already to
understand quantication over all of the sets.
6.4 Sets as dependent objects
Weyl introduces one- and multi-dimensional sets as extensional object-correlates of
properties and relations. (An n-dimensional set is of course a set of ordered n-tuples.
¿e now-standard set-theoretic reduction of ordered n-tuples to sets, developed by
Kuratowski and Wiener, would be most unnatural in a typed system such as Weyl’s.)
Functions are not simply appropriate multi-dimensional sets — to allow func-
tions of sets, Weyl is slightly more permissive, allowing > to appear in the denition
of a functional relation. Of course, quantication over sets, and also identity claims
between sets are ruled out in function denitions: so the sets taken as values are
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always a denable set in the old sense.25
Weyl describes the sets as ‘a new derived system of ideal objects over and above
the given primitive domain of objects. [....] Obviously, these new objects, the sets,
are altogether dierent from the primitive objects; they belong to an entirely separate
sphere of existence.’26 ¿e signicance of placing sets in a ‘separate sphere’ is that they
are not among the potential values of the variables which range over the primitive
domain of objects.
Sets are formed by abstraction on properties:
[...] the transition from the ‘property’ to the ‘set’ (of those things which
have the property) signies merely that one brings to bear the objective
rather than the purely logical point of view, i.e., one regards objective
correspondence (that is, ‘relation in extension’ as logicians say) estab-
lished entirely on the basis of acquaintance with the relevant objects as
decisive rather than logical equivalence.27
¿e ‘acquaintance with the relevant objects’ is here of course merely the verication
of whether or not each object has the property under consideration; and by logical
equivalence, Weyl means the validity of the biconditional, where a ‘valid’ proposi-
tion is one which requires no such verication; i.e. a proposition true under every
interpretation of the names and relation-symbols involved.28
As Feferman says,
Weyl describes this as the logical [predicative] conception of sets as
opposed to the objective [platonistic] conception. Furthermore, under
his conception there is no notion of set independent of given basic
domains and relations.29
To summarize: for Weyl, sets (including multidimensional sets, among them
functions) are ideal objects, derived from their members in an essentially pleonastic
way: there is nothing more to their identity than the coextensionality of the relations
which dene them; and they are certainly not items of the same category as their
members, the relata. Like the modern set-theorist’s classes, Weyl’s sets are really just
an extensional way of looking at properties.
25 For a discussion of the details of Weyl’s formal system, see Feferman, ‘Weyl vindicated’. 26 I.§ 4,
p. 22 27 I.§4, p. 23 28 See Pollard, Introduction to Weyl,¿e Continuum p. xviii for support for
this reading. 29 Feferman, ‘Weyl vindicated’. (Material in brackets Feferman’s.)
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¿e question of ontological commitment therefore raises its head. It seems that
on this conception of sets as dependent abstract objects, we do not need to take
talk of sets as any more ontologically committing than we do talk of whereabouts,
for example. To account for our talk of whereabouts, we do not need to know
more about them, or to suppose that there is anything more to them than this
abstraction principle: your whereabouts are the same as my whereabouts i we are
in the same place. For sets, the equivalence relation in the abstraction principle
is coextensionality of the dening properties. ¿is is really just Frege’s infamous
Basic Law V: but with the crucial dierence that here it is understood predicatively,
so that the sets which are introduced to us by abstraction on properties are items
of a dierent logical type from those which have or lack those properties; so type
restrictions rule out any question of sets being members of themselves.
More recently, interest in impredicative abstraction principles has been revived
by the neo-logicist programme of Hale and Wright.30 ¿emotivating idea is that we
should take Hume’s Principle (the abstraction principle for cardinal equivalence) as
serving to introduce us to new objects, the natural numbers. Numbers are supposed
to be objects in the full, old sense, and so Hume’s Principle is supposed to be taken
impredicatively, that is, with the numbers we are introduced to on the le -hand
side of the principle falling under the rst-order quantiers on the right-hand side.
¿is is essential for the proof that Hume’s Principle entails the existence of all of
the natural numbers. ¿e legitimacy of impredicative abstraction has been much
disputed, but that of predicative set abstraction is not in doubt; as Hacking argues, it
has a good claim to be counted as logic.31
Parsons32 has argued that a substitutional interpretation of the quantiers suces
to give the intuitively correct truth conditions for sentences involving quantication
over predicative sets. ¿e substitution class is of course open sentences with one free
object variable (and no bound class variables). Parsons suggests that this can be seen
as an analysis of the thinner sense of existence in which such sets may be said to exist;
thinner, that is, than the full-blooded sense of existence which is conveyed by the
standard objectual quantiers, and which is the only sense of existence recognized by
Quine (following Russell). But reductions always cut both ways: rather than taking
the substitutional analysis as showing that we may harmlessly suppose sets to exist,
30 See e.g. the papers collected in Hale and Wright,¿e Reason’s Proper Study. 31 Hacking, ‘What is
logic?’. 32 Parsons, ‘Substitutional quantication’.
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we may just as well be inclined (perhaps by Quinean considerations of economy and
the univocality of existence) to say that it shows that sets do not really exist.
An alternative for the predicativist which is in the spirit of Parsons’ plea (and
which both preserves an extensional logic, and is more in keeping with attractive
formalisms for predicativist mathematics such as ACA0) is to accept sets and in-
stead to eliminate properties, by means of Skolem’s open-sentence analysis of denit
property. In ACA0, sets are items of a dierent type from individuals (which in the
intended interpretation are natural numbers); and they are given to us by means of
a comprehension axiom:
§X∀x(x > X ϕ(x)),
where ϕ(x) is an open sentence containing no bound set (upper-case) variables, and
not containing X free. (It is the prohibition on bound set variables which makes
this predicatively acceptable, of course.) Just as with the classes of NBG, this can
be presented so as to give it a more constructive appearance, by giving, instead
of a comprehension scheme, a nite number of axioms for basic sets (the empty
set, singletons of numbers) and permissible operations on them (complementation,
pairwise union and intersection, projection, etc). ¿is was Gödel’s method in his
presentation of NBG; but it is just a dierent route to the same destination, as the
operations on sets correspond closely to the way logically complex sentences are
built up by means of the logical constants.
¿ere is, in short, a certain amount of ontological slack in the pair of ideas
property and set, and the question of which to pull taut is in part a pragmatic, or
even just a presentational issue. What is important — indeed, what is central to
predicativism — is the recognition that both sets and properties are open-ended. As
such, any (predicatively acceptable) collection ofmeans for dening sets or properties
is always incomplete. And expansion of the rst-order part of the language (or, in the
more constructive presentation, expansion of the permitted set-building operations)
will give rise to new sets. As we will see below, it is for this reason that Weyl denies
that sentences which quantify over sets express genuine propositions.
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6.5 Quantication over open domains
As mentioned above, Weyl takes the natural numbers for granted as a basic domain
of objects, which serve as the foundation for mathematics. What that ‘taking for
granted’ comes to is that (classical) quantication over the natural numbers is always
intelligible. Weyl does not think that this will be the case for every domain (‘category’)
of objects: it is not the case, in particular, for the sets of natural numbers. What,
then is required of a given domain to make quantication over it intelligible? Weyl
writes that:
existential judgments play an essential role in mathematics. ¿e concept
of existence is overburdened bymetaphysical enigmas. Luckily, however,
for our current purposes we need only assume the following. If, say
P(x),P′(x), [...] are among the judgment schemes (R) which apply to
objects of our chosen category [...] then propositions such as ‘¿ere is
an object (of our category) of which both P(x) and P′(x) are true [...]’
[...] are said to be meaningful — that is, they arm denite (existential)
states of aairs concerning which the question of whether they obtain
or not can now be raised. `[fn:] Naturally, whether we are actually
able to answer this question is beside the point.e It is in this sense
that we understand the hypothesis that the characteristic features of the
categorical essence under consideration are supposed to determine a
complete system of denite self-existent objects [namely, the extension of
that category].33
A later footnote refers back to this passage: ‘[...] closed judgments are, intrinsically,
just propositions. ¿at they all have one meaning, i.e. express a judgment, is a precise
formulation of the hypothesis mentioned at the end of §1 regarding the “complete
system of self-existent objects”. ’
Itmust be said that this is not as clear asmight bewished. ¿e footnote dismissing
concerns about ‘whether we are actually able to answer this question’ makes it clear
that Weyl is, in this period, not an anti-realist in the sense of Dummett’s meaning-
theoretic arguments: our inability to verify a (quantied) mathematical proposition,
even in principle, does not jeopardize its objective truth-value.
33 I.§ 1, p. 8. (¿e material in square brackets is the gloss of the translators of the English edition,
Stephen Pollard and¿omas Bole.)
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What does jeopardize the objective truth-value of an existentially quantied
proposition is the possibility of more potential counterexamples. ¿e assumption
that we have a ‘complete system of self-existent objects’ is required for quantication
to be fully meaningful, and it amounts to the assumption that the domain is denite.
According toDas Kontinuum, we can make this assumption for the natural numbers,
but not for the sets of natural numbers.
¿e reason why quantication over the sets of natural numbers is not in general
meaningful is simply that we do not have a denite understanding of the domain
of sets of natural numbers. We can characterize some of them by certain means of
construction or denition: for example, the arithmetical sets, which are the intended
model of Weyl’s principles of construction. But such a characterization is only ever
partial, as it leads, by diagonalization, to further sets which fall outside the original
characterization. It is this indenite extensibility thatmakes non-schematic universal
quantication problematic: the meaning of the claim that all Fs are G is unclear if
it is unclear just what Fs there are. ¿e exception is schematic quantication: in
certain cases, it is unclear what Fs there are, but clear that any F that there is must
be G, for some general reason. But the absence of such a general reason is no reason
to believe that the generalization is false.
On the other hand, an existential quantication can be seen to be stably true on
the basis of a partial characterization of the domain: if we have found one F that is
G, that is enough for the existential to be true, regardless of any haziness about the
extent of the Fs. Of course, a negated existential quantier is a universal quantier;
so while we can establish true sentences of the form §X..., they do not express
full propositions, in that they are not amenable to the normal logical operations.
Limiting the applicability of classical logic in this way is of course undesirable, and
in Ch. 5.3.3 above, I outlined an approach to justifying the application of classical
logic to the indenitely extensible continuum.
In later life, a er having abandoned the predicativist project and joined Brouwer’s
intuitionist ‘revolution,’ Weyl wrote that:
¿e leap into the beyond occurs when the sequence of numbers that
is never complete but remains open toward the innite is made into a
closed aggregate of objects existing in themselves. Giving the numbers
the status of ideal objects becomes dangerous only when this is done.34
34 Weyl, Philosophy of mathematics p. 38.
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While Brouwerian intuitionism was a substantial development, it does not represent
a complete break in Weyl’s thinking: Weyl reveals how he viewed his earlier work by
going on to say that a consistency proof of axiomatic arithmetic ‘would vindicate
the standpoint taken by the author in Das Kontinuum, that one may safely treat
the sequence of natural numbers as a closed sequence of objects,’35 that is, that sen-
tences quantifying over the numbers may be assumed always to have a determinate
truth-value. Feferman suggests that this remark shows Weyl to have been unaware
of Gödel’s 1933 work on the negative translation, which established the intertrans-
latability of classical and intuitionistic logic;36 or at least that Weyl did not grasp
the import of this work for axiomatic number theory. Feferman suggests that ‘In
consequence of [Gödel’s] reduction, even the natural numbers can be conceived of as
a “potentially innite” totality.’37 But reductions cut both ways: for the predicativist,
it is more to the point to see the negative translation as showing that the natural
numbers, innite though they are, can legitimately be conceived of as a closed or
completed totality: in my terms, a denite domain.
Weyl endorses the traditional view that the only form of humanly-graspable
innity is the potential innite.38 What is distinctive about Weyl’s position in Das
Kontinuum is that he nonetheless makes a case for countably innitary mathematics
with classical logic. Weyl makes this case by rst treating the innity of the natural
numbers as a denite domain, and then developing a theory of analysis based on an
enumerated sequence of sets of numbers which can also be so regarded. ¿e daring
rst step is what would be justied by a nitary consistency proof of arithmetic,
were such a thing possible; and it is justied, insofar as it can be, by the proof of
the intertranslatability of intuitionistic and classical logic. Feferman’s point is to
be understood in the tradition of Hilbertian proof-theoretic instrumentalism: the
mathematician who accepts only intuitionistic arithmetic, and nothing else, should
be convinced by Gödel’s negative translation that the classical theorems vindicated
by Weyl’s predicative analysis, while they may perhaps not all be meaningful in
themselves, are at least guaranteed not to lead her into contradiction. As such, they
may be considered conservative extensions of her mathematics, parts of an ‘ideal’
35 Weyl, Philosophy of mathematics p. 60. 36 See Ch. 5.2.3 above. 37 Feferman, ‘Weyl vindicated’;
Gödel, ‘Intuitionistischen Arithmetik [1933e]’. 38 For example: ‘¿e notion that an innite set is
a “gathering” brought together by innitely many individual arbitrary acts of selection, assembled
and then surveyed as a whole by consciousneses is nonsensical; “inexhaustability” is essential to the
innite.’ I.§ 4, p. 23
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calculus which may permit shorter derivations of contentual results.
6.6 ¿e dependence of sets on their dening properties
Weyl’s hypothesis in Das Kontinuum that the natural numbers are a closed system,
permitting meaningful quantication over them, gives some insight into what Weyl
thinks goes wrong with impredicative mathematics: the power-set of the naturals,
for example, is not something which can legitimately view as a ‘complete system of
denite self-existent objects’ — the collection is not complete in that it is indenitely
extensible; and the objects in it are not ‘denite’ and ‘self-existent’ in that some of
them depend upon others.
For example, consider the property K which holds of just those natural numbers
of which all of a certain specied collection k of properties of naturals are true (i.e.
λn.(∀P > k)Pn). ¿e extension ofKmay very well be identical with the extension of
one of the k-properties; this is obviously the case if, for example, the empty property
λn.n x n is in k. But if we take seriously the idea that K, the intersection of the
k-properties of N, is a property, then it is clear that K cannot itself be one of the
k-properties. ¿e sense of ‘K’, the rule for determining whether or not Kn, cannot
require us already to know whether or not Kn.
On the standard, extensionalist view of sets, the relation of a set to its corres-
ponding property is an external one: the property merely lets us pick the set out. But
if we view sets not as pre-existent objects to be picked out in this way, but instead as
derived from those properties, in that they are abstracted from them, then we must
recognize that sets of natural numbers dened by means of quantication over other
sets of naturals are of a higher logical type. In short, we are forced to ramify.
Weyl’s insistence that objects come in categories imposes a rigid separation
between the ideal objects formed by abstraction, and the ‘basic’ objects on which
the abstraction is done. Quantication is always quantication over the objects of
a single category, and objects dened by means of quantication over a category
therefore belong to a dierent (‘higher’ or ‘derived’) category. In this, Weyl’s system
is very much like that of the Ramied¿eory of Types.
¿is hierarchical, genetic organization of properties (and therefore also of sets)
bears some comparison with the iterative hierarchy of sets. ¿e iterative story is
meant to motivate the axioms of Cantorian set theory, and to explain how such
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theories avoid the paradoxical collections of naive set theory. On the story, sets are
‘formed’ in stages, and can therefore have as members only those sets which were
formed at an earlier stage.
¿e basic dierence from the ramied predicative hierarchy of properties is that
set theory is thoroughly extensional, and so treats the sets which it describes as a
‘complete system of denite self-existent objects’. Hallett brings out this connection
when he writes:
What is axiomatized [in (Cantorian) set theory] in eect is the notion
of completed and xed range or extension. ¿e fundamental primitive
is set [...] and these sets [...] are treated extensionally as objects existing
completed, and independently of and separated from, any intension
which may help us to dene or recognize them.39
Hallett goes on to show the awkwardness faced by those who lean too heavily on
the intuitive ideas of iteration as a motivation for Cantorian set theory. ¿e intuitive
idea is of a constructive process which takes place in time. ¿e diculty comes, of
course, when we try to justify the full Separation axiom in this way. For example,
Boolos,40 one of the most careful exponents of the iterative justication, adopts an
axiom scheme of Collection, which tells us which sets are formed at a certain stage,
s: §y∀x(x > y (ϕ(x)& §t(tEs& xFt))),
(where tEs is to be read as ‘stage t is earlier than stage s,’ and xFt as ‘the set x is
formed at stage t; as usual, ϕ may not contain free occurrences of y). As ϕ here
is entirely arbitrary, it can mention, and quantify over, sets formed at any stage,
including those later than s— that is to say, sets which, according to the intuitive
story, have not yet been formed. ‘Formation’ seems here to be amisleadingmetaphor:
as Hallett says, ‘ “formation” here can only really refer to the structural hierarchical
organization of a given universe of objects.’41
¿e case of the ramied predicative hierarchy of sets is rather dierent. Here the
metaphor of building up from the natural numbers can be successfully sustained —
indeed, predicativism just is the mathematics which can be built constructively from
39 Hallett, Cantorian set theory, pp. 195–6 (his emphasis). 40 Boolos, ‘¿e iterative conception’.
41 Hallett, Cantorian set theory p. 222; Hallett’s emphasis.
166 CHAPTER 6. THE METAPHYSICS BEHIND PREDICATIVISM
the natural numbers; and so constructivism about these sets (or indeed psychologism,
of some appropriately liberal form) seems to be a coherent position.
What the iterative conception of set was supposed to explain was why we should
believe what modern Cantorian set theory says about the sets: what sets there are
and what sets there are not. Paradoxical sets, such as the Russell set of non-self-
membered sets, are ruled out by the iterative story because there is no stage at which
they could be formed. ¿e guiding idea is that the story shows how sets are in
some sense dependent on their members; they cannot come into existence until
their members are there to be collected. But the temporal metaphor is disclaimed
as metaphorical and potentially misleading. (It is also inadequate: a sequence of
moments of time which is well-ordered by the normal temporal ordering cannot be
more than countably innite.) Neither can the dependence be explained modally: it
is true that if the members of a set did not exist, the set would not exist either; but it
seems that the reverse is also true, and in any case, the platonist would presumably
insist that the members of the pure hierarchy of sets are all necessarily existent.
¿e defender of the iterative story seems to be driven to say that the ontological
dependence is a sui generis ontological primitive.42
¿e Cantorian’s notion of the ontological dependence of a set on its members
must be extended by the predicativist. ¿e intersection considered above, of the
k-properties of N, will not be formed until the stage a er that at which all of the
k-properties are formed (except in those cases where it so happens that the set is also
dened by a dierent property, which does not quantify over the k-properties; in any
case, the property will not be formed until that stage). So on the predicativist version
of the iterative story, the ontological dependence of a set is both on its members, and
on its dening property. Of course, as sets are extensional, the same set will have
many dening properties; but this is established a er the fact. What comes rst is
the hierarchy of properties, with its dependencies of sense.
But how, given this ramied view of sets, should we view the continuum? Weyl
opted for an unramied mathematical system, because he felt that to deal with real
numbers of dierent levels would be ‘künstlich und unbrauchbar’.43 ¿at is to say, in
Das Kontinuum, all of the sets of natural numbers (and so all of the real numbers)
which are dealt with are of the rst level. Higher-level sets are simply ignored. It
42 For discussion of the iterativist’s diculties here, see Potter, Set ¿eory and its Philosophy.
43 ‘Articial and impractical,’ I.§ 7, p. 32.
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might seem at rst that this move by Weyl is under-motivated, or that he is trying to
sweep the complexity of the predicative continuum under the carpet. But in fact the
stratication of sets (of any one type) into levels depends on the particular forms
of set denition that we have chosen to allow for the rst level of sets: the meaning
of quantication over the rst-level sets will of course be dierent if we allow more
sets to be denable at the rst-level. And so to draw a hard distinction between rst-
and higher-level sets of natural numbers would indeed be articial. We will return
to this issue in Ch. 7.1.5 below.
6.7 Conclusion
¿e account which predicativism gives of the grounds of mathematical truth and
the nature of mathematical objects is one which keeps them within the grasp of
our cognitive abilities, at least when those abilities are appropriately idealized so
as to ignore the particular nite limits to which human thought is subject. Weyl’s
predicativism abandons the project of deducing arithmetic from something more
fundamental, and simply takes the natural numbers and the relation of immediate
succession as basic, and as given to us by means of intuition. What exactly that
intuition amounts to is not a matter which can be examined here; I will merely note
here the attraction of the Kantian answer that it is connected to our understanding
the passage of time.
¿e properties and relations whichWeyl considers are built up from that relation
of succession; and the sets are ideal objects abstracted from those properties. ¿e
‘building up’ of the properties is a wholly constructive process, and the individual
steps are applications of elementary logical operations. ¿e only doubt that can be
raised against the cogency of this conception is whether we can be sure that the result
of applying such classical logic over the innite domain of the natural numbers is
always meaningful. Quantication and negation are the troubling operations, and
LEM the problematic principle, and it is these that were discussed and justied in
Chapter 5. What remains is to see how much mathematics can be developed in
accord with this conception.
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Chapter 7
Predicative mathematics and its
scope
¿e basic question with which this chapter is concerned is: How much of classical
mathematics can be developed in a manner acceptable to predicativists? Or to put it
the other way around: What parts of classical mathematics cannot be predicativistic-
ally justied, i.e., what parts are essentially impredicative?
It is clear that there are some such essentially impredicative areas of modern
mathematics: areas which are essentially dependent on uncountable sets: examples
are higher set theory (dealing with large cardinals and so on) and also other heavily
set-theoretic branches of mathematics such as general topology. It will surprise
no-one that these will not be justied from a predicativist standpoint. Conversely,
primary school arithmetic certainly will be predicativistically acceptable.
But it is important to give a more precise answer than this: we need to do so in
order to nd out just how revisionary a position predicativism really is, and that is a
necessary part of any full assessment of predicativism as a general position within
the philosophy of mathematics.
¿ere are two particular fears in connection with this which have to be overcome
if we are to vindicate predicativism as an acceptable position. ¿e rst and most
serious fear is that predicativistically acceptable mathematics is too weak to justify
parts of classical mathematics which are directly used in the natural sciences. ¿e
second worry is that predicativistic restrictions might rule out parts which are
essential to (modern) mathematics as a systematic whole, leaving an unnatural
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assortment of fragments; such a rag-bagmight contain enough tools for the engineers,
but it would lack coherence and integrity as a subject in its own right.
¿ese indispensability arguments — that impredicative methods are necessary,
either to the scientic enterprise, or to a satisfying and coherent mathematical
enterprise — will be discussed in the second section of this chapter.
First, however, we need to nd out just how revisionary predicativistmathematics
has to be.
7.1 What predicativists can get
One way to try to answer our main question is simply to have a go: to set up a formal
system which is predicativistically acceptable, and to see how much of classical
mathematics can be derived in that system. ¿is was more or less Weyl’s approach
in Das Kontinuum.1
¿e trouble with such an approach is that it cannot deliver conclusive negative
answers: our failure to prove a certain theorem in a given systemmight simply mean
that we haven’t been clever or lucky enough to hit on the proof; and even if we can
show that there is no such proof in the system, that would not rule out the possibility
that some other predicativistically acceptable formal system could deliver a proof of
the desired theorem.
What we want is some sort of an analysis of what is needed for what: and the
so-called ‘reverse mathematics’ programme holds out the promise of just such an
analysis.
7.1.1 Reverse mathematics
¿e basic question which the reverse mathematics programme seeks to answer is:
What set existence axioms are needed to prove various parts of classical mathemat-
ics?2 ¿e forward part is fairly unremarkable: a certain known theorem is proved
from one of a range of axiom systems. ¿e axioms systems used form a nested
sequence of increasing strength; each system is presented as an extension of the
previous system bymeans of a stronger set existence principle. ¿e distinctive feature
1 For a clear modern presentation of Weyl’s project and its results, see Feferman, ‘Weyl vindicated’.
2 ¿e best introduction to the topic is the rst chapter of the encyclopedic Simpson, Subsystems of
Second Order Arithmetic.
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of the programme is that the analysis of the strength of a theorem can be shown to be
sharp, by means of the proof of a ‘reverse’. A reverse is a proof, in a base theory, that
the theorem entails the set existence axiom of the system used in the forward proof.
A reverse establishes the equivalence (modulo the base) of the theorem and the
axiom system, and shows that the system in question is the weakest which permits
the proof of the theorem. ¿e axiom systems studied by reverse mathematics are
those which turn out to permit proofs of such reverses; the notable systems are the
weak base RCA0, and then (in order of increasing strength),WKL0, ACA0, ATR0
and Π11-CA0.
¿e reverse mathematics programme can be seen as a natural continuation and
extension of Hilbert’s programme;3 and some of the formal systems used (RCA0
and ACA0) have some claim to epistemological naturalness. But the programme
is a mathematical one, and the axioms and systems are in large part the result of
the research programme itself: the axioms studied are the ones which turn out to
support the reversals. ¿e fact that they do — and in a wide range of branches of
mathematics — suggests that the axiom systems are ‘mathematical natural kinds’;
but further work is required to examine the extent to which they might also be
epistemological natural kinds.
¿e reverse mathematics programme has also concentrated primarily on systems
of second-order arithmetic. ¿is is not a serious limitation, as hereditarily countable
sets can be coded up by classes of natural numbers; for example, the weak set theory
ATRset0 is a denitional extension of ATR0.4 However, such reliance on coding is
undeniably rather unnatural, and we will examine whether this can be avoided.
In the context of our project here, investigating predicativism, the obvious ques-
tion is which of the systems in the taxonomy established by the reverse mathematics
programme count as legitimately predicative.
7.1.2 Justifying ACA0
Predicativism, as an outlook on the philosophy of mathematics, endorses the natural
numbers as unproblematically given. As we argued in Chapter 5, this means endors-
ing the meaningfulness of unrestricted quantication over them, and so accepting
the Law of the Excluded Middle as valid for such (arithmetical) sentences.
3 For argument for this point see Simpson, ‘Partial realizations’. 4 Simpson, Subsystems of Second
Order Arithmetic §VII.3.
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Every instance of the induction schema for the arithmetic sentences is also
predicatively justied — it is, a er all, of the essence of the natural numbers that
they satisfy induction for fully meaningful predicates. So standard rst-order Peano
Arithmetic, PA, which consists of platitudes about zero and the successor function,
recursive denitions of addition and multiplication, and the induction schema for
open sentences of the language of arithmetic, is entirely acceptable to the predicativ-
ist.
Given this, the natural rst theory to consider is PA extended by the addition of
predicative sets of natural numbers: this is the theory known as ACA0, and it has a
central role in the Reverse Mathematics programme.
ACA0 can be axiomatized by: (i) the usual rst-order Peano axioms for zero and
the successor function, and the recursive denitions of the addition and multiplica-
tion functions and the less-than relation; (ii) the induction axiom
∀X([0 > X& ∀x(x > X  sx > X)]  ∀x(x > X));
and (iii) the arithmetical comprehension axiom:
§X∀x(x > X ϕ(x))
(where ϕ(x) is an arithmetical sentence, i.e. one not containing any bound second-
order variables, though free variables of both types may appear as parameters). ¿e
Arithmetical Comprehension Axiom gives the letters in ‘ACA0’: the subscript zero
refers to the fact that induction is expressed by an axiom rather than by a scheme;
the signicance of this is that it does not apply to arbitrary open sentences of the
second-order language, but only to those predicates which have been recognized as
forming sets. In the context of the Arithmetical Comprehension Axiom, this means
that induction will not be provable for predicates which contain bound second-order
variables, in accordance with the predicativist idea that quantication over the full
continuum is not guaranteed to lead to determinately meaningful results.
7.1.3 Believing in ACA0; the metamathematics of ACA0
¿e intended interpretation of ACA0 is the obvious one: the rst-order variables
range over the natural numbers; and the second-order variables range over ARITH,
the family of arithmetically denable classes of natural numbers. ARITH occu-
pies a central place in recursion theory; it is also known as ∆0ª or ∆10, and can be
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characterized as 
n>NTJn(g),
where TJ is the Turing Jump operation, which takes a set X to a complete recursively
enumerable set relative to X.
Of course, as ACA0 is a (two-sorted) rst-order theory, the Löwenheim–Skolem
theorem applies, and there are non-standard models. However, the intended model
is the minimum (i.e. the unique smallest) model, in the sense that the range SMS
of the rst-order variables, in any modelM = `SMS,SM,0M, sM,+M, ċM,<Me, has a<M-initial subset isomorphic to the natural numbers; and that the range S of the
second-order variables for every ω-model of ACA0 (i.e. for every model M withSMS = N) contains ARITH as a subset.
A simple argument shows that ACA0 is equiconsistent with PA (indeed, that any
extension of a theory by the addition of predicative classes is equiconsistent with the
original theory): any model of PA can be extended to a model of ACA0 simply by
allowing the class variables to range over the denable subsets of the domain.5
While ACA0, and its minimum ω-model ARITH are simple and appealing,
there is a sense in which they are obviously incomplete: it is straightforward to
produce examples of classes of natural numbers which are not arithmetic, simply
by diagonalizing. If we enumerate all of the arithmetic formulae with one free
number variable (and hence the classes of ARITH which those formulae dene) as
ϕ0(x),ϕ1(x), . . . , then the class x > N S ϕx(x) is obviously not in ARITH, and
so cannot be proved by ACA0 to exist.
How we should respond to this incompleteness is an issue to which I will shortly
return.
7.1.4 Predicative mathematics: ACA0 andDas Kontinuum
¿e system ACA0 is the natural choice for a rational reconstruction of the mathem-
atics Weyl puts forward in Das Kontinuum.6 ¿e results of classical analysis which
Weyl proved in Das Kontinuum, and which can be formalized in ACA0, include the
5 As was mentioned above, Shoeneld, ‘Relative consistency proof ’ gives a proof-theoretic argument
for the equiconsistency that is eectively in PRA. 6 Feferman, ‘Weyl vindicated’ substantiates this
in some detail. One wrinkle is that Weyl’s original treatment of set-denition by recursion turns out to
be more generous than it should be, allowing the denition of non-arithmetical relations.
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following: a continuous function on a closed interval attains its maximum, its min-
imum, and its mean-value, and is uniformly continuous; the Riemann integral exists
for a piece-wise continuous function; and the Fundamental ¿eorem of Calculus.
All of the familiar functions of analysis can be dealt with in ACA0: the trigonometric
and exponential functions, and in fact all functions which can be given by power
series.
¿e enumerability of ‘all possible sets of natural numbers’, together with Cantor’s
diagonal proof of their uncountability, is what Weyl calls ‘Richard’s antinomy’ in
his discussion of the matter in Das Kontinuum.7 But as Feferman remarks, Weyl’s
discussion is thoroughly unsatisfactory.8
Weyl takes Cantor’s theorem as a piece of mathematics to be formalized. It can
be proved even in systems of second-order arithmetic much weaker than ACA0
(quantier-free class comprehension is sucient for the result) that any class coding
a sequence A0,A1, . . . of classes of naturals is incomplete, in that there is a class of
naturals which is not Ai for any i > N. Such a sequence of classes is implemented
in second-order arithmetic as a class B of pairs `m,ne S m > An. ¿e proof of
incompleteness is the usual diagonal construction: the class n S n ¶ An can be
proved to exist, but obviously cannot be in the enumeration.
What Weyl does not discuss is the possibility of seeing Cantor’s method of
diagonalization as something which can be applied to the system from outside, as it
were, to go from an enumeration of the classes denable in a formal system to a class
which is not so denable. Weyl seems not to recognize that that class ought to exist;
and that it has indeed been adequately dened, though of course not in terms of the
principles of denition which the system permits. It is precisely the way that the
argument leads us to a broader concept of denition that is the interest of Richard’s
paradox, and that (for the predicativist) shows the indenitely extensible nature of
the classes of natural numbers.
¿e predicativist need not follow Weyl’s at-footedness here. If not, the pre-
dicativist may still endorse the axioms of ACA0, and in particular the axiom of
arithmetic class comprehension; but she will not do so under the belief that those
are all of the classes that there are. ACA0 will be used by such a predicativist as
a convenient formal system for mathematics, but she will not suppose it to be an
7 Ch. 1, §5, pp. 26–28. See also the discussion of Richard’s Paradox in Ch. 3.3.2 above. 8 Feferman,
‘Weyl vindicated’ p. 262.
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exhaustive description of the continuum.
7.1.5 ¿e Law of Excluded Middle
One aspect ofACA0may seem tomake it problematic for the predicativist: it validates
the Law of Excluded Middle for the language as a whole.9
As we have seen, the predicativist regards the classes of natural numbers as an
open domain: that is, one which we can only ever hope to partially characterize.
For this reason, classical quantication over the classes of naturals is not, in general,
meaningful. Of course, some sentences involving the second-order quantiers will
be validated: the instances of the arithmetical class comprehension scheme are Σ11
truths; and various trivialities, such as the Π11 sentence ∀X(0 > X - 0 ¶ X), can also
be proved. We might not know just what classes of natural numbers there are; but
we certainly do know that every class either contains or does not contain zero.
¿e issue hinges on how the predicativist is to understand the second-order
quantiers of a theory such as ACA0. It seems that they could either be taken as
ranging over the indenitely extensible domain of all subsets of the natural numbers;
or as ranging only over the arithmetic sets. In the rst case, there is no reason to
think that every second-order quantied sentences expresses a determinate meaning;
and so no reason to think that such a sentence is either true or false, unless we can
give a proof of it or its negation. Second-order quantication introduces a sort of
vagueness; in the case of some sentences, this vagueness is inessential, in that any
way of removing the vagueness will give the same truth-value to the sentence: these
are the second-order quantied sentences that can be proved or disproved. But there
is evidently no reason to suppose that that is always the case.
To understand the quantiers in the secondway is to conclude from the indenite
extensibility of the continuum that we should not try to quantify over it, and that we
should instead see our quantication as restricted to some fully denite ersatz, such
as the arithmetical sets of naturals.
Another way to put the contrast is to ask whether or not the minimal model
of ACA0 is the unique intended model. ¿e point is that the second-order sen-
tences which are undecidable in ACA0 are those which have dierent truth values
in dierent ω-models.
9 See Ch. 6.5, Ch. 5, and Ch. 3.2.1 for discussion of the relationship between quantication over open
domains and the failure of LEM.
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It is this issue which is behind the contrast drawn in Das Kontinuum between de-
limited and non-delimited judgements. In his explanation of how logically complex
judgements are built up, Weyl species a ‘narrower procedure’, which gives rise to
‘delimited’ judgements, and a broader procedure. ¿e narrower procedure restricts
the use of quantication to the basic category, that is, the natural numbers, whereas
the broader procedure allows quantication also over the derived categories (sets
and functions). Only delimited properties are permitted in class denitions.
Weyl notes that this restriction could be li ed in accordance with predicativist
principles, if wewerewilling to distinguish rst-level sets of natural numbers (dened
by delimited properties) from second- and higher-level sets of natural numbers — if,
that is, we were willing to ramify.
Ramication would force us to view second-order quantication as being always
over some level of the ramied hierarchy. Weyl argues against ramication as unnat-
ural and awkward in practice, and seems inclined to view quantication over sets of
naturals as being over the full, indenitely extensible continuum. He writes:
¿e primary signicance of the narrower procedure is most clearly con-
veyed by the following observation: ¿e objects of the basic categories
remain uninterruptedly the genuine objects of our investigation only
when we comply with the narrower procedure; otherwise, the profusion
of derived properties and relations becomes just as much an object of
our thought as the realm of those primitive objects. In order to reach
a decision about ‘delimited’ judgements, i.e., those which are formed
under the restrictions of the narrower procedure, we need only survey
these basic objects; ‘non-delimited’ judgements require that one also
survey all derived properties and relations.10
Later, in the development of analysis in his system, Weyl points to an important
consequence of this:
the continuity of a function is not a delimited property; i.e., in order
to decide whether a function dened with the help of our principles
is continuous or not we have to inspect not just the totality of natural
numbers, but also the totality of sets [...] which arise from an arbitrarily
complex joint application of those principles. If we regard the prin-
ciples of denition as an ‘open’ system, i.e., if we reserve the right to
10 Note 24 to p. 30.
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extend them when necessary by making additions, then in general the
question of whether a given function is continuous must also remain
open (though we may attempt to resolve any delimited question). For a
function which, within our current system, is continuous can lose this
property if our principles of denition are expanded and, accordingly,
the real numbers ‘presently’ available are joined by others in whose
construction the newly added principles of denition play a role.11
Weyl immediately adds in a note:
Of course, in the case of every function one encounters in analysis, this
question does not remain open, since the negative judgment which as-
serts their continuity is a logical consequence of the ‘axioms’ into which
the principles of denition change when formulated as positive existen-
tial judgments concerning sets. But this is just a special characteristic
of these ‘absolutely’ continuous functions.12
¿e arithmetical continuum is only a limited part of the continuum, as any part
which is amenable to predicative mathematics must be; and as we are primarily
interested in the continuum, rather than the ersatz, it makes sense to view our
quantiers as ranging widely, and so as making systematically ambiguous claims,
rather than ranging only over the delimited sets of naturals.
Most concretely, it would not be sensible to extend ACA0 by adding a restrictive
axiom which explicitly claimed that every set is an arithmetical set. Such an axiom
could be framed by coding up the syntax of the language and constructing a numer-
ical predicate ϕ true just of codes of arithmetical sentences with one free number
variable, and then expressed as
∀X§a(ϕ(a)& ∀x(x > X Sat(x,a)),
where Sat is a satisfaction predicate. An axiom like this would aim to rule out all
but the minimal ω-model of ACA0.
But what is the upshot of this discussion for the Law of the Excluded Middle? It
seems at rst as if the predicativist should refuse to endorse consequences of LEM
such as ∀XΦ(X) - §XΦ(X) whereΦ contains class quantiers. (ACA0 validates
this.) But this should not trouble us toomuch: there is very little that one can actually
11 p. 87. 12 Note 7 to p. 87.
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do with it. And it can be justied by reecting that, on any way of removing the
vagueness from set quantication, it will be validated. ¿e formal analogue is, again,
that every ω-model of ACA0 will make one of the disjuncts true.
7.1.6 Delimiting the scope of predicativism
So far, I have argued that ACA0 can be justied on predicative grounds; and we
have seen that there are grounds within informal predicative mathematics for seeing
ACA0 as incomplete. ¿e obvious question, then, is howmuchmoremathematics the
predicativist can get. Drawing a limit to predicativemathematics is clearly something
that cannot be done within predicative mathematics itself.
In ‘¿e philosophical signicance of Gödel’s theorem’, Dummett suggests that
the moral to be drawn from the Incompleteness ¿eorems is that the means we
should nd acceptable for proving arithmetical results are indenitely extensible.
Dummett’s view is in accord with Gentzen’s ‘shading-o ’ interpretation of the proof-
theoretic ordinals from ωω up to and (problematically) including є0.13 (It seems
clear that Gentzen would have been willing to extend this analysis beyond є0.)
¿is view seems to be in tension with the idea that there are principled inter-
mediate stopping places on the road which leads from nitist mathematics, at one
extreme, to higher set theory at the other. (For example, Isaacson has famously ar-
gued that (rst-order) Peano Arithmetic is complete for a certain sort of arithmetical
insight.)14 ¿e philosophical signicance of the Reverse Mathematics programme is
surely the claim that the subsystems studied are such principled stopping places.
¿is tension could just be apparent, however. I suggest that we should take the
proof-theoretic ordinal of a formal system as a measure of its strength, that is, as
a formal analogue of Dummett’s ‘means of proof ’. ¿ese ordinals are transnite;
and so there are among them increasing ω-sequences which are bounded above.
¿ere is therefore the possibility of what seems ‘from below’ to be an indenitely
extensible succession of justied formal systems, which, when looked at ‘from above’,
are bounded above by a system which is their union.
I suggest that we can get a handle on the signicant stopping places on the road
by thinking harder about the proof-theoretic ordinals, and in particular the epistemic
13 ‘I fail to see, however, at what “point” that which is constructively indisputable is supposed to end,
and where a further extension of transnite induction is therefore thought to become disreputable.’
(Gentzen, ‘Neue Fassung’ p. 286.) 14 Isaacson, ‘Some considerations on arithmetical truth and the
omega-rule’.
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means by which we come to grasp them (or rather, to grasp them as the order-types
of well-orderings). Before addressing our central question in the next subsection, of
how much mathematics is predicatively justied, I will rst discuss a simpler case,
which will illustrate the general idea.
PRA is conventionally taken as the best analysis of nitary arithmetic; it takes
induction to be legitimate when applied to quantier-free arithmetical formulae,
and to Π01 formulae.15 (¿ese are argued to be nitistically justied because they
can be expressed as free-variable, or schematic generalizations; they therefore do
not require the acceptance of the natural numbers as a denite domain.) ¿e proof-
theoretic ordinal of PRA is ωω. If we are prepared to go beyond PRA to stronger
systems, the natural way to go is to increase the strength of the induction scheme
by allowing in greater quantier complexity. If we add to PRA the Π02-induction
scheme, we get a system with the proof-theoretic ordinal ωωω; and indeed for all
n > N, the proof-theoretic ordinal of PRA together with the Π0n induction scheme is
ω uparrowuparrow n. It seems clear that, a er PRA, none of these systems is a natural stopping
place.
¿e limit of the sequence is the rst xed-point of the operation α ( ωα, which
is known as є0. ¿is is the proof-theoretic ordinal of PA. Unlike the previous steps,
taking this limit does, I suggest, require a new idea. If this is correct, then there is an
epistemological position on which the theorems of PA are all acceptable, because
they are obtainable in one of the sequence of formal systems (PRA together withΠ0n
induction for n > N); but on which PA as a whole is not acceptable. What can this
unacceptability mean, given that all of the theorems of PA are endorsed? I suggest
that it means that, on this epistemological position, the consistency of PA is not
acceptable or obtainable.
¿is line of thought is closely related to Dummett’s argument that the ‘simple
argument’ for Con(PA) fails.16 ¿e simple argument is that acceptance of PAmeans
acceptance of the truth of the axioms, and therefore a commitment to their con-
sistency. In opposition to this, Dummett points out that to accept any proof in PA
requires condence only in the axioms used in that proof, and in particularly in only
nitely many instances of the induction schema. ¿ere is therefore a gap between a
belief in the overarching consistency of the axioms, and a simple working acceptance
15 For argument, see especially Tait, ‘Constructive reasoning’; Tait, ‘Finitism’; Tait, ‘Remarks on
nitism’. 16 Dummett, ‘Gödel’s theorem’.
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of PA. An agent who has merely this working acceptance of the theory is disposed
to accept any individual axiom when it is presented to her for evaluation; and she is
prepared to accept as true the conclusion of any proof from the axioms of the theory;
but in the absence of further reection on her commitments, she has no route to
justifying belief in the consistency of the system as a whole. PA therefore stands as
the limit of the mathematics obtainable on this position. In a similar way, Simpson
has claimed that ATR0 stands as the limit of predicativity.
7.1.7 Going beyond ACA0
ACA0 is an unramied theory. We can get stronger theories, which prove the ex-
istence of more collections of natural numbers, by ramifying. ¿e system RAα of
Ramied Analysis has second-order variables of dierent degrees, Xβ,Yβ,Zβ, . . . ,
for all β B α, and comprehension principles for each such degree ensuring the
existence of a collection of natural numbers Xβ dened by any open sentence with
bound second-order variables of degree less than β, and free second-order variables
(as parameters) of degree less than or equal to β. We can take these α,β to be natural
numbers coding ordinals, for example those from Kleene’s set O of recursive ordinal
notations; and so the progression of RAα will continue into the transnite. How far
can we go? ¿e limiting factor is that the system RAα is only predicatively legitimate
if α can be proved, in a predicatively acceptable manner, to be a well-ordering.
¿is raises a problem: the claim that a recursive linear ordering h of natural
numbers is a well-ordering is aΠ11 sentence and so on the face of it, is not predicatively
meaningful. ¿is problem can be avoided, however, by using quantication over
an arbitrary level of the ramied hierarchy. For such a h, abbreviate the claim that
any non-empty subset Xβ of its eld has a h-minimal element asWOβ(h). ¿en if
WO0(h) is provable, this proof will ‘li ’ to establishWOβ(h) for any β we come to
accept as a well-ordering.
¿e answer to how far we can go reduces to the question of which ordinals can
be reached ‘autonomously’. If β is the order-type of the linear order h, then to show
that β is a predicatively provable ordinal, we need to proveWO0(h) in RAα for
some ordinal α which we have already established to be predicatively provable.
An independent characterization of the limit of this progression can be given
impredicatively (‘from outside’), in terms of the Veblen hierarchy. ¿e least non-
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predicatively provable ordinal is known as Γ0.17
We can therefore identify what is predicatively provable with what is provable
in RAα for some α < Γ0. However, ramied systems are unwieldy and unnatural
(as Weyl emphasized); there has therefore been considerable interest in identifying
unramied systems which can be predicatively proved (in the sense just given) to
be justied. ¿e system ATR0, studied by the Reverse Mathematics programme,
can be given a local proof-theoretic justication: that is to say, the proof-theoretic
ordinal of ATR0 is Γ0, and so the justication of ATR0 requires the union of the
whole progression. However, every individual theorem of ATR0 can be justied
using less — that is, using predicatively acceptable means.
7.1.8 Alternatives?
¿e choice of second-order arithmetic is largely one of convenience. Systems of
second-order arithmetic are very well studied by proof-theorists, and are an adequate
framework for all of the obvious areas of mathematics which are not clearly con-
cerned with uncountability. (¿e reals ‘partake of countability’ through the rationals:
continuous functions on the reals are wholly determined by their behaviour on the
rationals, for instance. Real analysis is concerned with R as a separable metric space,
the completion ofQ; not with R simply as an uncountable set that we might consider
under the discrete topology, for instance.)18
However, the choice of the framework of second-order arithmetic requires a
certain amount of unnatural coding. In a sense, of course, this is also true of set
theory as a framework for mathematics. But set theory is untyped, and therefore
allows a uniform development of certain areas of mathematics, such as functional
analysis, which in the framework of second-order arithmetic would require a great
deal of ad hoc coding.
Feferman, in particular, has been concerned to develop systems of predicative
mathematics less removed frommathematical practice. Hismost developed system is
W,19 which is a conservative over standard rst-order Peano Arithmetic.W features
‘exible types.’ Formally, the language is two sorted: one sort of variables range
over individuals — numbers, sets, and functions, and so on; and the other sort of
17 See Feferman, ‘Predicativity’ for an overview of this investigation; the original proof is in Feferman,
‘Systems of predicative analysis [I]’. 18 Cf. the remark of Simpson, quoted p. 102 above. 19 Discussed
in Feferman, ‘Weyl vindicated’
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variable ranges over types: for example, the type of natural numbers, the type of sets
of natural numbers, and the type of functions on the naturals. ¿ere are operators
on individuals such as those which give ordered pairs and projections, denition
by cases and recursion, and function application; and there are operators on types,
for example those which give the type of ordered pairs of two given types, the type
of functions from one type to another, and subtypes (those individuals in a given
type which satises a predicative formula). ¿is rich framework allows a direct and
natural development of a great deal of modern functional analysis.
Such work is extremely valuable, and is indeed absolutely necessary if predicative
mathematics is to have any sort of independent life of its own, rather than remaining
merely as parasitic upon mathematics as carried out by ‘ordinary mathematicians’,
without regard for the varying degrees of innitary commitment required.
However, I believe that the results of Simpson’s ReverseMathematics programme
are a sound analysis of the innitary requirements behind at least those (very substan-
tial) parts of mathematics which can be directly stated in a second-order arithmetical
manner. Work on alternative frameworks may ll in more details, but seems unlikely
to change the general picture Simpson’s work gives us of the extent of predicatively
justiable mathematics.
7.1.9 ¿e predicative continuum
We are now in a position to explain a little further the picture of the predicativist
continuum sketched in Ch. 5.3. ¿e most important part of that picture is that
the continuum is indenitely extensible. However many real numbers we have
recognized, we can always come to recognize more. ¿is creates problems for the
completeness properties that characterize the continuum on the classical view.
¿e predicative continuum is sequentially complete: that is, every sequence of
reals which is bounded above has a least upper bound. (¿is is provable in ACA0.)
However, the situation with arbitrary sets of reals is not so clear. In the framework of
second-order arithmetic, a ‘set’ of reals can be given by means of an open sentence
with one free set-variable,Φ(X), satisfying the appropriate conditions: the intended
interpretation is of those real numbers which satisfy the formula. It is not evident
on the predicative view that such sets obey the least upper bound principle.
¿inking about the ramied continuum, where the reals are introduced in stages,
makes this clearer: for any given stage m, Φm(Xm) (where the (free and bound)
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second-order variables inΦ are restricted to range only over items of levelm) will
be satised by reals of levelm, and so will have a denable least upper bound at level
m + 1; but it may well not have one at levelm. And this situation is repeated at level
m + 1: there is no reason to think, in the general case, that all of the reals satisfying
Φwill have been ‘formed’ before some particular level, and so no reason to think
that there will be a least upper bound to all of theΦ.
Classically speaking, the general completeness principle is equivalent to its
special case, sequential completeness, by the following argument. Given an arbitrary
set S of reals which is non-empty and bounded above, we can set x0 to be some
member of S and y0 to be some upper bound for S. Now consider the midpoint of
x0 and y0: if this is an upper bound for S, set y1 to be the midpoint, and set x1 to x0;
otherwise, set x1 to the midpoint, and y1 to y0. Continuing in this way, halving the
interval each time, we generate two convergent sequences which must converge to
the same limit; and it is not hard to see that this limit is the least upper bound for S.
¿e problem with this argument, from the predicativist’s point of view, is that in
general we just don’t know what a formula such as Φmeans, because it may contain
embedded second-order quantiers. While in some special cases, as we have seen,
we can show that any way of precisifying these quantiers will give rise to the same
set of objects satisfying the formula, in general, we cannot. And so we can’t tell
whether or not a given real number — such as the midpoints in the construction
above — satises the criterion dening the ‘set’; and therefore we cannot actually
construct the sequences.
7.2 What we all need — indispensability arguments
¿e previous section examined the question of how much mathematics can be
justied on a predicativist view. ¿is section will look at the question of how much
mathematics we need. If predicativism is to be tenable, we need to dispel the worry
that it gives us less than we need. ¿e last section suggested that predicativism gives
us more than we might have thought; this section suggests that we need less than we
might have thought.
¿e question of what we need will be discussed in two parts: what we need for
science; and what we need for mathematics itself.
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7.2.1 Science — Quine–Putnam
¿e indispensability arguments ofQuine and Putnam argue formathematical realism
from the premise of scientic realism. ¿e idea is that if we are naturalists, we
ought to take seriously the claims of our best scientic theories; our best scientic
theories are highly mathematical, and so make purely mathematical claims as well
as scientic claims; so we ought to take mathematics seriously. ¿is ‘seriousness’ is
both ontological — we should believe in the mathematical entities which feature in
our scientic theories — and semantic — we should take the mathematical claims
which follow from our theories, and the mathematics used in our theories, to be
true.20
¿e position is the opposite of instrumentalism, which is precisely a refusal
to take seriously claims of a certain sort. In recent philosophy of mathematics,
instrumentalism about the role of mathematics in science has gone under the banner
of ctionalism.
Field’s eliminativist nominalism can be seen as an alternative response to the
Quine–Putnam argument. Field’s programme is to show that mathematics does not
feature essentially in scientic theories; that is, that the mathematical formulations
can be dispensed with by reformulating the theory in purely physical terms.
¿e ontological form of the Quine–Putnam argument goes something like this:
(P1) we ought to believe in all of the entities which feature in our current best
(scientic) theories of the world;
(P2) mathematical entities feature in our current best (scientic) theories of the
world; so,
(C) we ought to believe in mathematical entities.
As presented here, the argument is valid, and (P2) looks very dicult to deny.
(P1) is supported by two major themes of Quine’s philosophy, naturalism and holism.
Naturalism in fact motivates a stronger version of (P1): that we ought to believe
in all of and only the entities which appear in our current best (scientic) theories of
the world; but the additional strength is not wanted in this argument. Naturalism is
20 ¿ere is an obvious tension between mathematical naturalism and the Dummettian ‘logicism’
endorsed in Ch. 5.3.1. Presumably the hard-nosed Quinean line would be to deny that there is any such
thing as ‘mathematics’ in this privileged sense.
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the endorsement of scientic, and the rejection of non-scientic modes of inquiry,
as means of discovering what there is in the world.
Holism motivates or strengthens the ‘all’ of (P1): it rejects the idea that we could
make a distinction among our theories or the entities they invoke between the parts
which naturalism counsels us to take seriously, and parts which we are free to take
as purely instrumental. Our theories are conrmed en masse, and as such we cannot
pick and choose.
¿e Quine–Putnam indispensability arguments have received a great deal of
philosophical attention. Despite having received a great deal of criticism, the argu-
ment has also been defended by many. It is perhaps the most commonly accepted
reason for mathematical realism among analytically inclined philosophers working
today.
I will not be concerned here so much to assess the soundness of the argument:
there is an enormous literature doing that. I will therefore take it that the argument is
at least prima facie compelling; and I want instead to see exactly what the conclusion
amounts to. ¿at is to say, what will concerns us here is the question of how much
mathematics is justied by the indispensability arguments.
¿e rst point to note is that Quine endorses set-theoretic reductionism as a
conceptual economy; so the ‘how much?’ question becomes ‘how much set theory?’
¿e next point is that Quine draws a distinction between the parts of set theory
which receive empirical support, and those parts which do not, such as higher set
theory:
I recognize indenumerable innities only because they are forced onme
by the simplest known systematizations of more welcome [sc: scientic]
matters. Magnitudes in excess of such demands, e.g., °ω or inaccessible
numbers, I look upon only as mathematical recreation and without
ontological rights.21
In view of this, it should be stressed that Quine is not fully naturalistic with respect
to mathematical practice. Quine takes the indispensability argument to support only
a certain amount of currently existing mathematics.22
In discussing the indispensability argument, Feferman has claimed23 that all
21 Quine, ‘Reply to Parsons’ p. 400. 22 ¿is is in contrast to Maddy, Naturalism in Mathematics,
who urges that we should not look outside mathematical practice for the justication of parts of
mathematics. 23 Feferman, ‘Innity in mathematics’.
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scientically applied mathematics is predicatively acceptable, and can be formalized
in something like his formal systemW:
the necessary use of higher set theory in the mathematics of the nite has
yet to be established. Furthermore, a case can be made that higher set
theory is dispensable in scientically applicable mathematics, that is, in
that part of everyday mathematics which nds its applications in the
other sciences. Put in other terms: the actual innite is not required for
the mathematics of the physical world.24
What this hinges on is the fact that more or less all of the positive results of
functional analysis are provable in systems such asW: it is these parts of mathematics
which are heavily used in physics. ¿e negative results — the counterexamples, the
pathological cases — are for the most part not provable. For example, the existence
of non-measurable sets cannot be proved by predicatively acceptable means. (In the
framework of second-order arithmetic, indeed, there seems to be no natural way
even to dene discontinuous functions on the reals, never mind to prove results
about them.)
While it is true that some highly theoretical physics uses mathematics far in
excess of what is predicatively obtainable, this work seems to be very speculative, and
certainly a long way from what is needed to explain the phenomena. A distinction
should be drawn betweenwhat physicists say as physicists, which naturalism requires
us to accept as a basis for an indispensability argument, and what physicists say when
they are engaged in something more akin to pure mathematics. ¿is may indeed be
inspired by physics; but that is not in itself enough to make it worthy of the respect
that we give to the working parts of the machinery.
In the postscript to ‘Weyl vindicated: Das Kontinuum seventy years later’, Fe-
ferman considers two proposed locations for potential counterexamples that all
empirically applicable mathematics can be formulated inW.25 One is the use of
non-separable Hilbert spaces in quantummechanics and in statistical mechanics; the
other is the use of non-measurable sets in a proposed hidden-variable interpretation
of quantum mechanics. Both are highly speculative on the theoretical level, and it is
currently unclear how these theoretical models could be applied if they were to be
accepted.
24 Feferman, ‘Innity in mathematics’ p. 30. Emphasis in original. 25 Pp. 281–283; added in 1996.
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7.2.2 Mathematics — Gödel–Friedman
While the scientic indispensability argument just discussed is extremely well-
known, there is also a form of indispensability argument which draws primarily
on mathematical resources. ¿e locus classicus of such a form of argument is the
analogy drawn by Gödel between mathematics and physics:
It seems to me that the assumption of such objects [i.e. classes and
concepts, realistically construed and so not subject to the VCP] is quite
as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies and there is quite as
much reason to believe in their existence. ¿ey are in the same sense ne-
cessary to obtain a satisfactory system ofmathematics as physical bodies
are necessary for a satisfactory system of our sense perceptions. . . .26
¿is line of argument against predicativism has been explicitly pressed by Hellman.27
Since Gödel’s Incompleteness¿eorem, it has been clear that no single formal sys-
tem ofmathematics will be complete, even with respect toΠ01 sentences of arithmetic.
Nonetheless, some incompletenesses are more troubling, or seem more unnatural,
than others. And since the discovery of Gödelian incompleteness, there have been
continued eorts to nd examples of undecidable sentences which are genuinely
‘mathematical’ in character, rather than metamathematical, as Gödel sentences are.
¿e Paris–Harrington sentence and Goodstein’s theorem are examples of this sort,
which are formulable but not provable in PA. Somewhat more recently, Harvey
Friedman has been engaged on a programme to nd examples which require higher
set theory (such as the Axiom of Replacement, or even large cardinal hypotheses) for
their solution. ¿is programme was indeed rst suggested by Gödel, which explains
the title of this subsection.
Most relevant to the predicativist programme is the example (also due to Fried-
man) of a nite formofKruskal’s theorem that can be shown to imply the 1-consistency
of ATR0.28 As such, it is predicatively unprovable.
On reection, the supposed contrast between these (supposedly mathematical)
examples and the (supposedly metamathematical) Gödelian statements becomes
murkier. As is well known, for theories of the usual sort, Gödel sentences and
consistency sentences can be found in Π1 form. It is certainly true that these will
26 Gödel, ‘Russell’s mathematical logic [1944]’ p. 137. 27 Hellman, ‘Predicativism as a philosophical
position’. 28 For excellent discussion, see Smoryński, ‘Varieties of arboreal experience’.
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typically be very lengthy sentences which are only considered by mathematicians
because of their metamathematical meaning: but that is no fault of the sentences;
it is just a fact about how we happen to have come by them. In themselves, these
sentences are simply universal generalizations about the natural numbers. What
is supposedly more mathematical about examples such as the Paris–Harrington
sentence is that they are more closely related to sentences which mathematicians
have considered for reasons internal to the development of mathematics (in this
case, Ramsey theory; in the case of Kruskal’s ¿eorem, graph theory).
¿e key question is whether any such examples can form the grounds of a
compelling indispensability argument for impredicative mathematics. How is it to
be established that these results, which are predicatively meaningful but beyond the
scope of predicative proof, are indispensable to mathematics?
A necessary preliminary is to establish that the results claimed indispensable
are in fact true. ¿e evidence that can be presented for such claims will be either a
formal proof, or some sort of intuitive argument. Formal proof seems to be of no
use to Hellman here: a proof serves only to move us from belief in the axioms to
believe in the conclusion, and the issue here is precisely that the predicativist sees
no reason to take the classicist’s axioms to be true.
¿e intuitive arguments which can be given in support of the claimswill of course
vary with the claims. Most of the claims studied so far have been combinatorial
in character. ¿e extent to which direct intuitive arguments for such principles
are found compelling is a somewhat subjective matter. But it seems to be perfectly
possible for the predicativist simply to dig in her heels in the face of such claims: she
need not grant them any status higher than conjectures.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
¿e picture of mathematics as ‘abstract physics’ (to use Coa’s vivid phrase) is now
so familiar as to be a philosophical commonplace. While the most famous defence
of the view is due to Gödel, it is more or less explicit in the work of Zermelo and
Russell since about 1905, with their appeal to the regressive method of justifying the
axioms. ¿e familiarity of the picture should not blind us to its unhappiness and its
unnaturalness, at least if we take a longer view of the history of mathematics. What,
a er all, is special about mathematics? Where, to take Gordan’s contrast, should we
draw the line between mathematics and theology? Or between mathematics and
physics?
A vague formulation of the traditional answer is that mathematics has some sort
of compulsory character for us as rational beings (which, most concede nowadays,
theology does not have); and that unlike physics, this compulsory character is
not based on empirical evidence. Mathematics is not simply a matter of drawing
consequences from bald existential assumptions.
My main object in this thesis has been to show that, if we take the natural
numbers as given — that is to say, if we set aside the sceptical doubts of the nitist —
then predicative mathematics has this compulsory character, whereas the classical
mathematics of the continuum does not.
I have not been able to discuss in any great depth the question of why we are
justied in taking the naturals as given; indeed, I am unsure if there is much which
can helpfully be said. I would suggest that our knowledge of nitary mathematics
is ultimately derived from our symbolic intuition of stroke strings; this is a faculty
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which underlies our capacity to understand language, and is perhaps related to our
intuition of the passage of time. But I would also suggest that we have the ability
to reect on this nitary mathematics, and so to see the natural numbers as, in
principle, completable. It is on this conception that classical arithmetic — and so
also predicativism — are based.
Further, I have argued that this apparently modest basis suces for the develop-
ment of an enormous amount of mathematics; following Feferman, I suggest that it
accounts for all of the mathematics which is scientically applicable.
¿e predicativist view that I present can be located in philosophical space some-
where between the positions of Isaacson and Dummett: it shares Isaacson’s view
that rst-order Peano arithmetic (with classical logic) is primitively compelling, and
Dummett’s criticisms of the classical mathematics of the continuum and beyond,
based on the idea of indenite extensibility.
It is unseemly and inappropriate for philosophers to try to tell mathematicians
what to do, and unrealistic to imagine that the mathematicians would listen if they
did not like what they were being told. (One might perhaps, in a Lakatosian spirit,
think of trying to inuence the bodies which fund research in pure mathematics.)
¿e proper role for philosophy of mathematics is not to tell mathematicians what
to do, but to tell them what they are doing. In this spirit, I will put my conclusion
like this. ¿e distinction between the part of mathematics that is wholly predicative
and the part which makes essential use of impredicative methods is a philosophical
watershed; it is a distinction with deep epistemological signicance. Mathematicians
who work on the far side of the divide are doing something else, and something
which has a much weaker claim to be taken seriously, and indeed which has a much
weaker claim to be taken as mathematics, in the traditional sense.
¿ere is of course much work le to do. In Chapter 4 I gave a criticism of
classicism; in the rest of the thesis I have been advocating predicativism as an
alternative: I have argued that it avoids the problems identied with classicism,
and that it is compelling as the unfolding of a few simple and intuitively attractive
ideas. However, an area that deserves more attention is to investigate whether any
of the potential positions intermediate between predicativism and full classicism
can be given similar justications. Notably, Feferman has written that while he is
sympathetic to predicativism, his ownmathematical beliefs are based on a somewhat
broader base: he nds certain principles based on iterated inductive denitions to
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be compelling. While the mathematics of such principles have been studied,1 the
philosophical work has barely begun.
More relevant to the predicativist project, though, is further philosophical work
on the intuitive meaning and acceptability of various mathematical principles or
formal systems which are widely taken to be predicatively acceptable. ¿e sort
of work I have in mind is of the same sort as that which I attempted in Ch. 5.3.
Such work could tell us, for instance, whether the predicativist can straightforwardly
endorse the legitimacy of the full second-order induction scheme in the context of an
otherwise predicative formal system (such as ACA rather than ACA0). Of particular
interest would be a thorough account of Feferman’s systemW. An assessment of
the predicative acceptability of various forms of Choice principle would also be of
interest; again, there is much technical work done here, but very little philosophical
analysis.
Even in the absence of such further work, though, I hope that what I have done
here is enough to show that predicativism is worthy of serious consideration as a
philosophy of mathematics. It vindicates the traditional conception of mathematics
as a body of truths which are rationally compelling, independently of empirical
evidence; but it also justies the mathematics that is used in the empirical sciences.
It neither cripples mathematics, nor betrays its nature.
1 Buchholz et al., Iterated Inductive Denitions
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